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This study aims to evaluate the Non-Ferrous Metals Crime Combating Committee's 
impact on combating copper cable theft in South Africa. Data was collected via in-
depth interviews with awaiting trial detainees charged with copper cable theft at the 
Pollsmoor Correctional Centre in the Western Cape; members of the Mpumalanga and 
Gauteng Provincial Non-Ferrous Metals Crime Combating Committee; members of 
Business Against Crime South Africa; and investigators attached to Combined Private 
Investigations who investigate copper theft nationally. The in-depth interviews provided 
a comprehensive understanding of participant experiences relating to the impact of the 
Non-Ferrous Metals Crime Combating Committee on the combating of copper cable 
theft in South Africa. Moreover, the researcher performed a thorough literature study 
of the phenomenon locally and internationally.  
 
Research findings indicate shortcomings in the Non-Ferrous Metals Crime Combating 
Committee's effectiveness, limiting its impact on preventing copper cable theft. Based 
on these findings, the study recommends that the Non-Ferrous Metals Crime 
Combating Committee be replaced with a specialised South African Police Service 
Non-Ferrous Metals Theft Unit. Consequently, this study puts forward a set of 
recommendations proposing a systematic pro-active plan to address and minimise 
copper cable theft in South Africa. The proposed plan convincingly presents practical 
solutions to minimise copper cable theft and contributes to the current body of 
scholarship on copper cable theft in South Africa.  
 
Key terms: Copper cable; copper dealer; combating copper theft; essential 
infrastructure; modus operandi; non-ferrous metal theft; Non-Ferrous Metals Crime 
Combating Committee; scrap metal dealers; strategies to prevent copper cable theft; 







Inhloso yalolu cwaningo ukuhlola umthelela wohlelo lwe-Non-Ferrous Metals Crime 
Combating Committee mayelana nokuqedwa kokutshontshwa kwentambo yogesi 
(copper cable). Idatha iqoqwe ngokusebenzisa izinhlolovo ezijulile ezenziwa 
ngokusebenzisa iziboshwa eziboshelwe izintambo zikagesi ezisamele ukugwetshwa 
ejele lase Pollsmoor Correctional Centre ngaseNtshonalanga Kapa, amalunga 
eMpumalanga and Gauteng Provincial Non-Ferrous Metals Crime Combating 
Committee, amalunga eBusiness Against Crime South Africa kanye nabaphenyi 
abahambisana nophiko lweCombined Private Investigations oluphenya 
ukutshontshwa kwezintambo zikagesi ezweni lonke. Lezi zinhlolovo ezijulile zinikeze 
ulwazi olubanzi lwabadlalindima olumayelana nomthelela weNon-Ferrous Metals 
Crime Combating Committee mayelana nokuqedwa kokutshontshwa kwezintambo 
zikagesi. Ngaphezu kwalokho, umcwaningi wenze ucwaningo olunzulu lombhalo 
wobuciko mayelana nokutshontshwa kwezintambo zikagesi lapha ekhaya kanye 
nasemhlabeni wonke jikelele.  
 
Ulwazi olutholakele lukhombisa iziqi ezikhinyabeza ukusebenza kahle kweKomithi 
mayelana nokuvimbela umthelela walo mayelana nokutshontshwa kwezintambo 
zikagesi. Ngezizathu ezisuselwa phezu kwalolu lwazi, lolu cwaningo lubeka phambili 
isethi lezincomo ezinganceda iKomiti ekuqiniseni umthintela walo ngokuhlongoza 
uhlelo olugqugquzelayo lokunciphisa izinga lokutshontshwa kwezintambo zikagesi 
eNingizimu Afrika. Lolu hlelo oluhlongoziwe ngaphandle kokungabaza lwethula 
izixazululo ezenzeka empilweni yangempela ukunciphisa ukwetshiwa kwezintambo 
zikagesi kanti lokhu kunegalelo kwiziko lamanje futhi luqhubekisa iziko lamanje 
lwezifundo esimayelana nokwetshiwa kwezintambo zikagesi.  
 
Amagama asemqoka: Intambo kagesi; umuntu ohweba ngezintambo zikagesi, 
Ukulwa/ukuqedwa kokutshontshwa kwezintambo zikagesi; ingqalasizinda eyiNsika; 
Ingqubo elandelwayo; ukwetshiwa kweNon-ferrous metal; Ikomiti elibhekene 
nekutshontshwa kwe i-Non-Ferrous Metals Crime Combating Committee; Abahweba 
ngezinsimbi; Amasu okuvikela ukutshontshwa kwezintambo zikagesi; uMthetho 6 ka 




Maikemišetšo a thutelo ye ke go lekola khuetšo ya Komiti ya Twantšho ya Bosenyi bja 
Dimetale tše di Sego tša Tšhipi ka ga go lwantšha kutso ya megala ya koporo. Datha 
e kgobokeditšwe ka mokgwa wa ditherišano tše di tseneletšego tšeo di sepeditšwego 
le mahodu a megala ya koporo ao a golegilwego ao a letetšego go sekišwa 
Senthareng ya Tshokollo ya Pollsmoor go la Kapa Bodikela, maloko a Diprofense tša 
Mpumalanga le Gauteng a Komiti ya Twantšho ya Bosenyi bja Dimetale tše di sego 
tša Tšhipi, maloko a Dikgwebo tša Kgahlanong le Bosenyi tša Afrika Borwa le 
banyakišiši bao ba dirišanago le Dinyakišišo tša Praebete tše Kopantšwego tšeo di 
nyakišišago kutso ya koporo kemong ya bosetšhaba. Ditherišano tše di tseneletšego 
tše di file kwešišo ka botlalo ya maitemogelo a batšeakarolo ye e sepelelanago le 
khuetšo ya Komiti ya Twantšho ya Bosenyi bja Dimetale tše di sego tša Tšhipi ka ga 
go lwantšha kutso ya megala ya koporo. Gape, monyakišiši o dirile thutelo ya dingwalo 
ka botebo ya kutso ya megala ya koporo tikologong ya leagong le kemong ya 
boditšhabatšhaba.  
 
Dikhwetšo tša dinyakišišo di šupa mafokodi ao a lebanego bokgoni bja Komiti 
tšhitišong ya khuetšo ya yona go kutso ya megala ya koporo. Go ya ka dikhwetšo tše, 
thutelo ye e hlagiša sehlopha sa dikeletšo tšeo di ka thušago Komiti go tšwetša 
khuetšo ya yona pele ka go šišinya leano la go itokišetša seemo se ka diregago ka 
mokgwa wo o beakantšwego go fokotša kutso ya megala ya koporo ka Afrika Borwa. 
Leano leo le šišintšwego le hlagiša ka mo go kgodišago ditharollo tše di ka 
phethagatšwago go fokotša kutso ya megala ya koporo ka gona la ba la seabe go le 
go tšwetša pele popego ya bjale ya borutegi ka ga kutso ya megala ya koporo. 
 
Mareo a bohlokwa: Megala ya Koporo; morekiši wa Koporo; Go Lwantšha kutso ya 
koporo; popego ye bohlokwa ya motheo; Modus operandi; kutso ya dimetale tše di 
sego tša Tšhipi; Komiti ya Twantšho ya Bosenyi bja Dimetale tše di sego tša Tšhipi; 
barekiši ba ditlhekgetlhekge tša metale; Togamaano go thibela kutso ya megala ya 
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This chapter's content is intended to serve as a general orientation and focuses on the 
researcher's research methodology. The chapter content provides a contextual 
background and underlines the dynamics and challenges presented by copper cable 
theft syndicates and individual offenders. Both the latter and former pose substantial 
challenges to the South African economy and the South African Police Service 
(SAPS), parastatals, and the private security industry. The research problem 
statement identifies the research focus, namely, the pandemic level of non-ferrous 
metals-related crimes, and the impact thereof on the South African economy, society, 
and critical infrastructure, which impacts various industries, including local government 
energy, transport, and mining.  
 
Further, the researcher presents the research aim and questions explored in this study 
and the proposed value. The research design, approach, population, and sampling 
methods are then discussed. Moreover, the researcher describes the procedure used 
to gather data and deliberates using a case study as the preferred research design. A 
preliminary literature review of the topic under investigation is also presented. The 
researcher then explains the data analysis method used to analyse the gathered data. 
This chapter concludes with a discussion of the ethical principles observed during the 
research study.  
 
1.2 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
According to Coetzee (2013:2), “…the original Non-Ferrous Theft Combating 
Committee (NFTCC) was formed in 1993 to address non-ferrous metal theft” in South 
Africa. Influential organisations have been part of its membership over the years, but 
Business Against Crime South Africa (BACSA), the SAPS, Eskom, Telkom, and 
Transnet remain at the core of the Committee. Various sectors from the metal recycling 
industry, the mining industry, and corporations such as Johannesburg City Power 
have, from time to time, collaborated with the Committee. In essence: 
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The (NFTCC) is an integrated body of key role-players that provides 
strategic guidance and direction for the process of prevention and 
eradication of theft of non-ferrous metal so that quality of supply of 
strategic services can be ensured to the benefit of all the people in 
South Africa (Geldenhuys, 2008:1). 
 
The NFTCC is contemporarily known as the Non-Ferrous Metals Crime Combating 
Committee (NFMCCC) and is now managed by the SAPS. The NFMCCC has a 
specific focus: to address specific crime (non-ferrous metal theft) and other related 
crimes on both national and provincial levels by implementing a joint venture between 
relevant stakeholders. The NFMCCC is also mandated to co-ordinate integrated crime 
combating operations focusing on suppliers, dealers, and end-users (Coetzee, 
2013:3). 
 
The SAPS Annual Report for 2014/2015 (SAPS, 2015: 157-158) stipulates that the 
National NFMCCC meets once a quarter, as do the nine Provincial NFMCCCs to share 
information between role-players and to operationalise initiatives to address non-
ferrous metal-related crime. The theft of and illicit trade in non-ferrous metals is 
facilitated by individuals and groups operating at various levels of the non-ferrous 
metals' theft value chain (SAPS, 2015: 157-158). The identified stakeholders in 
combating these crimes include role-players in government, industry, and state 
institutions; but the SAPS is the lead department. In September 2014, the various role-
players in the NFMCCC developed a non-ferrous metals theft value chain. According 
to Robertson (2018), the value chain comprises five tiers ranging from local to 
international role-players and has been developed with level 1 representing individual 
and syndicate operatives, and level 5 representing international and transnational 
syndicates. The following government stakeholders form part of the NFMCCC:
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The following industry stakeholders, including mining, security and state-owned companies, form part of the NFMCCC: 






















The non-ferrous metals theft value chain, initially illustrated by Robertson (2018), is produced below with adaption by the 
researcher. 
DIAGRAM 3: Non-ferrous metal theft Value Chain (as adapted from Robertson (2018)) 
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Non-ferrous metals-related crimes, such as copper theft, were previously regulated by 
the Second-Hand Goods Act 23 of 1955 but are now regulated by the Second-Hand 
Goods Act 6 of 2009. The SAPS Annual Report of 2016/2017 (SAPS, 2017:122) 
reports that Second-Hand Goods Dealers' Forums have been established in the 
majority policing areas to reduce property-related crimes through information sharing 
and serve as a platform to establish co-operation and communication between the 
SAPS and the second-hand goods industry. The SAPS Directorate for Priority Crime 
Investigation (DPCI) incorporates the National Operational Committee and Provincial 
Operational Committees. Their function is to effectively operationalise the functioning 
of the NFMCCC through disruptive operations in an intelligence-led and integrated 
manner (SAPS, 2017:122). Therefore, to facilitate improved policing strategies, it is of 
utmost importance that the SAPS follows a holistic approach whereby stakeholders 
and private investigators in the copper industry, e.g., CPI and the Executive 
International Forensics Investigators; collectively co-operate and identify policing 
strategies to address copper theft. 
 
Thelwell (2014:3) explains why copper is such an attractive metal for copper thieves. 
He opines that with the advent of industrialisation in the late eighteen-hundreds, 
copper became essential for constructing buildings and power generation operations 
“…because it is the best conductor of heat and electricity of all metals (except for 
silver).” According to the Copper Development Association Africa (CDAA), the average 
home contains 180 kilograms of copper which facilitate electrical wiring, water pipes, 
and appliances. Copper has a useful life of more than half a century which further 
makes it an attractive asset. Most industrialisation efforts, and the building of 
infrastructure, rely on copper. As News 24 (2014:2) quoting the Institute for Security 
Studies points out, as a result of electricity, small businesses and home industries have 
transformed into large factories; this has, in turn, created the need for copper-based 
railways for distribution, and copper-based telephone systems for communications. 
Copper is commonly found in widely industrialisation and infrastructure projects, and 
resultantly, is often seen as a thermometer for the global economy. A cooling in copper 
price indicates a drop-off in demand to build infrastructure, which does not bode well 
for the economy. According to Torkelson (2010:1), copper's price hit a 60-year low in 
1999 as demand from post-industrial societies slowed. However, in the last decade, 
China's rapid industrialisation has again spurred copper prices, which reached an all-
7 
time high of just above $10 000 a ton in mid-February 2011. According to the latest 
figures from the International Copper Study Group (ICSG), “China is the largest 
consumer of refined copper accounting for 40 per cent of world demand.” The demand 
for copper has created robust international trade, while the market for illicit copper has 
increased alongside the legal demand. According to the SACCI Copper Theft 
Barometer, copper theft costs the economy between R 5 billion ($415 million) and R 7 
billion ($581 million) a year (SAPA, 2014).  
 
Copper theft is also an international phenomenon. According to Evans (2011), crime 
statistics from the Welsh railways, for example, indicate that copper theft is a 
conspicuous area of growth, which has escalated by 168 per cent. However, Evans 
emphasises that Wales is not the only territory in the United Kingdom (UK) that has 
experienced significant copper theft challenges. Similarly, there is an epidemic of 
copper cable theft crimes across the UK's railway network, although the crime is not 
restricted to the railways. Essentially any industry which makes use of copper cabling 
is vulnerable, including electricity substations and building sites. The consequences of 
copper cable theft can be severe and could result in rail-transport disruptions, rolling 
blackouts, and the loss of phone and internet services, for example. 
 
Evans (2011) explains the increase in copper cable theft as follows: 
i. The price of copper has escalated in the last two years, 
driven by booms in construction and industrial investment in 
China and India.  
ii. The cash price of copper on the London Metal Exchange 
(LME) was less than $ 3000 per ton at the start of 2009. In 
2011, it was more than $ 9000 per ton and breached the $ 
10 000 per ton barrier later in 2011. For that kind of money, 
criminals will take risks, even with the knowledge of the life-
threatening risk of 11 000 volts of electricity involved in 
copper cable theft.  
Copper theft has also risen sharply in the United States of America (USA) in recent 
years. In 2008, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) warned that copper thieves 
target electrical substations, cellular towers, telephone landlines, railroads, water 
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wells, construction sites and vacant homes (Evans, 2011). Despite the FBI's warning, 
figures from the National Insurance Crime Bureau (NICB) show that the number of 
reported copper thefts in the USA “…more than doubled from 13 020 in 2006-2008, to 
32 568 in 2010-2012. Copper has always been liable to this kind of predation since it 
has a high value” (Evans, 2011). Copper is easily recycled by scrap-metal dealers 
because it is used in an almost pure form in infrastructure, which contributes to 
phenomenon of cable-theft. Unsurprisingly, most copper in circulation today has been 
recycled many times, and present-day mining adds extraordinarily little fresh material 
to global stocks. There is, therefore, “…a continually active market for recycled copper 
into which criminals can leak stolen cabling” (Evans, 2011). 
 
According to McNees (2017:6), there were 28 040 insurance claims for the theft of 
copper, bronze, brass, or aluminium submitted to International Standardization 
Organization (ISO) Claim Search between January 1, 2014, and December 31, 2016. 
Of the 28 040 total claims, the vast majority (98%) pertained to copper theft in the USA. 
Of these claims, 65 per cent were made against personal insurance policies, while 35 
per cent were against commercial policies. A statistically significant positive correlation 
was found when the number of metal theft claims and copper prices were compared. 
It should be noted that the price of copper began to climb again in November 2016 and 
approached an average of $ 3 per pound by August 2017 which had a direct impact 
on the cost of insuring copper interests. The latter problem continues unabated.  
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
According to De Vos, Strydom, Fouche and Delport (2011:108), a problem statement 
clearly describes the issue under investigation. In this study, the issue under 
investigation is the impact of the NFMCCC on copper theft in South Africa. Mouton 
(2014:107) states that a well-defined research problem is a pre-condition for any study. 
In line with Mouton's writings, the identified research problem in this study will be 
comprehensively defined. According to Dantzker and Hunter (2000:44), a problem 
statement identifies the research problem being addressed and defines research 
questions that the researcher is trying to answer. Dantzker, Hunter and Quinn 
(2016:14) further state that one of the most critical steps is recognising and defining 
what will be studied before starting a research project. 
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Wentz (2017:2) supports the authors' statement above and opines further that the 
problem statement drills down from the research topic towards a solution. The idea 
that you are solving a problem suggests the problem can be solved. In some cases, 
however, research results do not necessarily solve the problem but contribute to 
understanding it better. Maxfield and Babbie (2017:19) argue that one of the most 
important, yet surprisingly tricky parts of the research process is specifying and framing 
your interest in a particular problem or question. In other words, what are you 
interested in understanding? For this study, the problem to be explored is the impact 
of the NFMCCC on the combating of copper cable theft in South Africa.  
 
According to the SAPS Annual Report of 2014/2015 (SAPS, 2015:158), an increase 
of non-ferrous metals-related crimes has raised concerns for South Africa's economy, 
society, and critical infrastructure; various industries including local government, 
energy, transport, and mining. Intelligence-driven operations have been initiated in all 
provinces to combat non-ferrous metal-related crimes and reduce copper cable theft 
in South Africa. According to Scheepers (2013:3), copper is widely available, poorly 
secured, and easy to steal due to the extensive range covered by mine power 
networks. It is also easy to sell despite implementing what appears to be a controlled 
process for copper sale in South Africa. There are thousands of scrap metal dealers 
or bucket shops willing to trade in copper illicitly. 
 
The SAPS Annual Report 2014/2015 (SAPS, 2015:156) illustrates that the SAPS 
Second-Hand Goods Control Section is responsible for the following: 
i. Maintaining governance in co-operation with SAPS Legal Services. 
ii. Maintaining National and Provincial NFMCCCs. 
iii. Maintaining mechanisms, such as training for the effective identification of 
non-ferrous metals. 
iv. Sustaining an integrated approach between relevant stakeholders. 
v. Co-ordinating compliance, as well as crime combating operations. 
vi. Monitoring the import and export of non-ferrous metal. 
vii. Monitoring investigations of non-ferrous metal related crimes. 
viii. Maintaining fixed structures on national and provincial levels and conducting 
a non-ferrous metals analysis to determine crime threat tendencies.  
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However, from the researcher's experience with copper theft investigation, a significant 
shortcoming in the policing of copper theft is that the SAPS and all other stakeholders 
that form part of the NFMCCC address copper theft in isolation and do not holistically 
engage with other stakeholders in the copper industry to identify policing strategies to 
curb copper theft. Resultantly, the SAPS, and stakeholders in the copper industry work 
in silos resulting in non-sharing of crime information, the loss of crucial evidence, and 
an inability to link similar cases committed in different areas. Based on the identified 
research problem explained above, the researcher will specifically evaluate the impact 
of the NFMCCC in its quest to combat copper theft in South Africa. 
 
According to the South African Chamber of Commerce and Industry's (SACCI) acting 
CEO, Peggy Drodskie the May 2015 statistics on stolen copper in South Africa were 
2.38 per cent lower than in April 2015; and 6.1 per cent lower than the previous year. 
However, the copper theft volume increased to 180 metric tons in May 2015, from 179 
metric tons in April 2015. According to South Africa's electricity provider, Eskom 
(Drodskie, 2018) 8 988 cable theft incidents were reported between 2012 and 2016. 
 
At a South African cabinet meeting on 24 June 2015 the Criminal Matters Amendment 
Act 18 of 2015 was approved for tabling in Parliament. The amendments provide 
changes to the law on infrastructure-related offences, such as cable theft and the theft 
of telephone lines. Stricter provisions are provided for the granting of bail and 
sentencing of offenders. The Amendment Act created a new offence that criminalises 
damaging essential infrastructure by tampering or interfering with the functioning of 
basic services through criminal activity. According to the SAPS Annual Report 
(2016/2017 (SAPS, 2017:122), the Criminal Matters Amendment Act came into effect 
on 1 June 2016. The purpose of the Criminal Matters Amendment Act is to address 
the increase in crimes affecting service delivery to the public, such as theft of copper 
cables and transformers, by creating a new dispensation for essential infrastructure-
related offences. The Criminal Matters Amendment Act criminalises tampering with, 
damaging or destruction of essential infrastructures, such as installations, systems, 
structures, and facilities, which may interfere with providing essential services, such 
as transport, energy, water, sanitation, and communication. 
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Thelwell (2014:2) acknowledges a report by the SACCI, which revealed that copper 
theft increased by 26 per cent in 2013. Thelwell further illustrates the consequences 
of copper theft in South Africa reporting, "Around 15 people were trapped under the 
rubble of a collapsed structure in Soweto" after an attempted copper cable theft 
incident. In South Africa, scrap metal is often weighed for cash, and resultantly those 
in financial need will turn to nefarious means to access and appropriate copper illegally. 
According to the SAPS Annual Report 2016/2017 (SAPS, 2017:122), on average two 
copper cable thieves are electrocuted in South Africa each month, which goes to 
demonstrate the often-disastrous results of this type of criminal activity. 
 
The phenomenon of copper theft in South Africa, and the strategies to address it have 
been identified for research purposes, not only for law enforcement but also for 
parastatals, such as Transnet and Eskom. Transet and Eskom rely on copper as an 
essential infrastructure component that provides essential services to the public. As a 
result, copper theft has a significant impact on the South African criminal justice 
system. Copper theft and its impact on the South African criminal justice system is 
further confirmed by BACSA, in its National Strategy and Funding Proposal for 2012-
2015 (BACSA, 2012). BACSA highlights that non-ferrous metal theft poses a serious 
threat to the South African criminal justice system and has done so for years. 
 
Further, this form of criminal activity harms victims, not only financially, but through 
other consequential and associated losses. The theft of non-ferrous metals harms the 
private and public sectors, especially where there are consequential losses that cause 
a lack of essential services, such as telephone lines, electricity, and railway services. 
The loss of these services, in turn, harms productivity and profit margins. 
 
According to BACSA (2012), the SACCI instituted a monthly barometer detailing 
copper theft cost to the country. From this, it was reported that the cost of copper theft 
increased to R 9.5 million in November 2013; however, SACCI hopes that improved 
policing will halt the increase in copper theft. In his State of the Nation Address (SONA) 
on 12 February 2015, former President, Jacob Zuma raised concerns regarding the 
“…the extent and impact of copper theft in the country,” and stated that copper cable 
theft must be “…effectively addressed.” The then President specifically mentioned that 
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copper theft negatively influences South Africa as a nation while emphasising that 
copper theft is a significant problem.  
 
Although copper theft is a countrywide problem, the researcher has experienced 
Gauteng as the foremost basis for copper theft syndicates, which, in turn, affects all 
the other provinces. In 2006, Van Dalen, a City of Cape Town Councillor, initiated a 
specialised crime-fighting unit known as the Copperheads to deal with copper cable 
theft. The unit was phenomenally successful and brought the cost of copper theft down 
from R 22 million to just under R 500 000 during Van Dalen's term of office. According 
to Feni (2007:6), millions of rand in damages are caused in the Western Cape because 
of copper theft. The most significant losses are suffered by the electricity utility, Eskom, 
telecommunications provider, Telkom, and the SA Railway Services. The Local 
Government of Cape Town, together with the SACCI, requested the Western Cape 
Government to appoint a Commission of Enquiry and a task team to examine the 
impact of copper theft on the South African economy. In May 2007, a request for the 
appointment of a Commission of Enquiry into copper theft was put forward. According 
to Van Dalen (2017), during a preliminary discussion, the outcome of the Commission 
of Enquiry and Task team found: 
i. There is a significant problem with copper theft in the Western Cape. 
ii. Copper theft should be addressed with immediate effect using a focused 
approach. 
iii. A dedicated Unit was implemented in 2006, addressing copper theft and is still 
active. 
iv. This unit should gather statistics and data and address copper theft with a zero-
tolerance approach. 
According to Van den Berg, “The theft of non-ferrous metals - copper, and aluminium 
in particular - is a severe problem in South Africa and has escalated to such an extent 
that losses run into millions of Rand annually” (Van den Berg, 2007). Simpson, as 
quoted by Coetzee (2013:18), made it clear that non-ferrous metal theft is not merely 
a South African problem; it has become a global dilemma. For example, “…non-ferrous 
metal thieves are stripping Italy in a red gold rush that has halted train services, 
damaged catacombs, and caused at least one blackout and the worldwide demand for 
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copper has sent prices spiralling to previously unimaginable highs” (Coetzee, 2013: 
18-19).  
 
Copper cable theft harms the criminal justice system in South Africa and has a 
significant effect globally. South Africa is experiencing a significant economic 
challenge resulting from the high number of copper theft incidents. It is estimated that 
cable theft costs South Africa up to R 7 billion per annum, which negatively affects 
taxpayers. In addition, there is often a cost to human life as a result of these crimes. 
For example, two people died, nineteen were critically injured, and a further 281 
sustained injuries, when two trains collided near Pretoria in January 2011. This 
accident was due to the theft of copper cables which disrupted the signalling system. 
This accident's financial cost was more than R 22 million, which directly impacted 
South Africa's economy since the State has a responsibility to subsidise these costs 
(Parks, 2015:2). 
 
In 2010/11 Telkom reported that they suffered losses of up to R 183.5 million due to 
cable theft. In certain areas, Telkom has simply stopped replacing stolen cables due 
to high copper cable theft incidents. State utilities Eskom, Telkom, and Transnet 
reported combined losses of more than R 3.12 billion due to copper theft between 2006 
and 2011. Workers' jobs at these parastatals are threatened, as they are drained of 
funds to repair the damages caused by copper cable theft. In addition, workers and 
companies suffer financial losses due to the constant train delays caused by cable 
theft (Parks, 2015:2). 
 
The importance of researching this phenomenon is to evaluate the impact of the 
NFMCCC in combating copper theft and therein to identify shortcomings and 
challenges to address this crime. 
1.4  RESEARCH AIM 
According to De Vos et al. (2011:108), the study's aim indicates the research's central 
thrust, while the goals identify the specific issues of focus. The research aim “…is 
strongly interlinked to the problem statement to ensure that all the gaps will be 
addressed systematically” (Welman, Kruger & Mitchell, 2005:2). 
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This study aims to evaluate the impact of the NFMCCC on the combating of copper 
cable theft in South Africa. There is value in evaluating the impact of the NFMCCC on 
copper cable theft and ascertaining whether it has been successful and to what extent, 
and, if necessary, redirect the NFMCCC to improve its impact and ultimate 
effectiveness.  
1.5  RESEARCH PURPOSE 
According to Welman et al. (2005:22), the purpose of the research is threefold. Firstly, 
it seeks to describe how things are, that is, define the nature of the study object. 
Secondly, it seeks to explain why things are the way they are; it may be so because 
one thing has caused another to change, for example. Lastly, the research seeks to 
establish what the relationship is between things and predict phenomena. Denscombe 
(2010:25) emphasises that there must also be a reason for conducting research. 
 
Based on the pillars offered above by Welman et al. (2005:22), this study focuses on 
the following purposes:  
i. To describe the extent and impact of copper cable theft in South Africa. 
ii. To describe the impact of the NFMCCC on the combating of copper cable 
theft in South Africa.  
iii. To explore co-operation to combat copper cable theft between government 
and industry stakeholders who form part of the NFMCCC. 
iv. To investigate factors that hinder the implementation of effective policing 
strategies to address copper cable theft. 
v. To examine current policing strategies which seek to address copper cable 
theft.  






1.6  RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
According to Gray (2014:690), a research question “…is a specific formulation of a 
research project's issues.” Bernard (2018:55) posits five questions to ask about every 
research question one is considering pursuing. If one answers these questions 
honestly (at least to oneself), the chances are that the research produced will be of 
high quality. The five questions are: 
i. Does this topic (or research site, or data collection method) interest the 
researcher? 
ii. Is this a problem that is amenable to scientific injury? 
iii. Are adequate resources available to investigate this topic (to study this 
population at this particular research site, to use this particular data collection 
method)? 
iv. Will the research question, or the methods used, lead to irresolvable ethical 
problems? 
v. Is the topic of theoretical and/or practical interest? 
 
Flowing from the above, the researcher seeks to answer the following primary research 
question:  What is the impact of the NFMCCC on the combating of copper cable theft 
in South Africa?  
 
The secondary research questions arising from the above are: 
i. What is the extent and impact of copper cable theft in South Africa? 
ii. Is the NFMCCC effective in addressing copper cable theft? 
iii. Do government and industry stakeholders, who form part of the NFMCCC, 
efficiently engage in co-operative relationships to combat copper cable theft? 
iv. What factors hinder the implementation of effective policing strategies to 
address copper cable theft? 
v. What policing strategies are currently implemented to address copper cable 
theft?  
vi. Could current policing strategies that address copper cable theft be 
enhanced?  
vii. Which international best practices effectively address copper cable theft? 
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1.7  KEY THEORETICAL CONCEPTS 
The following concepts are central to this study: 
1.7.1 Theft 
According to Burchell (2006:782), theft consists of the “…unlawful appropriation with 
intent to steal something capable of being stolen.” In respect of its purpose and 
function, theft was initially defined as the “…secretive taking and carrying away of 
property from the owner's possession and control.” Snyman (2015:511) defines theft 
as the “…unlawful and intentional removal [appropriation] of movable property [such 
as non-ferrous metals] belonging to another” (for example, Eskom, Transnet).  
 
For this study, theft shall be taken as referring to the unlawful and intentional 
appropriation of copper cable, primarily from the infrastructures of parastatals, local 
governments and the energy, telecommunication, transport, and mining industries, 
which thus deprive the legal owners of ownership.  
1.7.2 Copper 
Copper is a non-ferrous metal and “…the 25th most abundant element present in the 
earth's crust” (Dodd, 2020:1). Semantically, copper is a “Ductile, malleable, reddish-
brown metallic element that is an excellent conductor of heat and electricity and is 
widely used for electrical wiring, water piping, and corrosion-resistant parts, either pure 
or in alloys such as brass and bronze” (The Free Dictionary, 2020).  
1.7.3 Copper dealer 
According to the Cambridge Dictionary (2020), a dealer is a company or person who 
buys or sells something. 
 
For this study, an illicit copper dealer (excluding licensed agents) refers to a copper 
thief (individuals or organised syndicates) who sells copper that has been stolen from 
the infrastructure of various industries including local government, energy, transport, 
and mining to disreputable scrap metal dealers who knowingly buy stolen copper from 
these individuals. 
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1.7.4 Non-Ferrous Metals 
According to Groover (2016:8), non-ferrous metals include other metallic elements and 
their alloys. In most cases, the alloys are more critical commercially than pure metals. 
Non-ferrous metals include pure metals and alloys of aluminium, copper, gold, 
magnesium, nickel, silver, tin, titanium, zinc, and other metals. 
1.8  VALUE OF THE RESEARCH 
The researcher undertook this study to improve the NFMCCC's efficacy by 
implementing a systematic pro-active plan that presents practical solutions to reduce 
copper cable theft in South Africa. The researcher hopes that the research will help 
the NFMCCC improve its impact on copper cable theft in South Africa.  
 
The eventual research contribution will be made available to UNISA and the greater 
academic community, students, and curriculum development practitioners. It will also 
be available as a research source for students and researchers. The broader South 
African society will benefit if copper theft cases are undertaken professionally and 
timeously, resulting in a higher conviction rate and crime reduction. The reduction of 
copper theft and the increased conviction of perpetrators will benefit the country's 
economy since damage to utilities, such as Eskom, Telkom, and the SA Railway 
Services, could be limited and service delivery to their clients enhanced.  
1.9  RESEARCH APPROACH AND DESIGN 
According to Mouton (2014:35), research involves applying various standardised 
methods and techniques to pursue valid knowledge. Precisely because scientists aim 
to generate truthful knowledge, they are committed to using objective methods and 
procedures that increase validity based on qualitative methodologies. The 
development of a research design follows logically from the research problem and 
instructions to address the research problem. A research design's primary function is 
to enable the researcher to anticipate what the appropriate research decisions should 
be to maximise the validity of the eventual results (Mouton, 2014:36). 
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The researcher followed a qualitative research approach. Berg (2008:23) summarises 
qualitative research as research that seeks to answer questions by examining various 
social settings and the individuals who inhabit these settings.  
 
The researcher followed a collective case study design. Creswell (2013:99) argues 
that in a collective case study, the researcher selects multiple cases. The multiple 
cases for this study included the following: 
i. Correctional Services, Pollsmoor. 
ii. Business Against Crime South Africa (BACSA). 
iii. Private investigators integrally involved with copper theft, i.e., Combined 
Private Investigations (CPI). 
iv. Mpumalanga Provincial NFMCCC. 
v. Gauteng Provincial NFMCCC. 
The main benefits of a collective case study are the opportunities it creates for 
exchanges among researchers, forensic investigators, and decision-makers thus 
ensuring that they apply the research results (Innvær, Vist, Trommald & Oxman, 
2002:239). 
1.10  DEMARCATION OF THE STUDY 
This study was delineated to include awaiting trial detainees on charges relating to 
copper theft at the Pollsmoor Correctional Service Centre. In addition, this study was 
demarcated to BACSA, CPI, the Mpumalanga Provincial NFMCCC and the Gauteng 
Provincial NFMCCC. 
1.11  POPULATION AND SAMPLING PROCEDURE 
Gray (2014) defines a population as “…the totality of people, organisations, objects, or 
occurrences from which a sample is drawn.” The inclusion of all provincial NFMCCCs 
and investigators in South Africa involved in the pro-active management and reactive 
investigation of copper theft would be the ideal population to explore the research 
problem comprehensively. Practically, however, interviewing all role-players would be 
near impossible, and therefore the researcher reverted to a sample of the population 
consisting of role-players and forensic investigators attached to the investigation of 
copper theft-related cases.  
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Most empirical studies involve selecting a group from which propositions will be 
advanced (Flick, 2011:70). The researcher applied non-probability sampling; in 
particular, purposive sampling, to select participants from the following sample: 
o Detainees awaiting trial on charges of copper theft at Pollsmoor Correctional 
Centre, Western Cape. 
o National NFMCCC. 
o Mpumalanga and Gauteng Provincial NFMCCC. 
o BACSA, who is a founder of the original NFTCC. 
o CPI private investigators: “CPI is a corporate investigation firm, specialising in 
investigating non-ferrous metal theft, explicitly focusing on syndicates targeting 
electrical networks. It supports the majority of the South African electricity supply 
companies as well the railway networks. In addition, CPI secures and tracks 
high-value cargo, with its unique, robust locking mechanisms and its top of the 
range tracking device, for both road and rail transportation and logistics agents. 
It further investigates hi-jacking or theft of any non-ferrous metal or high valued 
cargo and prides itself in its excellent recovery levels. Currently, CPI is the sole 
supplier of investigations to parastatals within South Africa, addressing copper 
cable and conductor theft. CPI has a national footprint addressing copper theft. 
Its services include but are not limited to: air support for tracking and tracing 
(privately owned helicopter), investigation of all copper/non-ferrous metal thefts 
for large entities and state-owned companies, investigation of energy thefts 
(illegal connections/theft of electricity), security risk assessments, escorting 
high-value commodities, information gathering on syndicates in order to 
apprehend and prosecute, capturing information gathered on an intelligence 
database, and deployment of undercover agents for corporate entities” (CPI, 
2019). 
1.12  DATA COLLECTION 
In social science research, there are three primary forms of data collection: one can 
collect data by asking people (surveys and interviews), observing, or studying 
documents (Flick, 2011:104). The researcher used in-depth interviews to collect data 
for this research. 
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An in-depth interview is a loosely structured interview. It allows freedom for both the 
interviewer and the interviewee to explore added points and change direction, if 
necessary. In-depth interviews offer the opportunity to capture rich, descriptive data 
about people's behaviours, attitudes, and perceptions, and unfolding complex 
processes. Strategies are elegant in design, relying on a seemingly simple method for 
gathering data (Marshall & Rossman, 2011:91). In-depth interviews are typically 
conducted face-to-face so that rapport can be created with participants. The theoretical 
roots of in-depth interviewing are what is known as the interpretive tradition. According 
to Kumar (2019:239), in-depth interviewing involves repeated face-to-face encounters 
between the researcher and informants directed towards understanding informants' 
perspectives on their lives, experiences, or situations expressed in their own words. 
This definition underlines two essential characteristics of in-depth interviewing: it 
involves face-to-face, repeated interaction between the researcher and their 
informant(s); and it aims to understand the latter's perspective. Because this method 
involves repeated contacts (and hence an extended length of time spent with an 
informant), it is assumed that the rapport between the researcher and informant will be 
enhanced and that the corresponding understanding and confidence between the two 
will lead to in-depth and accurate information. Successful in-depth interviewers listen 
rather than talk. They have a clear line of questioning and use body language to build 
rapport. The interview is more of a guided conversation than a staccato question and 
answer session. The in-depth interview is conducted using a discussion guide, 
facilitating an exploration of participant views through open-ended questioning 
(Berman, 2017:5). 
 
The in-depth interviews were conducted face-to-face with CPI investigators and 
accused copper cable thieves awaiting trial at the Pollsmoor Correctional Centre. This 
phase of the interview process took place prior to the state of national disaster arising 
from the COVID-19 pandemic. However, the next phase of the interview process took 
place during the state of national disaster arising from the COVID-19 pandemic. The 
researcher took cognisance of and adhered to UNISA's COVID-19 Position Statement 
on Research Ethics (UNISA, 2020) which stipulates that a responsible human 
participant research approach is required in the context of COVID-19. The COVID-19 
Position Statement prohibited face-to-face interviews – for the duration of the lockdown 
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period – because they posed an inherent risk to participants and/or researcher. This 
condition was adhered to in the interest of participants and researchers. The 
researcher complied with the principles prescribed by UNISA's COVID-19 Position 
Statement on Research Ethics, as indicated below: 
i. While conducting research, clear, practical risk mitigation measures were taken to 
protect the participants, the community, the researcher, and research support 
staff. 
ii. The researcher assessed the research study's risk-benefit ratio, particularly 
concerning face-to-face contact and data collection in public spaces or locations 
where social distancing cannot be practised.  
iii. The right to self-determination was respected and always carefully considered. 
This approach included the participants' right to withdraw, right to decline to 
participate, and right to explore alternative participation methods. 
Consequently, the researcher conducted in-depth interviews with participants from the 
NFMCCC and BACSA via Skype to ensure social distancing. The Skype interviews 
mitigated the risks inherent in conducting face-to-face interviews and presented zero 
risks of COVID-19 infection. All interviews were recorded electronically for transcription 
and data analysis purposes. 
1.13 DATA ANALYSIS 
The researcher applied qualitative content analysis to analyse collected data. 
According to Dantzker et al. (2016:64), content analysis is used to gain insights into 
an event or phenomenon. The qualitative content analysis emphasises verbal rather 
than statistical analysis of communication. For example, Klinger and Brunson 
(2009:93) conducted an analysis of detailed accounts by police officers of how they 
perceived events during incidents involving the use of lethal force. According to Maree 
(2001) “Qualitative data analysis tends to be an on-going and iterative (non-linear) 
process; this implies that data collection, processing, analysis, and reporting are 
intertwined, and not merely several successive steps” (Maree, 2001:99).  
Creswell (2013:182) believes that the data analysis process conforms to a general 
contour, which the author represents as a data analysis spiral. Creswell justifies the 
analysis spiral because the researcher engages in moving “…in analytic circles, rather 
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than using a fixed linear approach.” Creswell further explains that the researcher 
“…enters with data or text and exits with an account or a narrative.” In between, as 
Creswell describes, the researcher touches on several facets of analysis and circles 
round and around.  
The researcher applied the following steps of the data analysis spiral, as described by 
Creswell (2013:182-184) to the analysis of data collected for this study: 
a. Organising the data 
The researcher commenced with data management by organising the data into 
manageable files. These files were further converted to appropriate text units (e.g., 
words, sentences, and themes). 
b. Reading and memorising 
To get a sense of the entire database, the researcher read the transcripts in their 
entirety numerous times. This process enabled the researcher to divide the data into 
chunks. During this data division, the researcher identified vital concepts that emerged 
from the data and formed categories and supporting evidence to represent various 
perceptions about each category.  
c. Describing, classifying, and interpreting data into codes and themes 
This step involved describing, classifying, and interpreting the data. In this loop of the 
spiral, the researcher developed categories to build detailed descriptions and themes 
and provide interpretations according to the researcher's views or the literature's 
perspectives. The researcher continued with the process of data coding to aggregate 
the text into smaller categories of information. Classifying the data by taking the 
qualitative information apart and looking for categories and themes followed data 
coding. 
d. Interpreting the data 
To make sense of the larger meaning of the data, the researcher interpreted the data. 
e. Representing and visualising the data 
In this final phase of the data analysis spiral, the researcher presented the data. 
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1.14 METHODS TO ENSURE TRUSTWORTHINESS 
It is suggested that “Qualitative approaches to achieving rigour include building 
trustworthiness, authenticity, credibility, transferability, dependability, and 
conformability” (Gray, 2014:186). Lincoln and Guba (1985:33) suggest that the 
following aspects should be addressed to ensure trustworthiness in qualitative studies: 
a. Transferability to illustrate pertinent issues and factors, and thick 
descriptions to provide evidence for making judgements. 
To ensure transferability in this study, the researcher provided comprehensive 
descriptions of participant responses in the form of verbatim excerpts to allow readers 
to make judgments regarding the transferability of the findings. 
b. Dependability, using audit trails through the data.  
To ensure dependability, the researcher retained the audio recordings and transcripts 
of all the in-depth interviews conducted. In addition, the researcher kept a detailed list 
of references consulted throughout the study. The researcher further documented in-
depth interviews to illustrate how the interviews were conducted. As a result, any other 
person could conduct interviews with the sampled participants with a high likelihood of 
reaching equivalent results. The data analysis method was also described in detail. 
c. Conformability, with the audit showing the connections between data 
and the researcher's interpretations. 
To ensure conformability, the researcher kept a comprehensive account of the 
research methodology followed to control whether the findings' interpretation, the 
recommendations and the conclusions can be linked to their sources and if the analysis 
supports them. The responses gained from the study participants were electronically 
archived, and the subsequent transcripts were stored for evaluation by other 
researchers, to authenticate the outcomes of the study. 
d. The research findings were taken back to participants (member 
checks) to evaluate whether such findings are a tangible manifestation 
of their views to ensure credibility. 
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e. Authenticity relates to analysis and interpretation of meanings and 
experiences that are lived and perceived by research subjects. This 
approach means that the researcher is aware of the multiple voices 
within the data and the subtle, sometimes conflicting realities. The 
following questions could be asked: are the interpretations authentic? 
Have rival explanations been considered? 
To ensure the authenticity of the analysed data and its interpretation, the researcher 
kept complete records of how data was analysed and subsequently interpreted. The 
researcher further considered multiple explanations from participants and not only 
selected explanations. As a result, an accurate interpretation of the data was made 
possible. 
1.15 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
According to Strydom (2005:97), ethics refer to “…a set of moral principles that offer 
rules and behavioural expectations about proper conduct towards experimental 
subjects and respondents.” The researcher adhered to the following ethical 
obligations, as prescribed by O'Leary (2014:64): 
a.  Informed consent 
O'Leary (2014: 66) emphasises that participants can only give informed consent if they 
have a full understanding of their requested involvement, including time commitment, 
type of activity, topics covered, as well as all emotional and physical risks potentially 
involved. O'Leary further clarifies that informed consent implies that participants are: 
i. Competent – participants should have reasonable intellectual capacity and 
psychological maturity to participate. 
ii. Autonomous – participants can make self-directed and self-determined choices. 
iii. Involved voluntarily – participants should not be unaware, forced, pressured, or 
duped. 
iv. Aware of the right to discontinue – participants should not be under any obligation 
(or pressure) to continue involvement. 
v. Not deceived – the study's nature, any affiliations or professional standing, and the 
study's intended use should be honest and open. 
vi. Not coerced – positions of power should not be used to coerce individuals to 
participate. 
25 
vii. Not induced – while it may be acceptable to compensate participants for their time 
and effort, an inducement should not compromise a potential participant’s 
judgement. 
 
b.  Ensure no harm to participants 
Harm includes emotional, psychological, or physical harm.  
 
c.  Ensure confidentiality and anonymity 
Confidentiality involves protecting the identity of those providing research data, and 
thus all identifying data must remain solely with the researcher. Anonymity refers to 
protection against identification, even from the researcher; therefore, information, data 
and responses collected anonymously should not be identifiable to any participant. 
 
In addition to the above considerations, the researcher followed the principles 
prescribed in the UNISA Policy on Research Ethics (UNISA, 2007:7). 
1.16  SUMMARY 
In this chapter, the South African and international cable theft phenomenon was 
outlined. In addition, the research problem, aim, and purpose of the study was 
identified. The need for further research on the shortcomings experienced in policing 
of copper theft, and lack of co-operation between the SAPS and all other stakeholders 
who form part of the NFMCCC, were highlighted. The research’s methodological 
parameters were outlined, with reference to population and sampling, data collection, 
data analysis, methods applied to ensure trustworthiness, and ethical considerations. 
  





AN OVERVIEW OF COPPER CABLE THEFT IN SOUTH AFRICA AND 
INTERNATIONALLY 
2.1  INTRODUCTION 
Copper theft and the resultant illicit industry created around it are draining the South 
African economy and negatively impact electricity supply, transport, communication, 
health services, productivity, and infrastructure. In addition, the theft of copper results 
in a large-scale lack of service delivery which contributes to consumer frustration and 
mistrust for local municipalities. According to Pretorius (2012:90), copper theft 
syndicates are holding the country's economy to ransom. The Chairperson of the 
Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Communications stated that copper cable theft 
is indeed a national crisis. Simultaneously, the Democratic Alliance (DA) 
Spokesperson on Public Enterprises argues that the time has come to take serious 
action to stop copper cable theft. The nation expects its government to secure national 
assets (including copper supported infrastructure), which ensure daily life necessities, 
for example, essential services like telecommunications, electricity, and transport. In a 
Parliamentary report, Rhoda (2018:19) opines that the private members' legislative 
proposal aims to amend various sections of the Protection of the Constitutional 
Democracy Against Terrorist and Related Activities Act 33 of 2004. Rhoda states 
further that copper cable's theft, which results in considerable economic losses, should 
be included in the Act's definitions. Rhoda argues further that the legislative proposal 
seeks to include punitive measures for those who directly or indirectly benefit from 
copper cable sale, namely scrap metal dealers. 
 
Rhoda (2018) agrees with Coetzee (2013:1) that non-ferrous metal theft is a concerted 
effort to attack the South African economy and stunt development and growth. This 
situation questions whether it would be possible and desirable for non-ferrous metal 
theft (including copper-cable) to be classified as an act of terrorism. According to 
Bindeman (2011:3), stricter control measures on export and prosecution for economic 
sabotage resulting from copper cable theft should be legislated. Bindeman argues 
further that the SAPS should prioritise copper cable theft as a priority crime. According 
to Robertson, the Executive Director of CPI, the SAPS will not effectively control copper 
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cable theft if they do not protect the assets (containing copper cable) that provide 
essential services. Michael, the DA Spokesperson for Public Enterprises (2012:1), 
opines that Parliament has indicated that the government is losing the war against 
copper cable theft.  
2.2  THE MAGNITUDE OF COPPER CABLE THEFT IN SOUTH   
  AFRICA 
Because of the effect of copper cable theft on the South African economy, electricity 
supply, transport, telecommunications, health services, productivity, and 
infrastructure, it must be combatted pro-actively by the SAPS NFMCCC. Araie 
(2019:1) posits that “…it is time to eliminate this scourge by ruthlessly implementing 
the law. Dithering is a luxury SA cannot afford as it totters on the brink of a total 
blackout.” According to Pretorius (2012:24), a literature review on copper theft 
“…revealed a paradoxical phenomenon in that most of the active initiatives for 
combating copper theft originated from outside the Gauteng borders.” 
 
 According to Liebenberg (2018:1), the magnitude of copper cable theft is a significant 
challenge globally. South Africa is currently experiencing an unprecedented challenge 
in terms of the high number of copper cable thefts, specifically in the hot spot areas, 
e.g., the provinces Western Cape and Gauteng. Morris (2017:1) agrees with 
Liebenberg (2018:1) and adds that copper mining is not a prime industry in the Cape 
area and yet it boasts multimillion-rand exports of the precious metal with no 
accounting for its source.  
 
Morris (2017:1) reports further that corrupt trade by thieves, illicit copper dealers and 
criminal syndicates who sell to copper-thirsty economies in the East - mainly India and 
China - is lucrative for the corrupt few but comes at a vast cost to South Africans; from 
commuters and householders to businesses and public enterprises. A press release 
by the Kalagadi Manganese Mine (2016:1) states that copper cable theft has a 
devastating effect on the economy, resulting in indirect costs estimated at R 5 billion a 
year. According to a report by CPI (2019), Eskom and Transnet's essential services 
have been seriously disrupted by the scourge, which has catapulted SA into becoming 
one of the world’s leading exporters (albeit illicitly) of copper cable to countries such 
as China and India. 
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In the report by CPI (2019) the former SAPS Deputy Provincial Commissioner in 
Gauteng, Major-General Shadrack Sibiya, affirmed during a special hearing in the 
National Council of Provinces, that 72 533 incidents of copper cable theft were 
reported, and 10 736 arrests made in 2013. Transnet’s security head retired General 
Toka, states that from 2008/2009 the parastatal has suffered 6 917 incidents of copper 
cable theft to the value of R 95,5 million with an estimated replacement cost of R 239 
million (excluding the cost of train delays and cancellations (CPI, 2013:1)). 
 
Table 2.1 and Figures 2.1 and 2.2 below illustrate copper cable theft incidents at 
Transnet from 2008/09 to 2011/12. 
 









2008/09 1432 R 12 000 000 R 30 000 000 
2009/10 2014 R 27 100 000 R 67 600 000 
2010/11 2091 R 38 600 000 R 96 500 000 
2011/12 1380 R 17 800 000 R 44 500 000 
(Transnet Cable Theft Analysis 2008/09 – 2011/12, [s.a.]) 
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Figure 2.1 Transnet copper cable theft incidents 
(Transnet Cable Theft Analysis 2008/09 – 2011/12, [s.a.]) 
 
Figure 2.2  Transnet copper cable Theft losses comparative statistics from 
2008/09 to 2011/12 
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Eskom Group Executive Distribution, Ms Noah, made a strong proposal for a special 
crime prevention unit dealing with copper cable theft. Noah posits further that copper 
cables with an estimated value of R 265 million were stolen in 2010/2011 with an 
indirect cost to the economy of about R 5 billion. The cost included the cost of 
replacement and security; the shutdown of business operations; loss of income; loss 
of exports; power, communication, transport outages; and negative investor 
perceptions. There was also the human cost of accidents. Noah urges that harsher 
penalties must be imposed on cable thieves, who are part of organised crime 
syndicates (Noah, 2012:6). 
 
According to the South African Chamber of Commerce and Industry SACCI (2015:1), 
the Copper Theft Barometer level increased to R 14.30 million in August 2015 from R 
13.2 million in July 2015. The August figure was 9.16 per cent higher than the previous 
month and 9.5 per cent higher than the previous year. The Copper Theft Volume 
Indicator increased to 206.70 metric tons in August 2015 from 203.42 metric tons in 
July 2015. Sokanyile (2018:1) states that Eskom lost R 1.7 million in Cape Town since 
the beginning of the fiscal year 2018/19. According to Business Tech (2012:1), which 
quotes Makhanya – the spokesperson for the South African Chambers of Commerce 
and Industry - copper cable theft increased in January 2012. Makhanya further stated 
that the Copper Theft Barometer, registered R 21, 9 million in January 2012, up 4,6 
per cent from R 20,9 million in December 2011. The increasing copper price is a 
potential driving force for theft. During February 2012, the price climbed by R 2 776 to 
R 63 506 per ton. The previous decline in price in 2011 was due to uncertainty in the 
global economy, which meant that SA’s annual copper exports dropped by 4,8 per cent 
in November 2011. 
According to Mawisa reporting for Carte Blanche (2019), criminals target copper 
cables from essential infrastructures like power lines and communication networks. 
The action borders on sabotage and syndicates make millions of Rand from the 
activity. The crime of cable theft has become a game-changer, as Mawisa (2019) 
reports:  
When your cell phone network goes down, it may not be your 
service provider’s fault. When you plunged into darkness and 
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stuck in traffic, because the traffic lights don’t work, Eskom 
might also not be to blame. It’s a criminal network stealing 
everything and anything they can, from power cables to 
copper, to even batteries that run traffic lights and mobile 
network towers, stealing from society, and crippling the 
economy bit by bit. 
 
Pieterse (2017:1), the Johannesburg City Power Director, states that tunnels coursing 
under Johannesburg contain copper cables that are being stripped out and smuggled 
as far away as Asia.  
Table 2.2 National overview of copper cable theft per province (2011) 
PROVINCE TOTAL OFFENCES 
GAUTENG 7 605 
WESTERN CAPE 4 344 
KWAZULU NATAL 3 719 
NORTHWEST 2 366 
LIMPOPO 2 348 
MPUMALANGA 1 912 
EASTERN CAPE 1 429 
FREE STATE 1 070 
NORTHERN CAPE 443 
TOTAL NATIONAL INCIDENTS 25 236 
 
Tables 2.3 to 2.5 illustrate the number of copper theft incidents at the top three police 
stations in the top five policing clusters in South Africa. 
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Table 2.3 Number of copper theft incidents registered at the top three police 
stations within the top five cluster precincts in Gauteng during 2011 
TSHWANE 
NORTH 
SEDIBENG WEST RAND JHB WEST 
JHB 
CENTRAL 
Akasia Vereeniging Kagiso Honeydew Booysens 
197 145 147 149 149 
Temba De Deur Carletonville Roodepoort Sophiatown 
147 105 85 132 108 
Pta North Evaton Krugersdorp Florida Moffatview 
106 78 80 115 106 
 
Table 2.4 Number of copper theft incidents registered at the top three police 








Paarl Worcester Ravensmead Athlone 
Bishop 
Lavis 
187 148 75 147 89 




101 65 67 45 89 












Table 2.5 Number of copper theft incidents registered at the top three police 
stations within the top five cluster precincts in Mpumalanga during 2011 
WITBANK MIDDELBURG SECUNDA KWAMHLANGA PIENAAR 
Witbank Blinkpan Balfour Tweefontein Kwabokweni 
172 124 58 54 37 
Vosman Middelburg Evander Kwamhlanga Pienaar 
96 112 35 53 31 
Delmas Hendrina Secunda Siyabuswa Nelspruit 
67 72 33 32 29 
Robertson (2018:3) posits that the effect of infrastructure theft and damage, 
specifically copper theft, on the South African economy is well known with damages 
running into billions of Rands annually. Copper theft, however, is a global phenomenon 
and the recurrent explanation is that metals have become attractive targets due to the 
soaring price of scrap metal. The price increase is generally attributed to the global 
demand for metals exceeding the available supply. Consequently, it is proposed that 
price increases have stimulated the creation of illegal markets that provide 
opportunities to sell stolen metals at financially rewarding prices.  
 
Life preserving assets that supply electricity, telecommunications, transport, and 
revenue are under threat, and citizens expect the government to secure the national 
assets which facilitate daily life. Due to a dearth of academic literature, and the inherent 
economic nature of this phenomenon, it has become evident that a sophisticated, yet 
integrated approach is necessary to mitigate a multi-faceted crime threat within a wide-
ranging and high-impact target. Moreover, it is apparent that stakeholders know 
precisely “…how they are being plundered, but they appear to be unable to counter 





2.3  THE IMPACT OF COPPER CABLE THEFT IN SOUTH AFRICA 
According to Amisi (2015:109), South Africa has a “…well-developed infrastructure 
consisting of a large rail, road, telephone, and electricity distribution network.” The 
infrastructure was built up over decades when $ 8 000 per metric ton of copper was 
inconceivable. Liebenberg (2018:1) states that copper cable theft is a significant 
challenge for South Africa, which has a direct negative impact on the economy. 
Liebenberg (2018:1) further argues that the impact of copper cable theft on the 
essential infrastructure is draining the fiscus, disabling infrastructure and significantly 
contributed to South African being downgraded to junk status.  
 
Van Dalen (2012:4) posits that in 2010 copper cabling with an estimated R 265 million 
value was stolen, resulting in an indirect cost to the economy estimated at R 5 billion 
per year. Copper cable theft has resulted in the following: 
o negative investor perception of South Africa, 
o power, communication, and transport outages resulting in low productivity, 
o damage to business and other infrastructure during or after the theft, 
o huge replacement cost of stolen copper cables; and 
o the cost of security to protect cable infrastructure.  
 
According to Van Dalen (2012:4), harsher penalties for cable theft offenders must be 
implemented, to deter would-be offenders from the perceived easy benefit resulting 
from the crime. Moreover, the entire crime value chain must be dismantled, including 
the export (illegally) of metals, to countries such as Korea, China, India, and the United 
Arab Emirates. However, Van Dalen (2012:4) predicts that copper cable theft is not 
likely to end if non-ferrous cable metals prices remain sufficiently attractive to 
prospective thieves. 
2.3.1 Economic impact 
The former Minister of the Department of Public Enterprises, Malusi Gigaba, confirmed 
that Eskom and Transnet continue to suffer the loss of millions of Rand because of 
copper cable theft (Drodskie, 2018). The SACCI spokesperson, Drodskie (2018) 
opines that …the effects of copper theft on the South African economy are vast, 
ranging from delays in rail transport and shipping to dysfunctional traffic lights.” 
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According to Van den Berg (2007:1) victims of copper cable theft not only suffer direct 
consequences because of financial losses such as replacement cost but that 
individuals and organisations suffer indirect losses, such as:  
o Reputational damage to an organisation.  
o Negative impact on service delivery. 
o Lowered employee morale. 
o Loss of revenue or income. 
o Labour costs to replace and repair. 
o Overtime costs for staff. 
o Cost of equipment and vehicles. 
o Security costs to protect and safeguard assets and customers. 
o The cost of electronic equipment, alarms, and monitoring devices. 
 
According to Planting (2011:1), copper theft costs the South African economy an 
estimated R 10 billion per year. Planting (2011:2), opines further that “…with the 
national growth limping along at 3 per cent and national debt set at billons, this problem 
clearly cannot remain unresolved as it can destroy the country’s fragile economy.” 
According to SACCI (2014:1) losses due to copper theft increased marginally to R 13.2 
million in October 2014, up from R 13 million in September 2014. This was the fifth 
monthly increase in 2014 and was 43 per cent higher than in 2013. The increase in 
October 2014 was a worrying signal that copper theft may increase over the short to 
medium-term. The volume of stolen copper increased from 173 tons in September 
2014 to 176 tons in October 2014. The increases in copper theft suggest an upward 
trend which appears to have taken hold. SACCI reported that copper theft's impact 
ranges from frustration over network service interruption to the loss of lives. 
Municipalities are also placed under the financial strain of replacing stolen cables. 
 
In its annual report, Telkom said that its losses due to cable theft increased from R 
165.4 million to R 183.5 million between their 2010 and 2011 fiscal year, and the 
number of cable theft incidents increased by 17 per cent. Cable theft has also been 
blamed for several deaths (due to electric shock and burns) of electrical engineers 
repairing and maintaining vandalized substations and copper cables (Peters, 2014). 
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From a financial perspective, Eskom and Transnet have collectively lost R 1.2 billion 
through copper cable theft between the years 2006-2012 (Business Tech, 2012). 
2.3.2 Impact on transportation 
According to a press release by the Congress of South African Trade Unions 
(COSATU) authored by Parks (2015), it is estimated that copper cable theft costs 
South Africa up to R 7 billion per annum much of which impacts on hard-working 
taxpayers. In addition, copper cable theft threatens lives. For example, two people 
died, 19 were critically injured, and a further 281 were injured when two trains collided 
near Pretoria in January 2011. This collision resulted from the theft of two 25-metre 
copper cables, which disrupted the signalling system. This accident's financial cost to 
train and rail infrastructure was more than R 22 million (Parks, 2015:2). 
Parks (2015) further states that the “…escalation of copper cable theft and vandalism 
in South Africa’s major cities, the deleterious effects on the social fabric and financial 
base of the electricity generation and distribution utilities, as well as a lack of adequate, 
public interventions for addressing these challenges are all widely documented in the 
literature.” On the socio-economic front, cable theft and vandalism have interrupted 
the Gautrain (Johannesburg’s electric-powered inter-city railway transport system) 
schedule resulting in incessant delays due to signalling problems, disruption of 
telephone networks and numerous accidents at faulty robots leading to traffic jams 
(Pretorius, 2012:22). In contrast to these phenomenal losses, the Metal Recycling 
Association of South Africa (MRA) estimates the value of the scrap metal industry - 
which benefits directly/inadvertently from cable theft - to be at a staggering R 15 to R 
20 billion a year (Pretorius, 2012: 28).  
 
Transnet (2012:2) states that the company lost R 4,5 million to copper theft in the 
2016/2017 fiscal year in KwaZulu Natal. In 2017 they lost R 2,1 million. Further, such 
theft gives South African companies a bad reputation as clients do not receive their 
goods on time, forcing them to consider other alternatives. Transnet (2012:2) argues 
that it has invested in physical, technological, and specialised security to combat this 
crime, resulting in a reduced profit margin. PRASA (2019:22) likewise reports that it 
experiences high levels of lawlessness and the resultant copper cable theft cost the 
company R 625 million during 2018/2019. 
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2.3.3 Impact on telecommunications 
According to Parks (2015:1), Telkom reported R 183.5 million losses due to copper 
cable theft in the 2010/2011 budget year. Parks (2015:1) further posits that “…in 
certain areas, Telkom has stopped replacing stolen cables due to the high theft rate.” 
Parks (2015:2) states further that, “…between 2006 and 2011, Eskom, Telkom and 
Transnet reported combined losses of more than R 3.12 billion due to copper cable 
theft. Workers’ jobs are threatened, as companies drain their funds to repair damages 
caused by copper cable and metal theft. Workers and companies suffer further 
financial losses due to constant train delays caused by copper cable theft.” According 
to Gilbert (2016:1), copper cable theft cost Telkom over R 200 million during the 2015 
budget year. The company further revealed that it spent R 100 million on cable theft 
repair costs and another R 107 million on security services. Telkom also stated that it 
experienced over 6 000 incidents of cable theft across its copper network over the last 
year. 
2.3.4 Impact on the agricultural sector 
Pieterse (2017:1) reports that copper cable theft is on the rise in the Midlands, affecting 
farmers, businesses, and the economy. Pieterse (2017:1) quotes La Marque, the 
Director of the KwaZulu-Natal Agricultural Union, who posits that copper thieves dig 
up agricultural pivot lines that feed irrigation systems and Telkom and Eskom lines. 
The cost of doing business is affected, and this includes time and delivery delays. The 
impact is severe as it leaves farms unable to function efficiently. Pieterse (2017:3) 
further states that it is essential that all incidents of cable theft to be reported and 
stricter measures of prevention to be implemented. Once the copper has been stolen, 
it is sold to scrap metal dealers. Scrap yards are, by law, supposed to keep copper for 
seven-days along with the seller’s identity number and contact details. This regulation 
has resulted in some scrap dealers moving their copper haul to other sites until the 
seven days expire and police have already inspected their primary site. The copper is 
then exported to India and China (Pieterse, 2017:3). 
2.3.5 Impact on electricity supply 
According to Parks (2015:3), South African household electricity consumers have been 
incensed by escalating power tariffs in recent years. Meanwhile, Eskom, the main 
power generating company, justifies rising tariffs based a need for sufficient funds to 
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modernise its ageing infrastructure. Any additional reason for Eskom to further raise 
tariffs is therefore considered unwelcome by consumers. Peters (2014:4) opines that 
cable theft is also to blame for several deaths due to electric shock and burns arising 
from electrical engineers repairing and maintaining vandalized substations and copper 
cables (Peters, 2014). From a financial perspective, Eskom and Transnet have 
collectively lost R 1.2 billion through copper cable theft between the years 2006-2012 
(Michael, 2012). These numbers correspond to those released by Telkom, which 
indicate that the entity lost R 1.9 billion in repair and replacement costs due to copper 
cable theft between 2006 and 2011 (Michael, 2012). 
Noah (2012:3) the Group Executive for Distribution Division at Eskom, made the 
following statement concerning the effect of copper cable theft on the power utility: 
i. The theft of non-ferrous metals in South Africa has become a severe problem in 
the past few years, impacting negatively on the economy.  
ii. This can be attributed to the dramatic increase in the copper and aluminium prices 
because of the growth in international demand for the materials, amongst other 
factors. 
iii. The sectors most affected by non-ferrous metals' theft are communication, rail 
transport, Eskom, and other utilities.  
iv. Eskom Distribution Division is most affected by non-ferrous metals' theft because 
of the vast geographical range of its network, the electricity network capacity/load 
and infrastructure that runs mostly in remote areas in South Africa. 
v. A total number of 1 591 conductor theft incidents were reported between April and 
December 2011 (cable 1 399, overhead conductor 118 and earth straps from 
substations 74 incidents). Total losses (direct costs) suffered are estimated at R 22 
022 855. A total of 292 perpetrators were arrested. Material to the value of R 2 477 
033 was recovered. 
 
Wilson (2018:1) reports that nationally, the government estimates cable theft costs 
between R 5 and R 7.5 billion per year (mostly affecting Eskom). The Nelson Mandela 
Municipality described cable theft as a massive problem that causes havoc to the 
electricity supply. An estimated R 10 million has been spent on replacing underground 
and overhead electricity cables. This includes the replacement and purchasing of the 
wires to re-install and fix structures damaged by cable theft. Mamaila (2019:1) states 
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that ongoing copper cable theft from companies, such as Eskom, has a devastating 
effect on the local copper industry. 
2.3.6 Impact on critical infrastructure  
Bornman (2018:1) reports that Eskom recovered more than R 5 million worth of stolen 
infrastructure, including copper cables, at a site in Muldersdrift, west of Johannesburg. 
The power utility's Divisional Executive of Security, General Tebogo Rakau stated that 
one person had been arrested for dealing and being in possession of stolen property 
(Bornman, 20018:1). This indicates the presence of an organised crime syndicate. 
Bornman (2018:3) argues that Eskom and the SAPS should intensify their fight against 
infrastructure theft, which not only plagues the power utility but other state-owned 
entities such as Transnet and PRASA. Smith (2013:18) states that over and above the 
financial implications, broader social implications affect essential services, clinics, 
hospitals and ambulance services, police services, fire brigades, schools, government 
departments and municipal services, the SANDF, and the South African Postal Service 
(SAPO). If any one of these services is non-operational, it has a severe impact on 
consumers and can lead to a loss of life in medical infrastructure insufficiencies.  
Bornman (2018:1), opines that while it may appear that the only victims of cable theft 
are organisations like Eskom and municipalities who bear the cost of replacing stolen 
cable and damaged infrastructure, the effects suffered by society can be even worse 
and include prolonged power outages which affect businesses, and ultimately lead to 
job losses. Unplanned power outages resulting from cable theft also affect healthcare 
services at clinics and endanger the lives of people who are on life support equipment. 
Copper cable theft costs the economy between R 5 billion and R 7 billion a year, while 
Eskom spends in the region of R 2 billion a year replacing stolen copper cables 
(Bornman 2018:1). 
 
Mawisa (2019) states that there is no single piece of infrastructure or place immune to 
copper cable theft. Criminals target essential infrastructure costing the country more 
than R 5 billion every year, not including consequential losses. In addition, the cost to 
human life is high. Twenty-two miners, for example, were presumed dead at Gloria 
Coal Mine after cable thieves caused a gas explosion in 2019 (Ramphele: 2019:1). 
When it comes to essential infrastructure-related crime, it is not merely a case of theft 
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or damage to property. The crime lends itself to sabotage, and authorities are adamant 
that the culprits' punishment must meet the crime.  
 
Johnson, interviewed as part of the television series Carte Blanche (2019), stated that 
the Criminal Matters Amendment Act has become the ultimate game changer and 
made it possible to close the gaps created by past legislation. Since 2016, if 
successfully prosecuted, criminals found guilty of tampering, damaging, or stealing 
essential infrastructure can receive terms of imprisonment of up to 30 years, a fine up 
to the amount of R 100 million, or both.  
 
In the State vs Malome Alfred Matsitela and others, the court stated that theft is a 
severe crime in itself, even if committed in isolated circumstances by individual 
persons. However, when the crime is committed by gangs or syndicates or two or more 
people in a planned and organised manner, the seriousness of the crime reaches a 
different level, which is further worsened when the theft is from the country’s essential 
infrastructure relevant to the delivery of basic services to the community. The 
legislature made it clear in the Preamble of the Criminal Matters Amendment Act 18 of 
2015 that increased sentences are called for because of “…the unacceptably high 
incidents of crime relating to essential infrastructure”, and since “…essential 
infrastructure-related offences are becoming increasingly more organised...” and 
“…offences which of themselves are relatively minor [cause] considerable damage to 
essential infrastructure.” Copper cable theft and the damage to infrastructure, for 
example, cost Telkom, and many other companies, millions each year in repairs, lost 
working hours and lost customers.  
 
Dordley (2019:1), the Western Cape Regional Head of PRASA posits that the 
combined efforts of the PRASA Protection Services, SAPS Rapid Rail Response Unit, 
provincial SAPS offices and security contractors have yielded excellent results. 
Dordley (2019:2) further reports:  
i. PRASA is one of several industries reliant on copper technology affected by theft 
(others include mobile phone operators, Eskom, municipalities, and Transnet). 
ii. Annual losses amount to R 5 billion (excluding the cost to the economy). 
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iii. The illicit metal theft trade causes considerable damage to infrastructure and has 
a debilitating effect on society. 
2.4 AN OVERVIEW OF COPPER CABLE THEFT INTERNATIONALLY 
According to Bell (2018), the world's ten biggest copper producers are: 
i. Corporación Nacionaldel Cobre de Chile (Codelco) 
ii. Freeport McMoRan 
iii. BHP Billion 
iv. Clencore 
v. Southern Copper Corp. 
vi. KGHM BolskaMeidz 
vii. Antofagasta 
viii. Firs Quantum Ltd 
ix. Rio Tinto Group 
x. Vale 
According to Bell (2018), these producers accounted for over 9.83 million metric tons 
- or 108 million US tons (known as short tons) - of the precious metal in 2017. The top 
four companies accounted for more than 62 per cent of that total. With copper going 
for $ 3.10 per pound as of fall 2017, the top ten firms produced over $ 640 billion worth 
of the metal in that year. Controlling about 19 per cent of the world's copper reserves, 
Codelco is an independent company owned by the Chilean Government. Codelco 
produced approximately 1 842 million metric tons of refined copper in 2017 - roughly 
11 per cent of the world's total - worth $ 125 billion, according to 2017 prices (Bell, 
2018). 
 
Phoenix-based Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold Inc. is the world's largest publicly 
traded copper producer. The company's assets include the Grasberg Mining Complex 
in Indonesia, the world’s largest copper and gold mine in recoverable reserves; the 
Morenci and Safford minerals districts in North America; and the TenkeFungurume 
minerals district in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Their ownership stake was sold 
to a Chinese company (China Molybdenum) for $ 2.65 billion in early 2017. FCX 
produced 1.7 million metric tons of refined copper in 2016 (about 9 per cent of the 
world's total), making it the world's second-largest copper supplier. Freeport-McMoRan 
posted revenues of $ 15.86 billion in 2017 (Bell, 2018).  
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2.4.1 United States of America 
According to a report by the FBI Criminal Intelligence Section (2008:1), copper thieves 
threaten US critical infrastructure by targeting electrical substations, cellular towers, 
telephone landlines, railroads, water wells, construction sites, and vacant homes. The 
theft of copper cable from these targets disrupts the flow of electricity, 
telecommunications, transportation, water supply, heating, security, and emergency 
services and presents a risk to both public safety and national security. Copper cable 
thieves are typically individuals or organised groups who operate independently or in 
loose association with each other and commit thefts in conjunction with fencing 
activities and contraband sale. Organised groups of drug addicts, gang members, and 
metal thieves conduct large scale thefts from electric utilities, warehouses, vacant 
properties, and oil-well sites for tens of thousands of dollars in illicit proceeds per 
month.  
 
The FBI Criminal Intelligence Section (2008:1) further stipulates that the demand for 
copper by developing nations such as China and India created a robust international 
copper trade. Copper cable thieves exploit this demand (and the resulting price surge) 
by stealing and selling the metal for high profits to recyclers across the USA. As the 
global supply of copper cable continues to tighten, the illicit copper cable market will 
increase. The FBI Report (2008) states that China, India, and other developing nations 
drive the demand for raw materials such as copper and are creating a robust 
international trade. Copper thieves receive cash from recyclers who often fill orders for 
commercial scrap dealers. Recycled copper flows from these dealers to smelters, 
mills, foundries, ingot makers, powder plants, and other industries to be re-used in the 
USA or supply the demand for raw material at the international level.  
 
According to FBI Criminal Intelligence Section (2008:1), on 4 April 2008, five tornado 
warning sirens in the Jackson, Mississippi, failed to warn residents of an approaching 
tornado because copper thieves had stripped the sirens of copper wiring, thus 
rendering them inoperable. In addition, on 20 March 2008, 4 000 residents in Polk 
County, Florida, were left without power after the copper wire was stripped from an 
active transformer at a Tampa Electric Company (TECO) power facility. Monetary 
losses to TECO amounted to approximately $ 500 000. Moreover, in March 2007, 
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farmers in Pinal County, Arizona, experienced a copper theft epidemic as perpetrators 
stripped copper from water irrigation wells and pumps, resulting in the loss of crops 
and high replacement costs. Pinal County’s loss amounted to $ 10 million. 
Schoenfelder, (2009:7) states that copper cable theft costs the public $ 1 billion per 
year. The Arizona Department of Transportation estimates that costs over the last two 
years have exceeded $ 500 000. The theft appears to be increasing, and the culprits 
are becoming bolder and more sophisticated. 
 
The severe increase in the cost of copper cable, coupled with the multiple options for 
its sale, has made the crime attractive to thieves. Copper cable theft is not confined to 
any specific area, as cables have been stolen during shipping, while in storage, and 
after installation. Vacant buildings and street lighting remain common targets of cable 
theft. Legislation in many States has changed because of the magnitude of this 
phenomenon (Schoenfelder, 2009). 
 
According to Kolevar (2007:1), the theft of copper wire from utilities occurs primarily at 
substation transformers, from utility poles, or the back of service trucks. The thefts 
have several adverse consequences, including the apparent economic impact, service 
disruptions, personal injury to or death of persons involved in the theft or later recovery 
efforts. Utilities across the USA are paying increasing attention to this growing problem 
and have begun to investigate and implement measures for deterring thefts, protecting 
facilities, and recovering from the consequences. Naturally, these efforts come at a 
cost which affects the taxpayer.  
 
Kolevar (2007:1) states further that copper cable theft is on the rise globally. While 
Kolevar focuses on electric utilities in the USA, copper is increasingly being stolen from 
other sources such as construction sites, telecommunications towers, and even 
individual homes. Lumber, copper pipe and wiring, and other materials left unsecured 
at building sites are all attractive targets and construction sites have been plagued by 
theft for years. A large concentration of copper in one place creates a lucrative target 
for theft. Numerous factors contribute to an increase in copper cable theft. Worldwide 
demand for copper has significantly increased over the last few years, for example. 
Figure 2.3 below demonstrates the percentage proportion of end-users of copper and 
copper alloy in the USA during 2002. 
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Figure 2.3: USA Copper and Copper Alloy End Users in 2002 
 
Source: Copper Development Association, Inc. (2002) 
 
According to Bergal (2018:1), during September 2008, a pickup truck struck and killed 
a 55-year-old woman crossing an intersection in a motorised wheelchair on a dark 
stretch of Kansas City highway. Bergal (2018:1) explains that streetlights were non-
functional due to copper cable theft. Besides creating dangerous conditions, copper 
wire thefts have become a drain on US resources. Thieves have stripped copper wire 
from abandoned houses, commercial buildings, and construction sites for years. They 
further tend to target public right of ways, creating a nuisance for public safety and 
transportation officials. 
 
Bergal (2018:1) explains that copper wiring is typically found in boxes at the base of 
light poles or on highway barriers, and in control stations (above-ground cabinets off 
the roadway connected to a whole section of lights). Thieves dressed in phoney gear 
(such as reflective vests) posing as utility or transportation workers have been known 
to target these sites. Others brazenly break into the boxes and steal the wires outright. 
The perpetrators, some of whom police confirm are drug addicts looking for quick cash, 
take their loot to scrap recycling yards to sell. Stealing copper can be lucrative. In 2018 
scrap copper sold for more than $ 2 a pound. 
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Koba (2013:1) quotes Adelizzi, the Executive Vice President of the American Supply 
Association who states that various industries use copper for various reasons. It is 
attractive to thieves because it is easy to steal; difficult to get caught stealing and the 
penalties for getting caught are merely a reprimand. The latter is a problem 
everywhere. Copper theft is an epidemic across the USA spurred by copper's record 
high values in recent years and a vast pool of vacant properties that have become 
easy targets for such crime.  
 
Hunt (2014:2) quoting Headley, the Vice President for Cassidy Turley in Indianapolis, 
states that because copper is often found in heating, ventilation and air-conditioning 
systems, plumbing, electrical wiring, and fibre-optics; it is highly valued at scrap yards, 
enticing thieves to steal the material and sell it for quick cash. However, the cost to 
real estate portfolios is not just the stolen copper itself, but the extensive property 
damage resulting from theft. Property managers should be concerned because the 
crime often requires restoration work which increases costs. According to statistics in 
a May 2013 report from the National Insurance Crime Bureau, which tracks metal theft 
statistics; between January 1, 2010, through December 31, 2012, the number of 
insurance claims for the theft of copper, bronze, brass, or aluminium increased thirty-
six per cent when compared with the same time between 2009 and 2011, and ninety-
six per cent of those claims were for copper alone. Copper theft and losses to the US 
businesses sector cost nearly $ 1 billion annually. Hunt (2014:2) quotes Kleinman the 
head for the Zurich Insurance Group, on the fact that copper theft is not a cheap 
problem to fix. He states further that the real cost to society includes building repairs 
and the replacement of mechanical or electrical systems that have been stripped of 
copper.  
 
McNees (2017:1) opines a total of 27 514 claims for the theft of copper, aluminium, 
brass, and bronze submitted to Insurance Services Office (ISO) Claim Search between 
January 1, 2014, and March 31, 2018. Of the 27 514 total claims, the vast majority 
(98%) pertained to copper theft. Of these claims, 64 per cent were on personal policies, 
while 36 per cent were against commercial policies. When the number of metal theft 
claims and copper prices were compared, a positive correlation (0.55) was observed 
between the values; however, this correlation was less significant than identified in the 
prior Metal Theft ForeCAST report (0.91). The average copper prices appeared to 
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climb in 2017 while the number of metal theft claims submitted to the ISO Claim Search 
continued to decrease in 2017. 
 
In 2008 an FBI Criminal Intelligence Report (FBI, 2008) scoped out the problem and 
drove innovative solutions. Among the findings: 
i. The demand for copper from developing nations such as China and India create a 
robust international copper trade, and as the global supply of copper continues to 
tighten, the market for illicit copper will likely increase. From 2001 until 2008, the 
price of the metal has increased by more than 500 per cent. 
ii. The thieves, many of whom are drug addicts or gang members, may act individually 
or as part of organised groups and are interested in quick cash from selling copper 
to scrap metal dealers. 
iii. Targets include electrical substations, railroads, security and emergency services, 
and other sensitive sites. Copper theft has been responsible for shutting down 
railway systems and even 9/11 emergency systems. 
 
According to the FBI (2008), on the surface, “…it could be a relatively small theft…but 
the public safety impact could be significant.” Moreover, while copper thieves may not 
intend to compromise critical infrastructure, they can still be charged with more serious 
federal crimes. Most copper theft involves a relatively small amount of money, often 
takes place in rural areas, and is investigated by local law enforcement agencies which 
help explain why, until recently, the implications of these crimes fell below the radar of 
federal law enforcement. The FBI intelligence analyst who wrote the FBI Report (FBI, 
2008:3) spoke with 150 people from local and state law enforcement and officials from 
railroad and energy companies regarding their copper cable theft experiences, whom 
all indicated that the crime is often miss-classes as a minor offence.  
 
Solutions to copper theft are, however, being developed in the US. Several informal 
task teams between local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies have been 
established to combat copper theft, most notably in Nevada. In one such case, a 
copper thief was charged with a more serious federal crime carrying a potential 20-
year sentence. The FBI has acknowledged that there is still much work to be done, but 
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serious issues surrounding copper theft are acknowledged and addressed at high 
levels (FBI, 2008). 
2.4.2 United Kingdom  
According to Rogers (2012:1), copper cable theft is a widely reported modern plague. 
In a world thirsty for metals those contained in power cables fetch a high premium. In 
a recessionary Britain, the number of people prepared to take the risk to steal copper 
cable is increasing. That is why copper thefts increased by 50 per cent during 
2011/2012 alone. Prices in the United Kingdom have doubled since 2009. In the 
researcher’s experience, copper cable theft is illegally conducted, and the proceeds 
are pro-actively sold to the waiting customer who is usually a legitimate dealer without 
the buyers (syndicates) ever handling the copper. It is directly sold from the 
environment where it is stolen to the new awaiting buyer by using a method to 
photoshoot the copper and then take a minimal risk by selling it. 
 
Rogers (2012:1) states that commuters heading into London in the mornings face a 
frustrating journey. During February 2012, a mere 30 ft of cabling was stolen overnight 
from beside the track outside London Bridge, yet the disruption was staggering. Over 
1 650 trains were delayed at a cost to Network Rail of £ 640 000 and the fury of 
thousands of paying passengers. Many cables are ripped up in the dead of night from 
the side of railway lines in the UK. 
 
Rogers (2012:1) states further that according to Chris Hearn, the Head of British 
Transport Police, the police are aware of what the public might think of them, but the 
energy suppliers and the railway companies suffer because of this crime. There are 
also tens of thousands of copper cable theft victims when power to homes and 
hospitals is lost. In some cases, houses have caught fire and trains are severely 
delayed. The crime causes massive disruptions and is highly dangerous. This has an 
enormous effect on the economy of Great Britain. 
 
Roger (2012:1) believes that copper cables are easy to target because they are found 
far from homes and people, and there are thousands of miles of rail-track to choose 
from, making it impossible to protect. Rogers (2012:2) went undercover with copper 
thieves and reports that men using assumed names use the black-market economy to 
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shift their loot. Rogers (2012) passed this information to both the Warwickshire 
Constabulary and the British Transport Police. An intelligence unit within the British 
Transport Police confirmed that an investigation based on the account followed. 
 
According to Sidebottom (2012:2), significant increases in the copper price are attributed 
to a global supply and demand imbalance, which is recognised as the main contributor 
to the surge in copper theft. This is supported by research analysing the relationship 
between copper price and copper cable theft from the British Railway Network. It is 
argued that price increases have generated more significant opportunities for 
offenders to sell stolen copper cable at financially rewarding prices with minimal risk of 
detection. 
2.4.3 China 
During a televised news report RGTE Staff (2015) reported on stacked 40-foot 
containers taken to a location in Foshan, China, a district west of Guangzhou that is 
home to many scrap yards and secondary metals production plants. An operation 
where red metal (copper and brass) scrap was hand-picked and removed from 
shredded mixed metal scrap loads was described. The segment explained how dirt 
was shovelled into containers after the copper scrap was removed to maintain its 
recorded weight.  
 
RGTE Staff (2015) states that fake replacement container seals replace genuine seals 
when containers are entered illegally. The culling of copper-bearing scrap from mixed 
loads proves profitable for the thieves but results in widely varying copper percentages 
for the containers' recipients compared with the shipper's records. Scrap recyclers 
have long complained of theft from containers in south China and Hong Kong, and the 
crime rings in that region became the focus of attention at a Bureau of International 
Recycling (BIR) session in 2012. 
 
According to RTGE Staff (2015:1), bearish market conditions continue in copper scrap 
markets, with Chinese demand and output affecting both sectors. RTGE Staff (2015:1) 
quoting Melvin Lipsitz, president of M. Lipsitz & Co., based in Waco, Texas, says 
China’s current economic difficulties seem to be weighing heavily on the copper sector. 
Lipsitz describes the situation in China as a significant economic and banking issue 
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“…that will take a great deal of time to work its way out.” In addition, he says the 
strength of the US dollar is influencing China’s interest in US scrap. 
 
Meanwhile, statistics continue to portray China’s slumping demand for imported 
copper scrap. An article by Andy Home of Reuters (Home, 2015:2) says imports of 
primary copper concentrates are booming in China, while the country’s copper scrap 
imports fell from 4.9 million metric tons in 2012 to 3.9 million metric tons in 2014. In the 
first five months of 2015, Home demonstrates, copper scrap imports were down 8 per 
cent compared with the first five months of 2014. Furthermore, a July 2015 Bloomberg 
Business Report (Bloomberg, 2015) indicates that growth in copper mining capacity 
around the world will increase for the next few years. RTGE Staff (2015:2) states 
further that if the 2015 price of copper is taken to indicate the scrap markets' health, it 
portrays a gloomy picture. The LME copper price fell to $ 5 240 per metric ton in July 
2015, the lowest in six years. 
2.4.4 Australia 
Australia is also targeted for copper theft, and her black market expands daily. This 
harms the community which influences the economy of the country. According to a 
report by the Crime and Misconduct Commission Queensland (CMC 2012:10) copper 
is stolen from locations such as power stations, railway lines, telecommunications 
facilities, churches, construction sites and unoccupied buildings.  
Most copper cable thefts in Queensland are opportunistic and unsophisticated. There 
have nevertheless been some instances of larger-scale, organised copper thefts. In 
2010, for example, one group of offenders stole three tons of copper cabling from 11 
substations in South-East Queensland (CMC 2012:10). The offenders were believed 
to have committed the thefts to fund their drug use and, although they were not 
organised criminals in the traditional sense, their offences nevertheless showed 
considerable co-operation and planning. Queensland Police Service officers indicated 
that the nature of offences in Queensland suggest that organised groups of offenders 
with specialist knowledge and skills are involved in most copper cable thefts. For 
example, recent cases have involved copper cable being removed from underground; 
a feat almost certainly requiring an electrician and multiple offenders with technical 
skills to remove and transport the materials (CMC Queensland, 2012:10).  
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According to the CMC Queensland (2012:10), despite the indication of a few organised 
copper thefts, the CMC has not received reports of cases involving traditional 
organised crime groups. The offenders in the example described above, for instance, 
were low-level drug users, who committed their offences to fund their drug use. 
Organised copper cable theft in Queensland in 2012 seems to be the domain of a 
loose network of offenders with familial or social connections. There are no indications 
of a large or increasing problem with organised copper cable theft in Queensland. 
However, the issue should be monitored over the next few years, for two key reasons. 
i. Copper theft, in general, is a large and growing problem overseas. In the USA, for 
instance, metal theft insurance claims increased from less than 14 000 between 
2006–2008 to over 25 000 in 2009–2011 (Speer, 2012). Similarly, copper thefts 
from UK railways rose by 70 per cent over 12 months, on top of a 65 per cent 
increase the year before (Herrmann, 2012; McCorkell, 2011). These trends are 
believed to have been driven by dramatic increases in copper prices fuelled by the 
high demand for copper to support rapid industrialisation in China (Tan, 2017). 
Some experts predict that the global demand for copper (and thus prices) will 
continue to increase. The same factors apply to Queensland and may result in 
similar increases in copper cable theft. With this comes the potential for organised 
offenders to increase their involvement in copper cable thefts to make considerable 
profits. Indeed, organised crime networks have been implicated in the UK (Adam, 
2011; Gladdis, 2011), and have been identified previously in Australia when copper 
prices reached record highs. In early 2008, authorities uncovered a Victorian 
network trying to ship $ 2.7 million worth of stolen copper wiring to the Asian black 
market (CMC, 2012:9). 
ii. Copper theft can have significant and wide-reaching effects. These include: 
o severe risks to health and safety, including the risk of electrocution for offenders, 
utility workers and members of the public, as well as explosions and flooding 
(CMC, 2012:9), 
o disruption to daily living, including the loss of water and electricity supplies, and 
interruptions to transport and telecommunications services (CMC, 2012:10), 
o increases in the cost of living. The costs of repairing the damage caused by 
copper cable thieves often far exceed the value of stolen copper – in the 
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Queensland case described above, the offenders caused around $ 750 000 
worth of damage. These costs are then passed on to consumers through 
increased building costs, utility costs, transport costs and insurance premiums 
(CMC, 2012:9).  
The extent of these adverse effects in Queensland would be amplified by any future 
increase in organised copper theft. This highlights the importance of monitoring the 
situation and intervening early if any increasing trend starts to emerge. Given that 
organised copper cable theft is not currently a significant problem in Queensland, it is 
difficult to determine the critical contributors. However, the following factors are likely 
to be influential (Tan, 2017): 
o Many locations where copper is kept are perceived as ‘soft targets’ – that is, 
they are thought to be isolated, insecure or easily accessible. For example, 
electrical substations are often found away from residential areas, and 
construction sites are easily accessible before the lock-up stage. For organised 
offences, insider involvement (for example, through employees of construction, 
utility, or transport companies) might also facilitate access to copper. 
o People are willing to buy stolen copper. These include disreputable, non-
compliant and unregistered metal recyclers, who do not notify police upon 
receiving goods believed to be stolen. This is less likely in large-scale 
operations, which might instead attempt to capitalise on overseas black markets 
that allow more copper to be sold at higher prices. 
According to the CMC (2012:13), organised copper cable theft could increase over the 
next two to three years, in Queensland if the demand for copper (especially in Asia) 
continues to grow, and if organised crime groups see this as a reasonable opportunity 
for making money. Slessor (2018:2) quotes Alan Morgan, the Managing Director of 
Recycling Australia who states that copper remains one of the highest value scrap 
metals in Australia and that there are still plenty of illegal scrap metal companies who 
will take illegal copper cable and other scrap metals for cash. Depending on the quality 
and type of copper cable, it is probably the highest value scrap at the moment. Thieves 
can go to any scrap metal company, and while the legitimate scrap metal companies 
will still take registration numbers, driver’s license and all the seller details, the illegal 
scrap companies will take the cabling with no questions asked.  
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Slessor (2018:3) states that work sites are often the target of theft of tools and 
materials like scrap metals, and he believes it is a common theft Australia-wide. There 
have been some changes in the industry where New South Wales is now cashless, 
Victoria is heading that way, and it is recommended that other States follow suit. This 
means that law enforcement can trace income resulting from the theft of copper cable. 
Copper cable is an easy target for theft, and illegitimate companies fuel the problem 
by offering quick cash. During May 2018, the commodity prices across the board were 
high. The price for steel was around $ 2000 per ton compared to between $ 7-8000 
per ton for copper. The theft of copper cable is undoubtedly an opportunistic crime 
made easier because copper does not contain serial numbers or other identifiable 
features and is virtually untraceable (Slessor, 2018:3).  
 2.4.5 Canada 
According to the Canadian Electricity Association (CEA), stealing copper cable from 
electricity infrastructure is extremely dangerous (CEA, 2015:12). It not only puts the 
lives of the thieves in danger, but emergency first responders, utility workers, and 
residents as well. The theft of copper cable from electricity infrastructure can cause 
fires, explosions, severe or fatal burns, and deadly electric shocks. According to CEA 
(2015:2), copper cable theft is costly to the electricity sector. With hundreds of incidents 
occurring in provinces and territories across Canada year after year, copper cable theft 
costs to electricity utilities are high. While these variables provide a reasonable 
estimate for a typical incident's costs, they often do not include the cost of additional 
jobs that are delayed while crews undertake repairs to replace the stolen copper cable.  
 
CEA members argue that copper cable theft costs the Canadian electricity sector 
approximately $ 40 million each year (CEA, 2015:11). Canada’s electricity sector is not 
the only sector feeling the impact. Copper cable theft also impacts the construction, 
rail, and telecommunications sector. Copper cable theft has an impact on everybody 
and is becoming an issue of national security in Canada. The City of Calgary's police 
department now has an entire full-time police unit dedicated to the investigation of 
copper cable theft. Cities across Canada have been plagued by copper cable theft, 
and the City of Surrey announced that they had spent $ 3.5 million repairing streetlights 
damaged by copper cable thieves. In response to this prohibitive cost, the City of 
Surrey has decided to eliminate copper cables in street lighting and replace it with less 
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valuable material. While this might be the right strategy for the City of Surrey to take, 
it means that copper cable thieves will be on the hunt for other sources of copper in 
the community. Copper and other valuable materials on construction sites or 
compounds could thus be targeted (CEA, 2015:8). 
2.5  SUMMARY  
The chapter presented an overview of copper cable theft in South Africa and 
internationally. The magnitude of copper cable theft was highlighted and supplemented 
with an overview of its impact on the economy. Particular attention was also given to 
copper cable theft internationally.  
Chapter three focuses on strategies for preventing copper theft. 
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CHAPTER 3 
AN OVERVIEW OF STRATEGIES TO PREVENT COPPER CABLE THEFT 
3.1  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides a contextual outline of strategies to prevent copper cable theft. 
The chapter begins by discussing current SA legislation on copper cable theft. The 
chapter further presents an outline of prominent role-players combating copper cable 
theft in the country. The chapter also explores international measures implemented to 
address copper cable theft. Lastly, this chapter provides a synopsis of the modus 
operandi followed by copper cable thieves. 
3.2  AN OVERVIEW OF LEGISLATION PERTAINING TO COPPER   
 THEFT IN SOUTH AFRICA 
The SAPS is the custodian of all laws in South Africa and has the responsibility of 
combating crime such as copper cable theft. To understand the legal response to the 
crime, it is crucial to unpack the legislative framework regulating copper cable theft in 
South Africa. This will ensure a better understanding of the law and provide a platform 
for proper planning in line with the legislative framework. The researcher posits that 
the legislative framework must be firmly integrated between forensic investigators, 
legal services, crime intelligence, parastatals, and the DOJ&CD to ensure an effective 
and efficient criminal justice system response to copper cable theft.  
3.2.1 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
Section 205(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereinafter 
the Constitution) stipulates that the objectives of the SAPS are to prevent, combat and 
investigate crime, to maintain public order, to protect and secure the inhabitants of the 
Republic and their property and to uphold and enforce the law. 
Section 24 of the Constitution, as the cornerstone of South African law, highlights that 
everyone has the right to - 
(a) to an environment that is not harmful to their health or wellbeing; and 
(b) to have the environment protected for the benefit of present and future 
generations, through reasonable legislative and other measures that – 
(i) prevent pollution and ecological degradation; 
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(ii) promote conservation; and  
(iii) secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural 
resources while promoting justifiable economic and social development. 
In light of the above, it is essential to note that once perpetrators have stolen copper 
cable the material is burnt (thus making the material unrecognizable) and this is usually 
done illegally in open spaces. This action contributes to pollution and impacts the 
environment negatively. It also allows for the creation of pockets of criminal activity in 
certain areas that negatively impact public safety and security.  
3.2.2 The Second-Hand Goods Control Act 6 of 2009 
The purpose of the Second-Hand Goods Control Act 6 of 2009 is to regulate dealers 
in second-hand goods and pawnbrokers, to combat trade in stolen goods (including 
copper); to promote ethical standards in the second-hand goods trade; and to provide 
for matters connected therewith. 
According to clause 4 of the National Instruction 2 of 2016 (which logistically 
implements the Act):   
(a) Section 25(4)(b) criminalises dealing in and possession of controlled (non-
ferrous) metal (i.e., copper) of which the cover has been burnt. This section 
of the Act provides that cable consisting of controlled metal of which the cover 
has been burnt, may not be possessed, acquired, or disposed of unless there 
is a good reason why the cover is burnt. Any transaction in burnt cable must 
also be reported to the police before the transaction is completed. 
(b) This prohibition will not only assist the SAPS in the detection and prosecution 
of cable thieves but function as a deterrent to persons who illegally deal in 
burnt cable, as a contravention may attract a possible maximum penalty of 10 
years imprisonment. 
Section 28(1) of the Second-Hand Goods Control Act 6 of 2009, states: 
Routine inspections: A police official may during times when business activity 
in respect of Second-Hand Goods is taking place, enter the premises of any 
registered dealer in order to investigate compliance with this Act and require 
the dealer, owner, an employee, or the person in control of the premises to: 
(a) Produce the certificate of registration relating to that premises of inspection; 
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(b) Produce any register, record, book, or other document relating to the goods 
in or on the premises for inspection or for the purposes of obtaining copies 
thereof or extracts there from. 
(c) Produce any goods [e.g., copper cable] found in or on such premises for 
examination; or  
(d) Explain any entry or absence of any entry [e.g., copper cable] in any register, 
book record or document found therein or thereon. 
 
Furthermore, Section 28(2) states: 
 If, upon any inspection, a police official discovers that any method of dealing, 
recording of transactions in registers or storage that is being used is in 
contravention of this Act, the Police Official may – 
  Demand immediate discontinuation of the method, and afford the dealer a period 
of no more than seven days to rectify such method in order to ensure compliance 
with the Act. 
From the researcher’s work experience in ensuring compliance in terms of this Act, he 
opines that Section 28(1) and 28(2) must be amended to ensure that they have a 
significant impact on the control of copper cable theft, thus making the enforcement of 
the Act effective and efficient. Second-hand goods dealers in the industry do not 
ensure compliance with Act 6 of 2009, especially in terms of Section 28(1) and (2). 
3.2.3 The Criminal Matters Amendment Act 18 of 2015 
The purpose of this Act is stated in its preamble (which is discussed further below): 
To amend the Criminal Procedure Act, 51 of 1977 (South Africa, 1977), to 
regulate bail in respect of essential infrastructure-related offences; to 
amend the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1997, to regulate the imposition 
of discretionary minimum sentences for essential infrastructure-related 
offences; to create a new offence relating to essential infrastructure; to 
amend the Prevention of Organised Crime Act, 121 of 1998 (South Africa, 
1998), to insert a new offence in Schedule 1 to the Act; and to provide for 
matters connected therewith. 
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3.2.3.1 Bail in respect of essential infrastructure-related offences 
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 59 and 59A of the Criminal Procedure 
Act, 51 of 1977, an accused person who is in custody in respect of— 
(a) any offence involving ferrous or non-ferrous metal which formed part of essential 
infrastructure; or  
(b) an offence referred to in section 3 of this Act, Criminal Matters Amendment Act, 
18 of 2015 (South Africa, 2015) may only be released on bail in accordance 
with the provisions of section 60 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977. 
3.2.3.2 Offences relating to essential infrastructure 
In terms of Section 3(1): 
Any person who unlawfully and intentionally – 
(a) Tampers with, damages or destroys essential infrastructure in; or 
(b) Concludes with or assists another person in the commission, performance or 
carrying out of an activity referred to in paragraph (a), and who knows or ought 
reasonably to have known or suspected that it is essential infrastructure, is 
guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to a period of imprisonment not 
exceeding 30 years or, in the case of a corporate body as contemplated in 
section 332(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977, a fine not exceeding  
R 100 million 
3.2.4 Common Law 
According to Kemp, Walker, Palmer, Baqwa, Gevers and Steynberg (2018:375&376), 
the elements of the common law crime of theft are:  
o Unlawfulness 
Unlawfulness may be negated by Y consenting to the removal of the property by X. 
Other circumstances negating unlawfulness include negotiorumgestio and the 
application of the de minimis rule. 
o Intent 
The element excludes consideration of motive and negligence. The State is not 
required to prove that the removal of an article (copper cable) was for gain. Nor is it 




South African law has adopted the Roman-law element of contrectatio, which requires 
the assumption of control by X of Y’s property. However, control may be assumed 
without the actual removal or carrying away of the article. One school of thought 
contends that the Roman law of contrectatio should be replaced with the more flexible 
concept of appropriation, which focuses on an assumption of X's ownership rights to 
the detriment of Y, who has been deprived of his proprietary rights. The property must 
be capable of being stolen.  
To the extent that theft involves the taking of property, it must be physically capable of 
being moved. This requirement excludes from the ambit of theft, the following: 
i. Immovables:  For example, buildings, farmland, and so on. 
ii. Incorporeal:  These are things that cannot be perceived by the senses, such as 
rights and duties, instead of corporals, such as a book or a car, which can. Only 
corporeal, movable things can be stolen. 
3.2.5   Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 
The Criminal Procedure Act, 51 of 1977 details the procedure for the whole criminal 
law system, including search and seizure, arrest, the filing of charges, bail, the plea, 
the testimony of witnesses and the law of evidence, the verdict and sentence, and 
appeal. 
3.2.5.1 Bail Restriction: Section 2 
Section 2 of the Criminal Matters Amendment Act excludes the application of Section 
59 and 59A of the CPA. Consequently, there is no discretion for police officials and 
prosecutors to grant bail to persons charged with essential infrastructure-related 
offences. 
 
Only the courts may deal with bail applications for these offences in terms of Section 
60 of the CPA. 
3.2.5.2 Bail Restriction: Section 4 
Section 4 amends Schedule 5 to the CPA by inserting certain essential infrastructure-
related offences into the Schedule, including the new offence created in Section 3(1). 
An accused charged with these offences may only be released on bail if the accused 
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adduces evidence which satisfies the court that the interest of justice permits their 
release. 
3.2.6 The Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998 
The Prevention of Organised Crime Act introduced laws that work against organised 
crime and gang activities, focusing on money-laundering and racketeering or illegal 
business activities. All illegal activities, as mentioned above, play a key role during 
copper cable theft. Crimes related to gangs, money-laundering or racketeering can be 
prosecuted in terms of this Act, even if the crime was committed before the Act came 
about, or if it was committed by a South African in another country. 
 
The researcher contends that copper cable theft should attract charges for high 
treason or sabotage where state security is involved or affected by the crime.  
3.2.7 The Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004 
According to the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act, corruption and 
related activities undermine rights, endanger societies' stability and security, 
undermine the institutions and values of democracy and ethical values and morality, 
jeopardise governments' sustainable development, and provide a breeding ground for 
organised crime. 
3.3  PROMINENT ROLE-PLAYERS IN THE COMBATING OF COPPER 
CABLE THEFT IN SOUTH AFRICA 
It has become critical that all role-players involved in combatting copper cable theft in 
South Africa must be integrated and function as one entity with the primary focus on 
pro-active combating; further enhancing conviction rates for copper cable theft. The 
following discussion presents an overview of the prominent role-players involved in 
combating copper cable theft in South Africa.  
3.3.1 The South African Police Service 
The SAPS Annual Performance Plan 2010/2011:12 (SAPS, 2015:12) indicates that 
the SAPS must focus on copper cable theft in South Africa. The SAPS derive its 
powers and functions from section 205 of the Constitution and the South African Police 
Service Act 68 of 1995. This legislation regulates the police service in terms of its core 
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functions, which are to prevent, investigate and combat crime, such as copper cable 
theft. 
The Annual Performance Plan 2017/18 (SAPS, 2018:150) states that the National 
Investigation Unit is responsible for the effective investigation of allocated/instructed 
case dockets and to prevent, combat and investigate, among other crimes, copper 
cable theft. The SAPS Annual Performance Plan 2018/2019 (SAPS, 2019:3) states 
that the Mining Crime Combating Forum and the NFMCCC should be operationalised 
at the appropriate organisational levels to effectively combat copper cable theft and 
focus on an operational approach to address theft of copper cable. According to the 
SAPS Strategic Plan 2014-2019 (SAPS, 2019:17) investigation of the theft of 
environmental assets and natural resources, namely, non-ferrous metals (copper 
cable theft, electricity theft), should be pro-active.  
3.3.1.1 Directorate for Priority Crime Investigations  
The DPCI is mandated to prevent, combat, and investigate national priority offences 
and serious organised crime (such as copper cable theft); serious commercial crime; 
and serious corruption. 
 
According to Pretorius (2012:14), the mandate of the DPCI can be expanded as 
follows: 
o The DPCI investigates non-ferrous metals related crimes as a national priority 
crime.  
o The DPCI appointed a Champion to deal with organised crime syndicates 
effectively. 
o National and Provincial Desks were established in September 2011, to focus on 
non-ferrous metals related investigations to enhance co-ordination and 
investigation of organised crime syndicates. 
 
The courts are also taking this crime seriously, and significant sentences are being 
handed out to perpetrators. A joint industry working group, formed by Eskom, 
Transnet, Telkom, the SAPS, the NPA and the SACCI, contributes positively to the 
fight against this crime. Of the 8 988 cable theft incidents reported between 2012 and 
2016, a recorded 1 159 arrests were made. This indicates that something is being 
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done to avert this crime and indicates that a lot more can still be done to reduce its 
impact (Gaffar, 2016). 
 
Beukman (2018:1), opines that DPCI had identified 39 hotspots for illegal mining in 
various provinces including Limpopo, Mpumalanga, North West, Gauteng, and Free 
State. The DPCI’s increased targeting of, and incursions into operational mines, have 
persisted and they have introduced countermeasures in line with their mandate. 
Beukman (2018:1) quotes Kadwa the former DPCI Acting Head: Organised Crime Unit 
who states that 52 cases of copper theft were reported in the first quarter of 2017/18. 
Kadwa states that a project-driven investigation was initiated during June 2016, 
focusing on a criminal group involved in theft and dealing in illegal unwrought precious 
metals.  
3.3.2 Non-Ferrous Metals Crime Combating Committee  
The strategic objectives of the NFMCCC are as follows: 
 Strategic Objective 1: Led by NFMCCC and assisted by the National Intelligence 
Co-ordinating Committee (NICOC), the NFMCCC co-ordinates and consolidates 
the government’s effort to combat theft and illicit trade in ferrous and non-ferrous 
metals in partnership with affected industries.  
 Strategic Objective 2: All role-players co-ordinated/monitored by NFMCCC (no 
executive authority). Mitigate theft and illicit trade in ferrous and non-ferrous metals 
across the illicit value chain (detect, prevent, combat, investigate and prosecute)  
 Strategic Objective 3: South African Revenue Protection Association (SARPA) and 
the involvement of DIRCO to be strengthened by regional and international co-
operation to combat infrastructure-related crimes.  
 Strategic Objective 4: DOJ&CD to enhance legislative and regulatory frameworks 
to assist interventions. 
There are various multi-disciplinary forums, such as the Intelligence Sub-Committee 
on Non-Ferrous Metals (ISCNFM), which report to the NFMCCC as the oversite body 
for non-ferrous metal theft. Individual perpetrators are being addressed with disruptive 
policing operations whilst syndicates are addressed through covert intelligence 
operations, utilizing unconventional methodologies. Both strategies continue in court 
62 
driven projects where intelligence operatives collaborate with the general detective 
service or DPCI to address this threat.  
 
According to para. 3 of the SAPS Circular 2/28/23 of 2011 (SAPS, 2011) the mandate as 
set out below was developed for the NFMCCC to address the theft of non-ferrous metals 
actively: 
o Establishing and maintaining an NFMCCC to address theft and related crimes 
pertaining to non-ferrous metals. 
o Implementing a joint venture between the relevant stakeholders to effectively address 
crime pertaining to non-ferrous metals on a national and provincial level. 
o Co-ordinating integrated crime combating operations that focus on the 
suppliers/dealers and end-users. 
o Monitoring the import and export of non-ferrous metals. 
o Launching and implementing a non-ferrous metal anti-crime communication plan and 
strategy, including educational awareness campaigns. 
o Monitoring investigations pertaining to non-ferrous metal-related crimes. 
o Establishing governance to deal with non-ferrous metals in SAP 13 stores effectively: 
and 
o Establishing mechanisms (training) for the effective identification of non-ferrous by 
law enforcement officers. 
Booysens (2013:1) supports the mandate for implementing the NFMCCC and states that 
a training manual will further assist the SAPS in effectively implementing the Second-
Hand Goods Act 6 of 2009, which came into effect May 2012. The Act stipulates that any 
person buying stolen goods, including copper cable, is as guilty as the person who stole 
it. If a dealer is found guilty, a court could impose a prison sentence of up to ten years. 
The SAPS is the custodian of the NFMCCC and mandated to chair committee meetings. 
The forum, which was established in 1993, involves role-players such as the SAPS, 
BACSA, Eskom, Transnet, and JSE-listed telecommunications group Telkom and 
Metrorail mines, municipalities, and representatives from many government 
departments. Booysens (2013:1) states further that the NFMCCC holds national and 
provincial meetings aimed at preventing non-ferrous metal thefts across South Africa. 
These meetings are currently also conducted quarterly at the station level, illustrating the 
SAPS’s commitment to stopping non-ferrous metal theft.  
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3.3.3 Combined Private Investigations 
CPI is a corporate investigation firm, specialising in investigating non-ferrous metal 
theft, explicitly focusing on syndicates targeting electrical networks for most of the 
electricity supply companies and the railway networks. In addition, CPI secures and 
tracks high-value cargo, with its unique, robust locking mechanisms and its top of the 
range tracking devices, for both road and rail transportation and logistics agents. CPI 
also conducts investigations of hi-jacking or theft of any non-ferrous metal or high 
valued cargo and prides itself in its excellent recovery levels (CPI, 2019).  
3.3.4 Eskom 
Eskom’s mandate is to provide efficient and sustainable electricity, including 
generation, transmission, distribution, and retail services (Eskom, 2011:13). However, 
provision of these services are hampered as a result of theft and damage to Eskom 
infrastructure. According to Noah (2012), Eskom’s former Group Executive of 
Distribution, a total number of 1 591 conductor theft incidents were reported during 
between April and December 2011 (cable 1 399, overhead conductor 118 and earth 
straps from substations 74 incidents). Total losses (direct costs) suffered are estimated 
at R22, 022,855. A total of 292 perpetrators were arrested. Material to the value of  
R 2, 477,033 was recovered. In response to Eskom’s losses suffered, Noah (2012) 
presents the following strategies: 
 
○ Internal strategies, such as, improving the intelligence network, implementation of 
the Eskom Network Crime Equipment Committee, conduct surveillance, do line 
patrols, and conduct investigations (Eskom contractor), and awareness creation 
strategies in conjunction with public safety initiatives. 
○ External strategies, such as, training of law enforcers on impact and material 
identification, constructive participation in forums such as NFCCC, scrap dealers 
disruptive operations, enforcement of the new Second Hand Goods Act, and joint 
ventures with other state owned enterprises.   
○ Integrated strategies, such as, joint intelligent gathering and strategy sharing in 
forums such as the NFMCCC, create localised armed response teams to be 
deployed when required, patrolling of high risk feeders/lines/cables and 
infrastructure based on intelligence information and previous crime activities and 
trends, conduct search operations on illegal scrap dealers, and joint operations with 
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law enforcement agencies to facilitate successful prosecutions.  
   
3.3.5 Passenger Rail Agency South Africa  
According to the Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa Annual Report 2012/2013 
(PRASA, 2013), the main aim and principal business of PRASA is to:  
Ensure that, at the request of the Department of Transport, rail 
commuter services are provided within, to and from the 
Republic in the public interest, and provide, in consultation with 
the Department of Transport, for a long-haul passenger rail 
and bus services within, to and from the Republic in terms of 
the principles set out in section 4 of the National Land 
Transport Transition Act, 22 of 2000.  
 
The City of Cape Town, PRASA, and the Western Cape Government formed a 
dedicated enforcement unit to focus on Metrorail commuters and infrastructure's safety 
and security. The Rail Enforcement Unit (REU) consists of 100 officers deployed on 
28 October 2018. 
 
The REU has made huge strides in combatting criminal elements which embattle the 
City of Cape Town’s Metrorail services. In 2018, for example, Cape Town’s public 
transportation system suffered a series of severe blows at the hands of shadowy 
criminal forces. Fire engulfed trains and busses without prejudice, leaving thousands 
of commuters stranded – adding further strain to the region’s already congested roads. 
Metrorail, a subsidiary of PRASA, bore the worst of the brunt. 
The REU has recorded thirty-six arrests on a range of charges including assault, 
possession of drugs and stolen property, malicious damage to property and copper 
cable theft. According to the Western Cape department of transport and public works, 
it has confiscated 379,5 metres of copper cable and 800 kilograms of railway 




As indicated in the PRASA Annual Report (2013) the South African Rail Commuter 
Corporation (SARCC) is an agency of the Department of Transport responsible for 
providing commuter rail services in South Africa. It has the custodianship of all 
commuter rail assets such as stations, infrastructure and rolling stock. Through its 
wholly owned subsidiary, Intersite Property Management Services (Intersite), new 
stations are built, upgraded, managed, and maintained. The primary and secondary 
objects of the SARCC, as stated in the Legal Succession to the South African 
Transport Services Act 9 of 1989, are to ensure that, at the request of the Department 
of Transport or any sphere of government, rail commuter services are provided in the 
public interest, and to promote rail as the primary mode of mass commuter 
transportation. The secondary objective is to generate income from the exploitation of 
assets transferred to the SARCC by the Minister of Transport under Section 25 of Legal 
Succession to the South African Transport Services 9 of 1989. 
 
According to the Western Cape Government (2019:1), vandalism costs Metrorail 
approximately R 70 million per year. Delayed and cancelled trains lead to lower 
productivity and job losses. To combat this, Metrorail has started offering monetary 
rewards for information about copper cable theft and other vandalism; fitted sixteen 
stations with Close Circuit Television (CCTV) cameras; constructed a wall between 
Nyanga and Bonteheuwel station to combat criminal behaviour, tightened security and 
added visible policing.  
Dordley (2019:1) reports that during 2018 Metrorail first implemented additional 
security resources to stop the recurrent incidences of vandalism and copper cable theft 
on the Western Cape’s rail network. The team has responded to more than 258 
incidences in the past year and made 347 arrests. The most targeted material proved 
to be underground signal cable, nearly all of which was recovered by the team. The 
team recovers on average R 380 722 72 worth of stolen material every month. 
3.3.7 Telkom 
According to the Telkom Integrated Report (2018:9), Telkom is a leading information 
and communications technology (ICT) service provider in South Africa, offering fixed-
line, mobile, data and information technology (IT) services. 
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Smith (2013:21) states that the protection and prevention of copper cable theft by 
Telkom is affected via:   
o Alarming of cable routes (on a zoned and priority basis).  
o Securing the network.  
o Welding manhole lids.  
o Covering cable runs with concrete. 
o Burying cable runs up to 2 m deep. 
o Replacing overhead with underground cable. 
o Replacing wooden poles with steel or concrete. 
o Lashing overhead cables to steel wires. 
o Securing the bottom of wooden poles with concrete or metal mesh. 
o Deployment of contracted armed response teams. 
o Patrolling of identified hotspots. 
o Special hot-spot initiatives, including the use of helicopters. 
o Raids on suspected scrap dealers in co-operation with SAPS. 
3.4  AN OVERVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL MEASURES TO ADDRESS 
COPPER CABLE THEFT 
To establish a feasible method to mitigate copper theft in South Africa, it is essential 
to explore the accomplishments and failures of copper cable theft prevention initiatives 
implemented in other countries. Consequently, the section hereunder explores 
measures implemented to mitigate copper cable theft in the USA, UK, France, Italy, 
Germany, and Bulgaria.  
3.4.1  United States of America 
According to a report from the FBI Criminal Intelligence Section (2008:1), industry 
officials have taken counter strategies and measures to address the copper cable theft 
problem. These include installing physical and technological security measures, 
increased collaboration among the various industry sectors, law enforcement 
partnerships and sharing of best practices. Many States are also taking 
countermeasures by enacting or enhancing legislation regulating the scrap industry to 
include increased record-keeping requirements and penalties for copper theft and non-
compliant scrap dealers. However, there are limited resources available to enforce 
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these laws, and a small percentage of perpetrators are arrested and convicted. 
Additionally, as copper thefts are typically addressed as offences (instead of felonies), 
those convicted pay relatively low fines and serve short prison terms. 
 
According to Schoenfelder (2009), the typical change in legislation involves increasing 
penalties for theft of copper cable and other metals and initiating new or increasing 
existing reporting requirements for vendors, such as recycling facilities, which buy 
scrap metal.  
 
According to Schoenfelder (2009), some successful strategies and techniques used 
by other organisations in preventing the theft of copper cable include:  
o Using Copper Keeper, a wire locking device that can be installed in conduit.  
o Installing tamper-resistant units on cabinets, poles, and pull boxes.  
o Performing security assessments on critical locations and taking hardening 
measures, including apprehending thieves instead of chasing them off.  
o Limiting the storage of copper cable to service centres and not using outlying 
facilities. 
o Placing guards on job sites.  
o Installing wiring and security devices on all job sites.  
o Burying pull boxes.  
o Installing alarm systems in the pull boxes. 
 
Other organisations' unsuccessful techniques for preventing copper cable theft include 
covering pull boxes with concrete slab and police surveillance. 
 
Schoenfelder (2009) indicates other techniques being used, which have unknown or 
inconclusive results include: 
o Purchasing an enclosed trailer to move the copper cable from site to site.  
o Requesting local law enforcement to look out for copper thieves.  
o Asking the public through the media to report suspicious activities.  
o Using Data Dots.  
o Using security screws.  
o Delivering copper material on an as-needed basis. 
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o Painting copper grounds at substations. 
 
While police seek suspects, the Metropolitan Transportation Authority, which runs the 
subways has installed more high-intensity lighting and surveillance technology in 
vulnerable locations. (Associated Press, 2015), the transit police chief, has also 
created a special unit to investigate these types of thefts, with undercover officers 
conducting sting operations at salvage yards (Associated Press, 2015). According to 
West Bend (2020:1), the following steps can be taken to avoid the ever-growing theft 
of copper cable: 
 Paint copper black  
An easy and inexpensive way to deter copper thieves is to paint all copper components 
black. This causes the copper to look like regular, worthless plastic tubing that no one 
would waste the time to steal. 
 Fence areas containing copper 
Areas containing copper items are always a potential target, and depending on the 
value of the item, a fence may be worth the investment. The amount of copper in most 
commercial air conditioners is never worth a significant amount, but the actual cost 
comes from the unit's destruction.  
 Install an alarm system 
Installing an alarm system to protect the copper from theft is a great way to deter 
potential thieves and catch those who attempt to steal. There are many alarm systems, 
and choosing one will depend on the location and type of object in need of 
protection. For heating and cooling units, for example, some alarms are triggered if the 
unit stops working. 
 Security cameras 
Aside from deterring prospective thieves, surveillance cameras can help police capture 
thieves, resulting in either the return of stolen goods or offenders' incarceration, thus 
preventing future thefts. 
 Hire security guards 
Ninety per cent of all copper theft in the USA occurs during the night or over weekends, 
which is logical since these times are when business premises are most likely 
empty. Recognising the increased risk of theft during these periods can significantly 
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reduce the chances of copper theft. Hiring staff or security personal to monitor the 
facility during these periods can significantly reduce the chances of a severe loss. 
3.4.2 United Kingdom 
In 2012, UK law enforcement and the British Metals Recycling Association introduced 
a joint programme called Operation Tornado (Wiltshire Times, 2013: 1). Cook (2015: 
43) explains that Operation Tornado was first started in County Durham - an area 
severely impacted by copper theft - to reduce copper theft incidents by placing a 
significant investigative and regulatory emphasis on the scrap dealers' functioning in 
the UK. According to O’Donnell (2012), as part of Operation Tornado, licensed scrap 
metal dealers operating in the county agreed to buy scrap metal only after receiving 
valid photo identification from the seller and then maintaining a copy of the 
identification for six months. The sale of scrap metal in exchange for cash payments 
without proof of identification is long believed by law enforcement to be a significant 
reason why copper theft is such a lucrative enterprise. In addition to the enhanced 
regulation, law enforcement entities, including the Durham, Cleveland, and 
Northumbria Police Forces, continued a multi-jurisdictional effort to identify and arrest 
known copper wire thieves. Additionally, regulators undertake periodic, and 
unannounced inspection visits to scrap dealers to ensure compliance with the 
regulation. 
 
Operation Tornado appeared to demonstrate that the programme's licensing 
component had a considerable effect on crime rates. The British Transport Police 
(BTP) reported that County Durham reported a 55 per cent reduction in copper theft 
and a 60 per cent decrease in copper wire theft from railroad property patrolled by the 
BTP. Operation Tornado's success caused the government to take notice, and a strong 
effort was made to find ways to replicate the success of the operation nationwide. The 
National Metal Theft Task Force, led by the British Transport Police, was launched in 
conjunction with Operation Tornado in January of 2012. Francavilla (2014) explains 
the task force initially included the BTP, local and regional police forces, 
representatives from several industry associations, insurance companies, and the 
British Metals Recycling Association. Developing from the task force and Operation 
Tornado's achievements, a legislative resolution responding to the metal theft 
challenge was passed by the government in early 2013. The Scrap Metal Dealers Act 
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of 2013 became law on February 28, 2013. Several conditions of the new law were 
included because of the National Metal Task Force and Operation Tornado. In terms 
of the law, scrap dealers are no longer allowed to pay for scrap metal with cash 
payments. Instead, all transactions must occur by either cheque or electronic transfer, 
thus ensuring an everlasting record of the transaction. Stolen scrap metal sold to a 
licensed dealer could therefore be effortlessly traced by law enforcement by merely 
viewing the recorded identify of the seller, as well as tracing the financial transaction 
(Cook, 2015: 45). 
3.4.3 France 
Cook (2015: 56) explains that the French response to the escalating number of copper 
wire thefts has been varied, depending on various legislative, governing, and official 
enforcement techniques. Resulting from the country’s geographic position in Europe, 
France has had significant challenges from organised crime metal syndicates 
frequently intersecting its borders. The Connexion (2011:1) describes how the French 
embarked on a series of co-ordinated criminalisation ventures combined with new 
physical security techniques. To discourage copper wire thieves that damaged railway 
infrastructure, the French National Railway (SNCF) entered into an agreement with the 
Gendarmerie, which operates its cable theft operations through a central office, to 
provide aerial helicopter watches, consisting of high technological thermal imaging, 
over its infrastructure. These aerial patrols were also intended to examine power lines. 
Furthermore, the SNCF also procured the latest technology intended to hamper copper 
wire thieves, for example, a state-of-the-art electronic warning system invented to alert 
staff instantly of theft, while also alarming the police. 
 
In addition, the French government embarked on multiple law enforcement projects, 
for example, the Gendarmerie’s involvement with Europol, Interpol and Railpol which 
resulted in the arrest of numerous scrap metal thieves (Cook, 2015:56). Cook 
(2015:57) further explains that in 2010, the French government amended legislation 
governing the scrap recycling industry. This amendment put an end to cash 
transactions for copper or other scrap metal worth more than $ 600. Kane (2011) 
applauds the French governments' firm stance explaining that legislation has been 
revised even further by doing away with cash exchanges for any scrap metal.  
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The French government continued with its strict legislative and regulatory approach to 
scrap metal theft by implementing even firmer rules on licensed scrap dealers 
operational in France. All scrap dealers must maintain a record of all scrap materials 
purchased, including a description of the item, and a copy of the seller’s identification 
(Pol-PRIMETT, 2011). Scrap dealers are now obliged to keep the records for five 
years, and any contravention of the law results in serious criminal consequences, 
including incarceration and weighty financial penalties. 
3.4.4 Italy 
Cook (2015:69), points out that Italy has followed an approach, which is different to 
France and the UK, and depends on conventional law enforcement approaches and 
strengthening teamwork between the various role-players responsible for combating 
copper cable theft in the country. According to Delfini [s.a.], law enforcement 
operations within Italy have generally consisted of three different operation levels. The 
first level focuses on action against individual offenders and organised crime groups, 
the second on detecting black-market handling channels, and the third on detecting 
illegal export channels. However, according to Pol-PRIMETT (2011), data from the 
railway sector illustrates that law enforcement actions have had minimum impact on 
copper theft. 
 
In a discussion paper, the Council of the European Union (2014) illustrates the Italian 
government arguments for several reform bills to combat copper theft. However, due 
to widespread political differences, the government was only allowed to authorise 
legislation amending the criminal code to add aggravating circumstances to any theft 
found to include scrap metal. The legislation explicitly includes stricter punishments for 
any offence believed to be related to the theft and the “…handling and receiving of 
copper, metal components or other material stolen from infrastructures for power 
supply, transport, telecommunications, or other public services which are managed by 
public/private entities under public concession schemes.” According to the European 
Crime Prevention Network (EUCPN), apart from conventional law enforcement 
endeavours and minor legislative amendments, the Italian government developed an 
innovative and co-operative programme involving a selection of the principal role-
players to limit copper theft. Consequently, in 2012, the National Monitoring Centre on 
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Copper Theft was founded to improve collaboration among law enforcement bodies 
and the organisations working to prevent copper theft. 
3.4.5 Germany 
According to an International Union of Railways (UIC), Security Platform report (UIC, 
2013) the German state railway (Deutsche Bahn) uses synthetic Deoxyribonucleic acid 
(DNA) to mark its infrastructure resulting in the easier tracing of recovered scrap metal, 
including stolen copper. Prospective buyers are thus able to detect stolen goods. The 
DNA attaches to everyone who comes into contact with the material. Deutsche Bahn 
further collaborated with primary telecommunications and energy corporations, such 
as Deutsche Telekom, the utility provider RWE, and the Association of German Metal 
Dealers, to form the Association of German Metal Traders to improve the monitoring 
of scrap metal (Lichtenberg, 2012:1). 
3.4.6 Bulgaria 
Pol-PRIMETT (2013:176-181) demonstrates the primary police methods used to 
address metal theft in Bulgaria. These include continuous administrative control of 
metal dealers, telephone tapping and electronic espionage, and monitoring of sites 
and movements of trucks transporting metals using Global Positioning System (GPS) 
connected to an information system. Once a company’s central managing office is 
informed of property attacks, the police are also notified of such threat. However, often 
responses are too late since one of the shortcomings is that many trucks are not 
equipped with GPS systems. However, corporations have initiated prevention 
measures by, for example, implementing advance monitoring protocols for trucks 
including names and registration plates, details of the driver, photographing cargo, 
changing of routes and time schedules, instructing trucks to stop only in parking areas 
with an elevated level of organised surveillance, instructing trains to move without 
stopping or decreasing speed or to stop only at secure stations. Increased surveillance 
inside plants, transportation by train, and secure transportation of cathodes have also 
been implemented. Other measures include armed guards, video surveillance, metal 
detectors, and special security procedures, like locking electrical panels, boards, and 
transformers in the stations using a secret closing system or placing transformers high 
73 
on the electric platforms. In some of the most at-risk regions, guards monitor energy 
facilities on a full-time basis.  
However, Pol-PRIMETT (2013:176-181) reports that in the past 15 years, the number 
of methods implemented to limit metal theft has not been adequate. Consequently, 
broader measures to reduce copper theft are proposed, such as co-operation between 
various law enforcement units, society, and scrap dealers. Although such 
collaborations exist, there is room for improvement, particularly regarding control 
measures. The primary challenge is the public law governing the purchase of non-
ferrous metals as scrap. 
3.4.7 South Africa 
The court in Lindeque and Others v Hirsch and Others, In Re: Pre-paid24 (Pty) Limited 
(2019) states that although many cable thieves are apprehended, only 7 per cent of 
offenders are prosecuted because of the difficulty of proving cable ownership. 
CableDNA, a South African company, has unveiled a revolutionary cable identification 
method to overcome the problem. In Lindeque (2019:1), the court states that South 
Africa loses an estimated R 10 billion per year in productivity, the loss of lives, and 
decreased service provision due to copper cable theft. Proving ownership of stolen 
electrical cable is impossible for law enforcement officials worldwide. Thieves are 
caught at great expense and effort – but often the courts cannot convict them because 
cable ownership cannot be proven. Philip (2014:1) states that one strategy to curb 
copper cable theft is to paint or spray barely visible micro-dots onto both copper cable 
and steel infrastructure to allow the police and parastatals to identify cable as stolen 
and instantly identify its owner. 
 
Van Dalen (2017:2) states that the illegal trade in non-ferrous metals has become a 
multi-million Rand industry in South Africa, involving all social classes. Equipment and 
copper cables containing non-ferrous metals has proven to be the most dominant 
targets. Other strategic articles like drain covers, solar panels, water meters and 
transformer oil are also targeted. Van Dalen argues that all role-players must 
investigate suspects and work closely together following effective and efficient 
processes to combat copper cable theft. However, Van Dalen believes that such close 
co-operation may be challenging because the various role-players have their own 
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ideas and strategies in the fight against crime. Van Dalen (2017:2) additionally 
cautions that the time has passed where the SAPS are the sole protectors against 
crime, and he calls for the public (partnership policing) to assist in the prevention of 
copper cable theft. 
 
Arendse (2010:39) posits that the NFMCCC operates as a forum to identify trends, 
give strategic guidance and co-ordinate operations, but that the SAPS is still not 
making use of a specific crime category or prioritising copper cable theft as a priority 
crime which makes it a challenge to determine accurate statistics. Too many incidents 
occur without detection by the SAPS. The specialised training of judicial officers is not 
offered at the grass-roots level, and resultantly too many cases are withdrawn or 
prosecuted ineffectively by the NPA. BACSA, as an NFMCCC partner, is still 
investigating the issue of increased export control. The potential marking of cables has 
been considered but remains a challenge. According to Chetty (2010:2), Telkom in a 
strategic move has decided not to replace stolen copper cables but focuses on 
providing affected customers with wireless services. 
 
Goosen (2017:1) suggests that a geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) analysis to predict 
and prevent copper cable theft should be implemented in the Gauteng region 
supported by geospatial software. Goosen argues further that the full power and 
benefit of GEOINT is realised from the integration and analysis of its three core 
capabilities: imagery, imagery intelligence and geospatial information. This can 
facilitate a comprehensive visual representation of an environment based on a 
common operating picture (COP). The latter will enable forensic investigators to 
understand the bigger picture relating to copper cable theft in a specific area pro-
actively. Furthermore, it allows for in-depth crime pattern analysis using descriptive 
and predictive models such as hot spot identification for copper cable theft. 
 
The fundamental strategy of a Command, Control, Communication, Computers, 
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) approach is gaining 
information dominance over a geographical area where copper cable theft is prevalent. 
This approach has resulted in better command and control of finite resources, 
improved situational awareness and more effective decision making. However, this 
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approach requires a higher level of trained individuals, integrated sensor data and 
geospatial software systems that incorporate useful analytical capabilities. This 
presents a significant challenge for many security companies. Pretorius (2012:63) 
alluded to a lack of such capacity and skills in the South African security sector.  
 
Booysens (2013:3) believes that the most inventive and cost-effective solution to prevent 
copper cable theft involves marking cables. He states that “Cable manufacturers are 
working on a marking standard for cables produced in the future. Eskom, for example, 
cuts a groove into its aluminium cables, which are also being targeted, to prove that 
the cables belong to the entity”. Bindeman (2011:5) argues further that there are many 
initiatives regarding the marking of the copper cables. In South Africa, where most copper 
cables are unmarked, the marking of copper cables will make the products traceable and 
deter thieves. If copper cables can be marked in one way or another, it may reduce 
copper cable theft in the future. Bindeman (2011:5), states that there are five marking 
techniques. The conductor or cable can be directly marked on the surface, or the surface 
of its internal components, by using a method that either etches, indents, prints, sprays, 
or employs any other direct marking technique. 
 
According to the court in Lindeque (2019:2), this strategy allows law enforcement 
officials to identify cables with their GPS coordinates, specific cable runs and their 
owners’ details using a smartphone 24/7/365 from anywhere in the world even after 
the insulation has been burnt or stripped and copper has been granulated. Van Zyl 
(2016:1) believes that cable theft has cost Telkom over R 200 million in losses during 
the 2015 budget year alone. Van Zyl (2016:1) argues that Telkom experienced over 6 
000 incidents of copper cable theft across its copper cable network during 2015. 
Telkom’s new strategy is to migrate customers to wireless and fibre technologies to 
lower copper availability to theft syndicates. O’Sullivan, Telkom’s Group Executive for 
Communications (2016:1) stated that the price of copper and its strong demand in 
international markets are catalysts for the occurrence of crime and that copper cable 
theft has become more sophisticated over recent years. Resultantly the industrial 
equipment supplier Banding and Identification Solutions Africa has seen a rise in demand 
from the electric power sector for its Ultra-Lok open-end clamp, owing to copper cable 
theft causing substantial disruptions to South Africa’s power supply (O’ Sullivan: 2016:1). 
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Wilkinson (2017:4) opines that Ultra-Lok was initially introduced to the South African 
market in 2007 as a high-pressure hose assembly clamping solution but highlights that it 
has proven successful in preventing copper cable theft. The Ultra-Lok clamp provides a 
robust and efficient tamperproof solution that can drastically decrease cable theft in South 
Africa. Various South African companies have developed and implemented innovative 
copper cable theft mitigating measures, such as robust and corrosion-resistant clamping 
systems which lock firmly over the external copper cable attached at 5 to 10-metre 
intervals. This clamping system is swift and straightforward to attach and resists pulling 
or force exertion. These clamps further avert lengthy pieces of cable being hauled by 
powerful vehicles from underground trenches. Another innovative solution involves a 
wireless, self-powered system which provides video confirmation when alarms and 
signals are activated by copper cable theft in progress. This system is called Videofied. 
It immediately alerts the monitoring staff of attempted theft by providing video footage of 
the event. 
 
Moreover, a South African security solutions company, Holomatrix, developed a system, 
called Authenticable, a direct Polyester (PET) tape system with three unique identification 
mechanisms: a printed serial number or barcode, a nickel holographic micro-dot bearing 
a unique code and an invisible DNA taggant. The chronological printed serial numbers 
are recorded every 2,5 centimetres. The micro-dots are ingrained in the PET carrier, and 
the DNA trace is imprinted along the carrier. The tape is fixed into the conductors' core 
while being manufactured and fits with present production methods. The micro-dots and 
DNA can survive exposure to fire. The result is a unique, accurate identification and the 
ability to trace every bit of cable (Hi-Tech Security Solutions, 2011). 
 
It is trite that ferrous and non-ferrous metals and essential infrastructure-related crimes 
impact society and the government alike. Conventional and unconventional methods 
are employed to prevent the adverse effects of this threat. South Africa has a well-
developed infrastructure consisting of a large rail, road, air, and sea network. Added 
to this it has strong telephone and electricity distribution networks. This substantial 
infrastructure was built up over decades when metal was inexpensive and used 
abundantly to construct roads, bridges, railway lines, and electricity and 
telecommunication distribution networks. Pretorius (2012:1) states that the potential 
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future threat to infrastructure via copper thieves was not considered at that time. 
Infrastructure crimes (ferrous, non-ferrous, and essential infrastructure-related crimes) 
remain a national priority that should be addressed operationally; primarily to combat 
the scourge and strategically control and prevent future occurrences. The key drivers 
of copper theft include socio-economic aspects like poverty, unemployment, and the 
continually flourishing scrap metal and recycling markets. Copper and aluminium theft 
have existed for many years and have intensified to such an extent that losses run into 
millions of Rand annually. Exacerbating this is the steady increase in copper prices. 
The increasing value of copper cable creates a lucrative market for the theft and 
exportation of illegal copper products regionally and internationally.  
3.5  MODUS OPERANDI  
A forensics investigator must clearly understand the modus operandi for copper cable 
theft to ensure an effective investigation and successful conviction.  
 
Torkelson (2010:1 & 2) states that organised crime networks have been implicated in 
the theft of miles of copper cable from peri-urban and rural areas in Gauteng, the North 
West and KwaZulu-Natal. Many criminal networks are domestic, but recent evidence 
suggests the involvement of militarily trained cells from Southern Africa. Their modus 
operandi entails stealing underground cables in the early hours of the morning, or from 
electrical substations, construction sites or vehicles in transit. Criminals use hired 
vehicles to transport the copper. The perpetrators may even use trucks and 
ambulances. Organised syndicates always rely on inside information and expert 
reconnaissance. 
 
Torkelson (2010:1 & 2) states further that the consistently high price of copper makes 
it a valuable commodity for illicit business. Thieves are sophisticated market analysts, 
who decide when the price of copper has risen to a point where the crime (weighed 
against the risk) is more financially rewarding than any other. Copper is widely 
available, poorly secured, and easy to steal due to the extensive transportation, power 
and communications networks operated by Transnet, Eskom, and Telkom. It is also 
effortless to sell, due to eager scrap dealers looking to profit from the global price 
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increase. Consequently, many actors - from petty thieves and organized criminals to 
scrap dealers and private security companies – benefit from this illicit economy.  
 
According to Marsh, Melville, Morgan, Norris, and Cochrane (2011:56) “…for many 
centuries we have attempted to find out which people are likely to become criminals 
and what elements or modus operandi drives specific individuals to commit a particular 
type of crime in the first place.” Over the year’s psychologists have considered a range 
of different explanations to answer these difficult questions. Some have argued that 
there may be a genetic explanation at the centre of criminal behaviour, while others 
have suggested that it is the environment and external elements in which people live 
that can influence their chance of becoming a criminal. 
 
Venter (2008:1) states that “…the typical small-time copper thief is a subsistence 
criminal who is financially underprivileged.” These subsistence criminals' despondent 
disposition is capitalised on by organised crime syndicates that employ them to steal. 
However, they are in the minority as gangs are responsible for most copper thefts, 
while large cartels operate in the scrap trade (Pretorius, 2012:1). Labuschagne (in Zinn 
and Dintwe, 2015:277) believe that a modus operandi analysis enables law 
enforcement agencies to allocate resources better. The researcher supports the view 
put forward by Marsh et al. (2011:57), which was also found to be the case at the SAPS 
at Philippi East. 
 
Geldenhuys (2008:1) confirms that copper thieves fall into two groups: organised crime 
syndicates, who tend to export their loot; and subsistence thieves who steal a couple 
of meters of cable at a time to survive financially. Moreover, Torkelson (2010:1) states 
that petty criminals comprise the first group benefiting from copper cable theft. 
Torkelson further states that petty criminals are often already involved in collecting 
scrap metal for subsistence purposes. Drodskie (2018:1), the Executive Advisor to the 
SACCI posits that copper theft seems to be driven by syndicates.  
 
According to Le Roux (2008:1), in Telkom’s experience, most of the repeat offenders 
are undocumented immigrants who, when caught, are deported to their countries of 
origin, only to return to South Africa to commit the same crime again. The 
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undocumented immigrants fall almost entirely into the subsistence crime 
categorisation, but some are military personnel using their unique training and tactics 
to commit the crime. In many high-theft or hotspot areas, copper cables are repeatedly 
stolen, sometimes within days of replacement or repair. This implies that local repeat 
offenders are involved. These criminals are aware of the weaknesses and the 
strengths of security and their calculated chances of being caught (Le Roux, 2008:1).  
 
Participants from a study conducted by Pretorius (2012:2) confirmed that “…copper 
cable thieves serve in all capacities; from police officers, contractors, employees, 
security officers, service providers and corporate management.” Some copper cable 
theft syndicates and copper cable theft specialists were highly qualified and well-
trained individuals with the influence and ability to run criminal operations. The higher 
the criminal's capacity, the better the level and size of equipment used, from 
excavators to specialised vehicles and copper recycling equipment. Thieves use 
rudimentary tools in lower-level criminal groupings, including bolt cutters, saws, poles, 
and rubber bands for isolation and binding.  
 
Pretorius (2012:2) further found that in general, copper cable thieves take time to plan 
and survey; they knew their area and environment in detail. They knew the security 
ability and processes, and precisely where soft target areas are located. Copper cable 
thieves are seldom caught on the job, as remote environments and well-placed 
observation posts give these criminals a benefit, and because they act primarily at 
night, the darkness in an ally facilitating escape. Copper thieves always look for weak 
spots and vulnerable places, and their patterns change, but their methodology 
invariably remains the same.  
 
Liebenberg (2018: 27) describes how cable thieves pro-actively collect information and 
identify risky areas. These criminals typically concentrate on cables in predetermined 
areas identified through their prior involvement with such activities. Though each 
situation varies, the method of cutting the cable remains identical. The tools used are 
relatively basic but adequate for the cause. Copper thieves use innovative methods, 
such as hacksaws or bolt cutters joined to a shaft enclosed in a rubber casing to cut 
overhead cables.  
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Le Roux (2008:1) explains that copper cables are continually stolen in various 
recurrent theft areas, occasionally within days of having been replaced or repaired, 
suggesting that repeat offenders commit these crimes. These offenders are aware of 
the shortcomings and the [in]ability of the security system and their estimated 
probabilities of being caught. Geldenhuys (2008:10) further states that copper thieves 
usually operate at night. The more sophisticated syndicates are equipped with trucks, 
winches, mechanised cutting equipment, and tractors; to knock over the masts and 
poles to reach the copper cable. They make use of internal and external experts to 
ensure their protection and security. These syndicates steal and sell copper in large 
volumes.  
3.6            SUMMARY 
This chapter presented an outline of strategies to prevent copper cable theft. The 
chapter commenced with a discussion of current SA legislation governing copper cable 
theft and applicable punishments. This chapter further presented the primary role-
players in combating copper cable theft in South Africa and explored international 
methods to address copper cable theft. Consequently, this chapter ended with a 
summary of the modus operandi followed by copper cable thieves.  
 
In Chapter four, the researcher deals with the findings and presents the themes and 
sub-themes arising from in-depth interviews.  
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CHAPTER 4 
PRESENTATION OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 
4.1  INTRODUCTION  
The objective of this chapter is to present the research findings garnered from the 
study. The participant experiences and insights catalyse the presentation of research 
findings on the impact of the NFMCCC on copper cable theft in South Africa. It is 
essential to explore participant experiences and the day-to-day reality of role-players 
that make up the NFMCCC. The participants whose experiences are described in this 
chapter are part of the narrative that contributes to an improved understanding of the 
impact of the NFMCCC on copper cable theft in South Africa.  
 
In this chapter, the researcher presents the experiences of the various sample groups 
included in this study concerning the impact of the NFMCCC on copper cable theft. 
The experiences of sample group A, which included ten participants awaiting trial on 
copper theft charges, are presented first. Questions posed to these awaiting trial 
prisoners could provide insight into the NFMCCC’s impact on combatting copper theft. 
The NFMCCC could eventually adapt its strategies and subsequently improve its 
impact on copper cable theft once the Committee has an improved understanding of 
copper cable thieves' modus operandi and strategies.  
 
Thereafter the experiences of sample group B, which included two participants from 
BACSA (a founding member of the NFTCC that later became the NFMCCC), are 
presented.  
 
The experiences of ten participants from CPI are presented as sample group C.  
 
The experiences of sample group D include role-players who form part of the 
Mpumalanga and Gauteng Provincial NFMCCCs.  
 
To ensure that the aim and the research purpose of this study are met according to 
the research questions, as discussed in chapter one (para. 1.6) the researcher 
conducted in-depth interviews with the sample mentioned above (groups A-D). A 
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qualitative research method was used as described in chapter one (para. 1.14) to 
ensure the in-depth interviews' trustworthiness. The researcher also considered ethical 
considerations, as reflected in chapter one (para. 1.15). 
 
These results are presented through themes and sub-themes, exploring the 
participants’ subjective experiences, knowledge, and opinions about the impact of the 
NFMCCC on copper cable theft. As mentioned in chapter one (para. 1.12) in-depth 
interviewing consists of face-to-face encounters between the researcher and 
participants directed towards understanding participant perspectives from their lives, 
experiences, or situations expressed in their own words. 
 
The results of the in-depth interviews are presented and discussed below. 
4.2  RESULTS ORIGINATING FROM INTERVIEW WITH SAMPLE GROUP A 
Table 4 (Sample Group A) below illustrates the emergent themes and sub-themes 
resulting from in-depth interviews with awaiting trial detainees charged with copper 
cable theft (sample group A). 
 








Participant perceptions/awareness of the damage caused by copper cable 
theft 
- Sub-theme 1.1: Learned awareness of general consequences. 
- Sub-theme 1.2: Awareness of damage to infrastructure.  
- Sub-theme 1.3: Loss of potential work opportunity and services due to damage 
to infrastructure. 
- Sub-theme 1.4 People can get hurt. 
- Sub-theme 1.5 No general awareness or understanding of the economic 
implications of cable theft. 








Planning the copper cable theft 
- Sub-theme 2.1 Pre-planned gang/group strategy for stealing copper cables. 
- Sub-theme 2.2 Going alone or casually involved with a friend or help for a group. 












Training for the offence (copper cable theft) 
- Sub-theme 3.1: No training but learning by observing others or simply taking a 
chance. 









The motivation and incentive to commit copper cable theft 
- Sub-theme 4.1 Making money from buyers of scrap metal for living expenses. 









Facilitating/reinforcing factors for copper cable theft 
- Sub-theme 5.1 Burnt trains and load shedding.1 








Executing the alleged offence (copper cable theft) 
- Sub-theme 6.1 Choosing between “Anacondas”2 and “shiny bright.”3 
- Sub-theme 6.2 Cutting overhead copper cables (less time consuming, although 
more dangerous). 
 
The researcher presents and discusses sample group A's responses by quoting 
responses verbatim as received from participants.  
 
The first theme that emerged from in-depth interviews with awaiting trial detainees 
charged with copper cable theft (sample group A) explores participant’s perceptions/ 
awareness of the damage caused by copper cable theft. 
4.2.1 Theme 1:  Participant perceptions/awareness of damage caused  
    by copper cable theft  
This theme presents participant responses regarding their perceptions/awareness of 
the damage they cause when committing copper cable theft. The answers to the 
following question gave rise to this theme:  
                                            
1  Load shedding, or load reduction, is implemented countrywide in South Africa as a controlled option to 
respond to unplanned events to protect the electricity power system from a total blackout. While Eskom 
uses the word blackout loosely to mean “no lights” in a local area, a country-wide blackout has much 
more serious consequences, which can occur when there is too much demand and too little supply, 
bringing the power system into an imbalance – tripping the power system in its entirety.  
2  Anacondas is the term used by copper thieves to refer to underground copper cables. These cables 
are thick, heavy, and long (similar to an Anaconda snake).  
3   Shiny bright is the term given by copper thieves to overhead electricity cables. 
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Are you aware of the damage caused to essential infrastructure and 
the impact on basic services and the economy resulting from copper 
cable theft?  
 
The purpose of this question was to explore participant awareness of the damage they 
cause to essential infrastructure and the subsequent impact on basic services and the 
economy when committing copper cable theft.  
 
After analysing the data derived from the in-depth discussions, it became apparent that 
all 10 participants aver that they were not aware of the actual damage caused to 
essential infrastructure during the crime. The participants only became aware of the 
offence's seriousness (particularly the costs involved to repair the damage caused) 
when they appeared in court on arraignment. 
 
A discussion of the sub-themes under Theme 1, follows hereunder.  
4.2.1.1 Learned awareness of general consequences 
The following responses regarding awareness of copper cable theft's consequences 
indicate that the participants developed such awareness only while in custody. 
   
One participant conveyed that he eventually became aware of the damaged caused 
to essential infrastructure and the impact on basic services and the economy resulting 
from copper cable theft:  
I realised that the thing about cables being stolen is that the trains 
can’t run. It doesn’t just affect the railway lines; it affects businesses, 
and this affects hospitals, and many people can’t go to work.” 
Another participant who was severely burned when touching a live wire stated that he 
was not aware of the damage caused by copper cable theft: 
 I was not aware, but I am aware now. I didn’t cut anything. I just 
touched it, and as I touched it, it felt like a shot. I got burned 70% 
and was in the hospital for a very long time.  
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4.2.1.2 Awareness of damage to infrastructure  
The majority of participants indicated an awareness of damages to infrastructure after 
the researcher clarified the concept. Participants conceptualized the damages to 
infrastructure resulting from copper cable theft as follows:      
o As far as I understand if we steal the copper, we are going to be 
short of lots of thing. 
o A lot of damage is being done. People can’t go to work if you steal 
cables. If maybe that cable runs to Pollsmoor there would have 
been no power today – no computers, not electricity, everything 
working with electricity would be off. 
o The trains cannot run. I think there in Netreg / Bonteheuwel, there 
are not trains there. I don’t even know the day I am released from 
prison how I will get home if there are no trains. 
4.2.1.3 Loss of potential work opportunities and services due to damage to 
infrastructure 
Participants overwhelmingly acknowledged the loss of income or jobs because of 
copper cable theft: 
If you steal copper the people can’t go to work because the trains 
are all stationary and there is also no electricity at home. 
 
It causes a lot of damage. People cannot do their jobs because there 
is no electricity and according to me, copper cable theft has a big 
impact on the economy. 
Disturbingly, one participant was aware of the impact of copper cable theft on 
infrastructure as well as basic and essential services; however, he continued 
committing the crime: “If one steals copper then the trains cannot run. People can’t go 
to work and may lose their jobs. In hospitals, people who are sick can die because 
there is no electricity.” Interestingly, another participant showed remorse for the 
damage caused by copper cable theft: “The service is poor because people can’t go 
to work. Nothing works and that is not right.” 
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4.2.1.4 People can get hurt  
Participant awareness of potential physical injury or death due was only mentioned as 
an afterthought.  
The building where the copper cables are being stolen can catch 
fire. There can be people inside who can get hurt too. 
 
Because of one stolen copper cable people who are lying in sick 
beds can also die. 
 
I am aware that trains can cause accidents during power failures 
and people can get hurt or even die. 
4.2.1.5 No general awareness or understanding of the economic implications 
of cable theft 
From the information derived from participants, it became evident that some 
participants lacked general awareness or understanding of cable theft's economic 
implications.  
I don’t know and I am not aware of that. 
 
I don’t know what is going on with the country’s economy. 
Some of the participants agreed that they are aware of the prohibitive cost of repairing 
or replacing damaged infrastructure as well as the snowball impact on the economy 
and the business sector:  
It is going to cost millions to put that copper cable back. 
 
It is also companies that suffer when people cannot get to work. 
So, it is not just Metrorail and PRASA alone suffering but it is 
companies also in the whole process because people cannot 
get to work. 
 
There is a lot of poverty, and if there is no work or the people 
cannot get to work the poverty will never stop. 
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4.2.1.6 Economic implications for the perpetrator  
One participant stated the fact that he was unaware of the value of the copper he had 
stolen and only became aware of the value of the stolen copper in court: 
I am talking about myself when I appeared in Court. The prosecutor 
asked the Magistrate the value of the piece of copper that I stole, 
and that is when I heard it is R 20 000.00.  
The second theme from group A explores participant planning and execution of copper 
cable theft. 
4.2.2  Theme 2: Planning copper cable theft  
This theme presents participant responses regarding their planning and execution of 
copper cable theft. The answers to the following question gave rise to this theme:  
 Did you plan the copper cable theft before execution?  
The purpose of this question was to explore participant actions before committing 
copper cable theft. The sub-themes arising from Theme 2 are explored below.  
4.2.2.1 Pre-planned gang/group strategy for stealing copper cables  
Participant responses to a question on planning and executing the alleged offence 
indicated that only two participants were part of a group that specifically planned the 
alleged offence. Accomplices perform prior surveillance and subsequently inform 
perpetrators when it is safe to execute the crime. 
 
Two participants explained how they performed prior planning and surveillance before 
executing the crime. One participant acknowledged that copper cable thieves have 
evolved into skilled and trained criminals:  
 
We maybe three who are going to steal the copper cable. Two may 
know the way to the train track or the way the police know how to 
get there. One will maybe sit there and the other one will maybe just 
walk around there. When we don’t hear from them then we know 
that it is safe, but if they tip us of that the police are coming then 
there is enough time for us to get away without being caught. 
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We are not a business or organisation, but the people who are doing 
it now are quite smart. We are not talking about small trades that 
people do. They do planning. They discuss first and explain their 
plans and then they go to steal the copper cable. I never received 
training where it comes to electricity, but people who are now doing 
these things I have seen they are almost like people who received 
training the way they do the copper cable theft. 
4.2.2.2 Going it alone or casually involved with a friend or help for a group  
The majority of participants indicated that they prefer to execute copper cable theft 
alone because of the fear of profit sharing and the possibility of being exposed by other 
copper thieves. It became evident that this crime is sometimes planned and 
occasionally impromptu.  
One participant explained how his spontaneous action to steal copper cable resulted 
in his arrest:  
I was already in the business of stealing copper cable. I got up early, 
took the hacksaw and got on the train. The cables were hanging, 
and I just wanted to cut a piece and go home. Law Enforcement 
came and caught me with the hacksaw in my hand, and I got 
arrested. 
Similarly, another participant reacted spontaneously to the opportunity to steal copper 
cable:  
I saw that there was a quiet place with very little people. It was very 
easy to take it because the copper cable stuck out of the ground. 
Nobody gave me information. That was my daily routine. As I walked 
past there were a lot of people scratching and then they move on. I 
made sure what was going on and I saw the stuff. People just help 
themselves and then they move away. 
Another participant explained he was arrested after his first attempt to steal copper 
cable: “I never touched the stuff. It was my first time. It had never been a job of mine. 
I went after other people.” 
 
In contrast to the above, another participant considered planning a critical factor before 
committing copper cable theft: “I planned a specific place. I have to plan because I 
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would need a specific tool. It was a hacksaw. I went home and come back with the 
tools.”  
4.2.2.3 At the wrong place at the wrong time  
Ironically, several participants protested their innocence. These participants attribute 
their arrest as a matter of being at the wrong place at the wrong time and thus deny 
being copper thieves. 
To be honest, I am not a copper thief. I was in the wrong place with 
someone by accident. I don’t know what to do with the copper 
because I have never stolen copper cable in my life. 
 
I am not really a copper thief. I was in the wrong place at the wrong 
time. Two bags were standing on the sidewalk. While we were 
looking in the bags the police came. They would not listen to our 
explanation, and we were arrested. 
 
I did not commit the act. I am unemployed. I have my section in 
Claremont where I watch the cars in the evenings. I am a drug 
addict. That particular night before the people came to cut the 
cables, I was smoking my dagga pipe. I did not take notice of the 
black things that was lying next to me. The people from PRASA 
came and I was arrested. I was at the wrong place at the wrong time. 
 
I did not commit any crime. There were no people with me. I was at 
the wrong place at the wrong time. 
The third theme from group A explores participant training to commit copper cable 
theft. 
4.2.3 Theme 3:  Training for the offence 
This theme explores participant experiences of coaching or guidance on how to 
execute copper cable theft. The answers to the following question gave rise to this 
theme:  
Have you received any form of “training” in preparation to 
execute copper cable theft?  
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The purpose of this question was to explore participant knowledge of the methods 
used to steal copper cable. The sub-themes resulting from Theme 3 are discussed 
hereunder.  
4.2.3.1 No training but learning by observing others or taking a chance  
From the in-depth interviews with sample group A, it became apparent that copper 
cable thieves receive on-the-job training on how to steal copper cable by observing 
more experienced thieves. Two participants made the following comments:  
I know too little about copper cable theft. I will not be able to know 
what wire I have to take. I went after other people. 
 
I have never been trained. I saw what other people were doing when 
committing copper cable theft. 
4.2.3.2 Planning for the offence, but not part of a gang  
It appeared from the in-depth interviews that copper cable thieves who are not part of 
organised crime syndicates do not usually have a pre-planned strategy to commit this 
crime but act on opportunity and information provided by others. One participant 
reacted as follows: 
I wouldn’t say I chose the site. It is just the site where I sat. It was a 
particular job where I sat. I knew people cut copper cables in the 
area of Claremont because they always said go out there, it is a 
hotspot. 
Another participant said he did not plan to steal copper cable. He maintained that bad 
influences led him to the crime: “I never planned for copper cable theft, but I was in the 
company of the wrong people.” 
The fourth theme explores participant motivation and incentives for copper cable theft. 
4.2.4  Theme 4: The motivation and incentive to commit copper cable theft 
This theme explored participant insights regarding their most significant consideration 
when they decided to commit copper cable theft. The answers to the following question 
gave rise to this theme:  
What was your primary motivation to commit copper cable 
theft?  
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The purpose of this question was to explore participant motivation for the crime. The 
majority of participants were motivated by money, drugs, and the needs of their 
families. 
 
A discussion of the sub-themes arising from Theme 4 follows hereunder. 
4.2.4.1 Making money from buyers of scrap metal for living expenses  
Participant responses indicate that copper cable theft and the subsequent selling 
thereof are financially rewarding crimes supported by scrap metal buyers who facilitate 
and create an easy market for selling. One participant confirmed that copper thieves 
commit this crime primarily for financial gain because of the high profits gained:  
Most people only do it for the money. The people in my position if 
they steal copper cables. It doesn’t pay hundreds of Rand; we are 
talking about thousands that people are getting at the scrap yard. 
Another participant echoed the profitability of selling stolen copper, confirming that 
many perpetrators commit this crime for a living: “… the people are doing it for a living. 
They do copper cable theft for a living.” 
4.2.4.2 Satisfying expenses related to drug addiction  
It became evident from the in-depth interviews that many perpetrators are drug 
abusers and commit this crime to finance their drug abuse. It also became evident that 
the risk of being electrocuted does not deter these perpetrators. Several participants 
reacted as follows:  
I smoked drugs. Anyone can do anything to get drugs. 
 
I can say now I am under the influence of drugs. Cable copper theft 
was a quick way to get money, so that is why I did it. 
 
By doing copper cable theft, you bring in more money and the more 
money, the more drugs you can use. 
 
If you need money to feed your drug habit, then shock [electrocution] 
is not a deterrent. 
The fifth theme explores facilitating/reinforcing factors for copper theft. 
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4.2.5 Theme 5:   Facilitating/reinforcing factors for copper theft  
This theme explores participant responses regarding their choice of a targeted site to 
execute the offence. The answers to the following question gave rise to this theme:  
Did you pre-select a particular site to commit copper cable 
theft?  
The purpose of this question was to explore why participants select a particular site to 
steal copper cables.  
 
The sub-themes arising from Theme 5 are discussed hereunder. 
4.2.5.1 Burnt trains and load shedding  
Burnt out trains and electricity outages are favourable to copper thieves since the risk 
of electrocution is low and they present easy targets: 
They don’t need any tools because the trains are burnt. They can 
just take the wire and then pull it loose. There is no live power in the 
burnt trains. 
 
I don’t know, but for me, it would be that load shedding is in their 
favour for copper cable theft. 
4.2.5.2 Corrupt security officers involved in the offence by taking bribes  
It appeared from the in-depth interviews that many security personnel responsible for 
securing parastatal assets are corrupt and involved in stealing copper cables from their 
workplace. Participants reacted as follow:   
The security officers sometimes bring the copper to me, especially 
when there is a strike. Security officers also burned a train in 
Heideveld. PRASA’s people also set fire to their own trains. We take 
the stolen copper to SA Metal and get the money. Then we take the 
money to the PRASA security and they would give us half of the 
money. 
 
There was a time the security officers caught me with copper. I made 




I will say the police do enough because they arrest people every 
day, but the security of PRASA they are very corrupt. 
The sixth theme discusses the execution of the alleged offence. 
 4.2.6 Theme 6:  Executing the alleged offence  
This theme explores participant responses to whether copper cables are well protected 
in South Africa. The answers to the following question gave rise to this theme:  
In your opinion, are copper cables efficiently secured in South 
Africa?  
The purpose of this question was to explore participant views on the securing and 
protection of copper cables.  
 
The participants agreed that underground cables are not sufficiently secured to prevent 
copper cable theft. The execution methods vary according to whether the offender 
elects to steal an underground cable (Anaconda) or an overhead cable (shinny bright).  
 
The sub-themes arising from Theme 6 are discussed hereunder.  
4.2.6.1 “Anacondas” and “shiny bright”  
Participants had diverse opinions about whether stealing underground cables or 
overhead cables was preferable. One participant stated that he prefers to steal 
overhead cables (shiny bright) which are lower risk and enable him to make more 
money without working hard. 
 
However, other participants explained how they go about stealing underground cables 
and the risks of being electrocuted. Ironically, one participant gave the impression that 
he did not think he was trespassing when he committed the crime: 
You get the wires underground, that is the thick copper cable that is 
underground, and we call it the Anaconda, because this cable is now 
coming out with more than one type of wire inside. A shovel and 
pickaxe are needed to take it out of the ground. Once it is taken out 
you have to remove the top layer. To remove all the pieces of plastic, 
you have to put it in a fire to burn it clean. 
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Someone in the group told me to pull the cable, when I touched it, it 
pulled me in and then I know nothing. I thought I was dead. There is 
no notice “Trespassers will be prosecuted.”  After I burnt the notice 
was put up. 
4.2.6.2 Cutting overhead cables is less time consuming although more 
dangerous  
Participants prefer overhead copper cables because less manpower is needed to 
commit the offence. Many participants preferred stealing overhead cables alone to 
avoid profit-sharing and lower the time taken to execute the crime.  
I noticed that to steal the copper cable that is in the air, you don’t 
need people to help you, but the copper cable under the ground, you 
need people to dig a trench. It is much better to cut the copper cable 
in the air. 
 
The copper cable under the ground you have to burn to get it clean 
while the cable in the air is already clean. 
4.2.6.3 Perceptions of the protection of copper cables: effectiveness of 
security and protection measures 
Participants agreed that copper cables are not sufficiently protected and not difficult to 
steal: 
Copper cable is not protected enough. It is very easy to take it. I 
would say they have to put it deeper into the ground to make it more 
difficult to steal the copper cable. 
 







4.3  RESULTS ORIGINATING FROM INTERVIEW WITH SAMPLE GROUP B 
Table 4 (Sample Group B) below illustrates the themes and sub-themes resulting from 
in-depth interviews with members of BACSA (sample group B). 








BACSA participant perceptions of the aims and objectives of the 
NFMCCC 
- Sub-theme 1.1 To prevent and combat the trade in stolen non-ferrous 
metal by a strategy for intervention and prevention of copper cable theft. 








Participants perceptions of the NFMCCC achieving its aims and 
objectives to combat copper cable theft. 
- Sub-theme 2.1 Some successes seem to emerge from the statistics on 








Challenging constraints faced for successful implementation 
- Sub-theme 3.1:  Lack of human experience. 
- Sub-theme 3.2:  Too many priorities for police investigations with limited 
resources. 
- Sub-theme 3.3:  Movement of personnel and lack of regular training 
efforts. 
- Sub-theme 3.4:  The implementation of communication procedures 
between the SAPS, the NFMCCC and role-players  
- Sub-theme 3.5:  Communication and co-ordination hampered by 








The nature of this expected multi-faceted co-operative relationship, 
interaction and working agreements with stakeholders 
- Sub-theme 4.1:  Deterioration of the relationship and interaction. 
- Sub-theme 4.2:  The NFMCCC monitoring and evaluating of strategies 
based on a threat analysis to combat copper cable offences. 
- Sub-theme 4.2.1:  Recordkeeping and stats are done, but a threat 
analysis does not inform new co-ordinated operation strategy. 
- Sub-theme 4.2.2:  Co-operation in interventions based on crime threat 
analysis is limited to working with local SAPS or parastatals. 
- Sub-theme 4.3:  Information sharing about convictions not readily 














More external operational challenges for the NFMCCC for the 
combating of copper cable theft 
- Sub-theme 5.1: Stolen copper cannot be identified because it has been 
burnt beyond recognition. 
- Sub-theme 5.2:  Involvement of foreign nationals. 
- Sub-theme 5.3:  The entries in the bucket shops (illegal trade). 
- Sub-theme 5.4:  Withdrawal of cases. 







 The operationalisation of the NFMCCC mandate in an integrated 
manner 
- Sub-theme 6.1: The functional operation relationship between the 
NFMCCC and the other stakeholders is hampered by legislation and 
lack of trained and committed SAPS members for the crime of copper 
cable theft. 
 
The researcher presents and discusses responses from sample group B by quoting 
responses verbatim as received from participants.  
 
The first theme that emerged from in-depth interviews with BACSA participants 
(sample group B) follows and explores participant perceptions of the aims and 
objectives of the NFMCCC.  
4.3.1 Theme 1: Participants’ perceptions of the aims and    
   objectives of the NFMCCC  
This theme presents the participant responses regarding their understanding and 
knowledge of the aims and objectives of the NFMCCC.  
The sub-themes resulting from Theme 1 are discussed below.  
4.3.1.1 To prevent and combat the trade in stolen non-ferrous metals by 
strategies for intervention and prevention of copper cable theft  
It emerged from the in-depth interviews with BACSA participants that the current 
strategies to address copper cable theft followed by the NFMCCC are not based on 
pro-active prevention. One participant stated: “Ensure the pro-active effective 
prevention of theft of non-ferrous metals for the Western Cape. I think it is applicable 
to the whole of South Africa.” Another participant suggested that legislation addressing 
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the theft of non-ferrous metals should be communicated to all role-players to enable 
them to implement improved preventative methods:  
Maximise exposure to all role-players regarding new legislation. If 
you share that information, parastatals, private securities, and the 
private industry could have put better measures in place to prevent 
copper cable theft. 
4.3.1.2 Regulate scrap metal dealers  
Participants regard the implementation and advancement of industry standards for 
scrap metal dealers and controlling the export market's compliance with standards as 
a significant aspect of non-ferrous metal crime regulation. Two participants stated:  
To promote ethical standards for the scrap metal dealers. 
 
Monitoring the export market to reduce the incidents of non-ferrous 
metal theft. 
 
The second theme explores participant perceptions of whether the NFMCCC achieves 
its aims and objectives.  
4.3.2 Theme 2:  Participant perceptions of the NFMCCC achieving its  
  aims and objectives to combat copper theft  
This theme presents participant responses regarding whether the NFMCCC achieves 
its aims and objectives to combat copper cable theft.  
 
Participants unanimously agreed that the NFMCCC does not always achieve its aim 
and objective to combat copper theft. Participants ascribe this situation due to the lack 
of clear communication, and the fact that the aims and objectives of the NFMCCC are 
not aligned to the new Criminal Matters Amendment Act. 
 
A sub-theme arising from Theme 2 is discussed below. 
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4.3.2.1 Some success seemed to emerge from the statistics on numbers 
arrested, but accuracy is questioned  
The participants acknowledged that limitations exist in achieving the aims and 
objectives of the NFMCCC, and therefore they are only partially achieved. One 
participant reacted as follows: “Succeed to some extent in our objectives, but we have 
our constraints with regards to abovementioned issues.” Another participant agreed 
that the aims and objectives of the NFMCCC are only achieved to some extent since 
statistics on copper cable theft remain high. However, this participant cautioned that 
official SAPS statistics are not reliable because they are not captured correctly: 
Partially yes. In spite of all the measures put in place by the 
NFMCCC we still see high incidents of copper cable theft, but I have 
to mention also, I don’t think you should rely so much on the 
statistics of the SAPS because I know some of those are wrongly 
put down. 
 
The third theme explores participant perceptions of the challenge/constraints for 
successful implementation of the aims and objectives of the NFMCCC.  
4.3.3 Theme 3: Challenge/constraints faced for successful    
  implementation  
Participant perceptions of challenges and inhibiting factors which affect the NFMCCC 
explicitly and implicitly mentioned in their contributions on several issues. 
  
The sub-themes arising from Theme 3 are discussed below.  
4.3.3.1 Lack of human expertise  
It became apparent that there is a lack of sufficiently trained staff within the NFMCCC. 
One participant shared his experience as follows:  
Expertise is limited. There is also no specialised investigation unit 
within that committee, and then as well you need the resources to 
address/assist people with knowledgeable expertise. 
 
It further emerged that a function differentiation exists within the NFMCCC. The 
NFMCCC members nominated to attend NFMCCC meetings do not have any 
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executive or decision-making powers. Designated members attending these meetings 
do so on a rotation basis, and resultant communication is affected, and allocated tasks 
do not come to fruition. One participant’s response succinctly summarises this 
sentiment:  
I am talking about a detective task team to investigate. In the 
beginning, I think the detectives were into it. It was a function for the 
detectives [SAPS Detective Division], and then they switched over 
to VISPOL [SAPS Visible Policing Division], and that is where the 
problem arose when the detectives’ responsibility lack, but the Asset 
Forfeiture Unit is still involved. 
4.3.3.2 Too many priorities for police investigation and limited resources  
It became apparent during the interviews that the SAPS experiences challenges with 
prioritising copper cable theft because of other priorities, limited resources, and 
insufficient expertise. One participant shared the following sentiment:  
The focus is not always just on the copper cable theft, and there are 
lots of other priorities that they have. I don’t think they’ve got enough 
people and availability of members is limited. Expertise is limited. 
Echoing the sentiments of his colleague, another participant believed the SAPS has 
too many other crime priorities to address, resulting in a situation where copper cable 
theft is under-prioritised:  
There are many other crime-related issues to address in the 
Western Cape ... So, there are other objectives that on the side they 
would be understaffed as the rest of the SAPS in the Western Cape. 
There are other filters also that shift from day to day depends on 
what is prevalent for that day like gangsterism, taxi violence, 
domestic violence, gender-based violence and other issues. 
4.3.3.3 Movement of personnel and lack of regular training   
During the interviews, it became apparent that training interventions for members of 
the NFMCCC are not consistently offered. Participants further raised doubts regarding 
the capacity and knowledge of the NFMCCC to present training interventions related 
to non-ferrous metals-related crimes. One participant regarded the lack of training as 
hampering the aim and objectives of the NFMCCC: “Movement of the personnel and 
more regular training has to be done for new members coming in, and it hampers the 
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NFMCCC.” Another participant confirmed the lack of frequent training interventions 
citing that the last training intervention was conducted in 2014: “The last training that I 
know of was in 2014. Now the training is not there.” This participant also questioned 
the NFMCCC’s ability to present training on the investigation of non-ferrous metal 
crimes: 
 I am not sure if the NFMCCC has got the knowledge to train the 
members on investigations, maybe on the policing of scrap metal 
dealers, maybe they have the knowledge on that but not on 
investigations. 
In addition, one participant emphasised that training on the investigation of non-ferrous 
metals crimes was facilitated by the Firearms Liquor and Second Hand Goods Control 
(FLASH) component within the SAPS. However, this participant suggested that 
training should be re-offered more often to reiterate the relevant principles and 
procedures.  
Training was done by the FLASH office, but my personal opinion is 
that we have to revisit that training regularly due to the personnel 
shuffling in the police service because there are always new 
members who are responsible for non-ferrous.  
One of the participants suggested that continuous training should be offered and 
recommended alternative modes of training suitable for the particular level of the target 
audience:  
The effectiveness is to continuously do training, and I think very 
effective is that you put it on a CD that they can look at it. The 
trainees can look at it as they see fit. Also, very important is that you 
have to speak to trainees on their level. Sometimes I sit at meetings, 
and the Brigadier in front speaks at a much higher level than your 
trainee, and it goes over the head. 
4.3.3.4 The implementation of communication procedures between the 
SAPS, NFMCCC and other role-players  
A lack of information sharing and inefficient communication between the NFMCCC and 
members on the grass-roots level became apparent during interviews. These 
shortcomings result in copper cable theft not being pro-actively prevented. One 
participant reacted as follows:  
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The sharing of information within the project is vital, and all role-
players know what is happening and sometimes the SAPS 
specifically the crime intelligence keep information so close to their 
chest that it doesn’t matter if that could have been prevented some 
copper cable theft. 
 
Another participant shared his colleague’s viewpoint acknowledging that information 
sharing is often limited to a need-to-know basis:  
They have the knowledge, but they do not share all information. 
Specifically, the information when it is currently under investigation. 
They don’t want to share that information, but the other information 
on statistics is shared. They do share the suspects, and they do 
share modus operandi. 
4.3.3.5 Communication and co-ordination hampered by irregular meetings 
and/or non-representative attendance  
Participants highlighted a need for better communication and co-ordination of 
processes between the NFMCCC and relevant stakeholders to prevent copper cable 
theft, especially by syndicates. The need for a unit dedicated to investigating non-
ferrous metals-related crimes also became apparent:  
The Provincial monthly meeting and the meeting is at Cluster level 
has declined somehow with also again the restructuring of the 
police. Individual parastatals give their information through to the 
responsible CIG members in the province. Impact of not sharing 
information will hamper the identifying of syndicates involved. 
Different role-players have appointed people and investigators to 
investigate these incidents. Information is gathered by them which 
are given through to SAPS for further investigation. The main 
problem again is there is no dedicated task team to investigate. 
Another participant highlighted regular non-attendance of NFMCCC meetings by role-
players, which, in turn, hampers decision-making and consequent execution of 
decisions made:  
The main problem is the level of attendance of the NFMCCC 
meetings. The initial instruction was that a Brigadier should chair the 
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meeting. Decision makers should attend the monthly NFMCCC 
meeting from the parastatals which are not always done. Only 
investigators are sent to give feedback, but if certain decisions are 
taken people who can implement the decisions that were taken are 
needed. 
 
Another participant similarly shares this sentiment: “The NPA is not always present at 
meetings, and I think they should definitely be there.” Furthermore, another participant 
identified shortcomings in sharing information between the various levels of command 
resulting in communication distortion: “CIG is managed at a national level, and the 
information isn’t regularly channelled to the stakeholders with regard to specific 
syndicates.” 
 
The fourth theme explores participant perceptions of the nature of the expected multi-
faceted co-operative relationship, interaction and working agreements with 
stakeholders. 
4.3.4 Theme 4:  The nature of the expected multi-faceted co-operative  
  relationship, interaction and working agreements with  
  stakeholders  
This theme presents participant responses regarding their experiences in engaging in 
multi-faceted, co-operative relationships, interaction and working agreements with 
stakeholders to facilitate, identify and sustain policing strategies to combat copper 
cable theft.  
The sub-themes resulting from Theme 4 are discussed below.  
4.3.4.1 Deterioration of relationships and interactions  
It became evident from interviews that the relationship between the NFMCCC and 
other relevant role-players is not always sound or trustworthy, especially during 
information-driven operations. Participants were further of the opinion that the SAPS 
are not always present. Participants suggested this relationship has deteriorated 
because of factors, such as budgetary limitations and changes to legislation:  
To a certain extent, the SAPS do engage with stakeholders. It is just 
a question of some of the stakeholders who must again be brought 
on board because of the changes that recently took place and 
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budgetary restraints which they had. Telkom lost their investigators 
with their restructuring, so those are continuous things which have 
to be addressed. 
 
Another participant pointed to the fact that new legislation placed limitations on the 
interaction and working relationship between SAPS and other role-players:  
Some of the legislation now prevents stakeholders to do operations 
with the police. In the past we used to have an annexure to a warrant 
when searching premises and the names were included in the 
application. The stakeholders were mentioned, which is not done 
anymore due to the legal department of the police, saying that 
stakeholders cannot participate in their operations anymore. That is 
one of the causes of deterioration of the working relationship 
between SAPS and stakeholders. 
4.3.4.2 NFMCCC monitoring and evaluation of strategies based on threat 
analysis to combat copper cable offences  
Participants agreed that although statistics are available, no real co-operative and co-
ordinated intervention strategies were planned based on threat analysis information. 
4.3.4.3  Recordkeeping and statistics are done, but a threat analysis does not 
inform new co-ordinated operational strategies  
One participant believes that FLASH keeps a record of statistics related to non-ferrous 
metal-related crimes: “FLASH office in the province keep record of all the operations 
that take place. It gets reported monthly by the individual policing precincts. They have 
guidelines of how many visits and operations they have to do monthly.” Another 
participant acknowledged the registering of statistics, but questioned the sharing of 
information and how information is acted upon to inform new co-ordinated operational 
strategies to address non-ferrous metal-related crimes:  
The only thing that gets done from my perspective and that is what 
I have picked up in the meetings is just the number of incidents and 
number of monitory value. That is what they look at, and I don’t know 
if this has got anything to do with their yearly performance, but it is 
all about numbers and no action. The NFMCCC do not act on crime 
threat analysis. No information is shared on this. 
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4.3.4.4  Co-operation for interventions based on crime threat analysis is 
limited to working with local SAPS and parastatals  
The participant responses suggested that they prefer to co-operate with the local 
SAPS and parastatals because they are more supportive than the NFMCCC regarding 
strategies based on threat analysis:  
Limited actions from stakeholders of NFMCCC. If we do identify 
crime threat analysis, assistance in acting is very limited from them. 
We would rather go to the local SAPS for assistance on acting on 
analysis. 
In agreement, another participant confirmed that parastatals are more supportive of 
implementing co-operative interventions based on crime threats, though these 
interventions do not always result in success:  
Specific actions are mostly initiated by parastatals, and I wouldn’t 
say that the parastatals’ interventions are not always successful. In 
some instances, it is, and in some, it is not. 
4.3.4.5 Information sharing about convictions not readily available for the 
NFMCCC  
Participants highlighted various challenges affecting the conviction of perpetrators. 
One participant explained as follows:   
As far as the convictions are concerned, there are still a lot of issues. 
Research proved that there are three factors why cases were 
withdrawn. The one was that the complainant of the specific 
parastatal did not want to give evidence. The second factor was that 
the cases went to court, but because of just a three- or four-line 
affidavit of the complainant the accused that was arrested had time 
to explain to the investigation officer in his explanation statement of 
three or more pages why the incident happened. 
Another participant revealed that although the SAPS have statistics related to pending- 
and withdrawn cases, this information is not shared with the particular provincial 
NFMCCC in his province:  
The arrests are sent through to the FLASH office on a monthly basis 
by each police precinct and there used to be a document of how 
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many postponements for the cases were there and how many 
withdrawals. That is where we did the research from. That document 
isn’t displayed at the Provincial NFMCCC meeting on a monthly 
basis. 
The fifth theme explores participant perceptions of external operational challenges to 
the NFMCCC.  
4.3.5 Theme 5: External operational challenges to the NFMCCC for  
  combatting copper cable theft  
The following is a summary of participants’ perceptions of additional external 
challenges that the NFMCCC face to carry out their mandate. 
 
The sub-themes resultant from Theme 5 are discussed below.  
4.3.5.1 Stolen copper cannot be identified because it has been burnt beyond 
recognition  
One participant explained that evidence in copper cable theft cases is problematic 
because the outer plastic casing is usually burnt off and thus the owner cannot be 
identified: “Once the copper cable has been burnt there is no way that it can be 
identified and traced to a certain entity.” 
4.3.5.2 Involvement of foreign nationals  
One participant explained that foreign nationals are sometimes used to do dangerous 
work during copper cable theft. These foreign nationals are abused by drug dealers 
who accept copper cable as payment for drug purchases. As a result, these copper 
theft incidences are becoming increasingly violent:  
This is also a great concern. The incidents become more violent of 
nature as well as the involvement of drug dealers taking in non-
nationals for paying for drugs. 
4.3.5.3 The entries in the bucket shops (informal, illegal trade)  
One participant mentioned the challenge that the illegal trade in copper poses for the 
policing of crime as follows: “The bucket shops are in the informal settlements which 
makes policing very difficult.” 
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4.3.5.4 Withdrawal of cases  
During the interviews, it became evident that an excessive number of copper theft 
cases are eventually withdrawn due to ineffective police investigation at the local level 
instead of detective investigation by senior officials. As a result, the sharing of cross-
precinct crime information does not take place. One participant summarised this 
phenomenon as follows:      
Withdrawal of cases has a high volume in the province due to the 
detectives that aren’t involved too much in the investigation and that 
cases are investigated at local police precinct. Although it is the 
same syndicate involved, the one police precinct doesn’t know what 
the other is doing. 
4.3.5.5 Copper theft increases when there is load shedding  
Participants agree that load shedding enables criminals to commit copper cable theft 
by lowering the risk of electrocution. One participant reacted as follows:  
Definitely copper cable theft is going to increase, and load shedding 
has an enormous effect. With syndicates it won’t have an effect 
because they just continue. Your ‘bread and butter thieves’ however 
will operate when it is dark, and they can’t be noticed. 
 
The sixth theme explores participant perceptions of the operationalisation of the 
NFMCCC in an integrated manner. 
4.3.6 Theme 6: The operationalisation of the NFMCCC in an integrated manner  
This theme explores participant responses regarding whether the mandate of the 
NFMCCC is operationalised in an integrated manner to effectively address copper 
cable theft.  
 
It emerged that participants are optimistic about the existence of the NFMCCC; 
however, the Forum's functional operation and co-ordination have several challenges 
that relate to challenges in Theme 3, as discussed earlier. 
 
The sub-themes resultant from Theme 6 are discussed below.  
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4.3.6.1 The functional operational relationship between the NFMCCC and the 
other stakeholders is hampered by legislation and lack of trained and 
committed SAPS members  
It became apparent that parastatals, who lack powers to arrest, find themselves in a 
difficult position during operations co-ordinated by the NFMCCC. The SAPS are not 
always present, and there is an apparent lack of training at station level regarding the 
mandates and legislation: 
The mandate is operationalised in an integrated manner apart from 
legislation which prevents parastatals accompanying police 
members when they do operations. 
 
It further became evident that the NFMCCC and other stakeholders' working 
relationships are not optimal and should be re-evaluated. In addition, it appears that 
the SAPS do not have dedicated members to address non-ferrous metals-related 
crimes:  
In my opinion, the whole project should be revisited with everybody 
involved to keep them involved. Get SAPS to have committed 
members to do the non-ferrous project and do not shift personnel. 
Do not make it an over and above job at the station for the dedicated 
non-ferrous member.  
 
The lack of training by the NFMCCC once again emerged. One participant stressed 
the fact that certain SAPS members are not familiar with procedures to follow in cases 
of non-ferrous metals-related crimes:     
The NFMCCC was supposed to provide training to police stations 
and police offices on the new Act. That was in 2014. They gave 
training but even last year when we got to a police station they don’t 
even know what case to open. They don’t even know the criminal 
code on the CAS-system. 
 
Sample group B (who initially implemented the NFTCC) demonstrated the need for a 
benchmark to serve as best practice and the need to return to the basics. They also 
suggest that the current NFMCCC should follow best practices and that they should 
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look to the successes of the previous NFTCC to gain a competitive edge in the fight 
against copper theft.  
 
4.4 RESULTS ORIGINATING FROM INTERVIEW WITH SAMPLE GROUP C 
Table 4 (Sample Group C) below illustrates the themes and sub-themes resulting from 
in-depth interviews with CPI participants (sample group C). 








CPI participant perceptions of the aims and objectives of the NFMCCC 
- Sub-theme 1.1: Combined approach by the SAPS and relevant private 








Participant perceptions of the NFMCCC achieving its aims and 
objectives to combat copper cable theft 
- Sub-theme 2.1: Outspokenly negative about successes. 








Engagement in multi-faceted co-operation relationship, interaction and 
working agreements with stakeholders to facilitate, identifying and 
sustain police strategies to combat copper cable theft 
- Sub-theme 3.1: Lack of structured result-driven working agreements with 
time frames. 





















The nature of the strategies planned for achieving the goal 
- Sub-theme 4.1:  Lack of clear planned strategies that are effectively 
managed. 
- Sub-theme 4.2:  The strategies are not applied properly because of 
possible corruption or incompetency. 
- Sub-theme 4.3:  Perception of strategies monitored, evaluated, and 
adapted based on the up-to-date information and/or from a crime threat 
analysis to determine the copper cable crime trends. 
- Sub-theme 4.3.1:  Overall negative perceptions of strategies adapted 





















Participants perception about the NFMCCC continuously developed 
and implements strategies to address identified shortcomings or to 



















Operational relationship between the NFMCCC and other stakeholders 
- Sub-theme 8.1:  Experience of passiveness or ineffectiveness. 









Factors hindering the successful implementation of policing strategies 
implemented by the NFMCCC to address copper cable theft, challenge 
internal and external 
- Sub-theme 9.1:  Human resource issues availability of knowledgeable and 
dedicated SAPS members. 
- Sub-theme 9.2:  The need for training of SAPS members  
- Sub-theme 9.3:  Perceptions that communication and information sharing 
is an indispensable aspect for effective operations. 
- Sub-theme 9.3.1:  Communication information sharing insufficient and 
should be included intelligence and not just stats. 
- Sub-theme 9.3.2:  Sharing is done, but it is selective sharing of information. 
- Sub-theme 9.3.3:  No sharing of information on cases (catastrophic). 
- Sub-theme 9.4:  Link between SAPS and NFMCCC  
- Sub-theme 9.4.1:  A link exists but influenced by lack of trust and feelings 








 The NFMCCC functions of monitoring and co-ordination 
crime/combating operations in an integrated manner. 












 Summary of NFMCCC efficiency and functionality on copper cable theft 
 
 
The researcher presents and discusses sample group C’s responses by quoting 
responses verbatim as received from participants.  
4.4.1 Theme 1:  CPI participants’ perceptions of the aims and objectives of the  
 NFMCCC  
The participants made a strong statement that the aims and objectives of the NFMCCC 
are not upheld due to the lack of proper communication and training which should be 
integrated with the new laws on copper cable theft in South Africa. 
 
The sub-themes resulting from Theme 1 are discussed below.  
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4.4.1.1 Combined approach by SAPS and relevant private enterprises to 
combat copper cable theft  
The participants' responses indicate that co-ordination of approaches by the NFMCCC 
is not always effective, particularly during critical stages and major operations. It also 
emerged that parastatals are left without support or co-ordination by the SAPS due to 
internal power struggles. The following responses from participants summarise their 
views: 
To get various role-players, South African Police Service, all 
SOE’s (State Owned Entities), all the people that are implicated 
by essential infrastructure or copper cable theft together in order 
to get a solution to address the crux. 
 
To combat and stop the theft of copper cable as well as the export 
which is now not allowed to be leaving the country. 
 
Main focus and aim were to get people together to address copper 
cable theft and to address it in an organised manner. 
 
History of the success of the previous co-ordination committee 
and also highlighted the information sharing and dedicated 
leaders.  
 
The second theme explores participant perceptions of the NFMCCC, achieving its 
aims and objectives to combat copper cable theft. 
4.4.2 Theme 2: Participant perceptions of the NFMCCC achieving its aims 
   and objectives to combat copper cable theft 
Contributions indicate that participants have mixed feelings about the NFMCCC 
attaining their goal and objectives, ranging from a clear no to being uncertain and/or 
acknowledging only partial success. 
 
The sub-themes resulting from Theme 2 are discussed below. 
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4.4.2.1 Outspokenly negative about success  
It emerged from the in-depth interviews with CPI participants that the NFMCCC does 
not achieve its aims and objectives to combat copper cable theft. It appears that 
NFMCCC meetings only focus on non-ferrous metal crime statistics; however, no 
action is taken to address this crime collectively:  
No. I would say these meetings are there for statistic related 
objectives currently. In these meetings crime trends are discussed 
or crime statistics, but there is no tasking towards the individuals on 
these meetings in order to get results. 
 
Another participant echoed similar sentiments and stated: 
No. It is evident that role-players keep information to themselves. 
Meetings have become a statistical session and crime is not being 
addressed. 
 
In agreement with his colleagues, another participant suggested that all NFMCCC role-
players should reach consensus on the aims and objectives of the NFMCCC to combat 
copper cable theft efficiently: 
 
All the entities in our country, Public Service entities plus private, 
plus the police have to come to a table to talk the same thing and 
that vision laid down must be to set goals and goals should be 
achieved at the end. The main thing about the performances has to 
be feedback. 
4.4.2.2 Partially successful  
It became clear from the in-depth interviews with CPI participants that they perceive 
the NFMCCC as partially successful in achieving its aims and objectives to combat 
copper cable theft. Participants ascribed this partial success because of the NFMCCC 
focusing on ‘easier’ targets and not providing expert management. 
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One participant regarded the previous forum, namely the NFTCC, to have achieved its 
aims and objectives. However, this participant has doubts about the current NFMCCC 
achieving its aims and objectives in terms of copper cable theft: 
I think when it was still the NFTCC, we achieved more of our goals. 
I am not quite sure if the NFMCCC is really achieving their goals at 
this stage of the game. 
Another participant was sceptical about the NFMCCC achieving its aims and 
objectives explaining that it focuses primarily on petty criminals instead of organised 
syndicates: “We are hitting the easy targets, soft targets, the small ones and the big 
guys are not scared.”  In agreement, another participant echoed a similar opinion: 
I think they feel that there is a certain amount of success, but if you 
go down to the ground level there is still a lot to be learned and a lot 
of changes to be made to certain things as well as goals to be set 
when it comes to what is expected from the top levels of the 
structure down to the bottom. When it comes to check the box, you 
know the stations are doing inspections, but what is happening from 
the inspections, I don’t think much is actually going past that. 
 
One participant was of the view that the SAPS do not use external or internal expertise 
optimally:  
All the role-players are there, but they are not optimally making use 
of the expertise of the other companies or the components in the 
SAPS that are involved. Currently, it is the custodian of Vispol 
Policing [SAPS Visible Policing Division] and most of the efforts are 
coming from Vispol Policing. 
Another participant echoed the sentiments of his colleagues, stating:  
In my opinion they [NFMCCC] are about 60% to 70% effective. 
There is room for improvement. The current efficiency and 
functionality can better by getting more people involved and getting 
the inputs from the private sector. 
 
114 
The third theme explores participant perceptions of engagement in multi-faceted co-
operative relationships, interaction and working agreements with stakeholders to 
facilitate, identify and sustain policing strategies to combat copper cable theft. 
4.4.3 Theme 3:  Engagement in multi-faceted co-operative relationships,  
  interaction and working agreements with stakeholders to 
  facilitate, identify and sustain policing strategies to  
  combat copper cable theft  
From the feedback received from CPI participants, the existing NFMCCC structure is 
primarily used for discussion and interaction, but they doubt that planning and 
implementation are done according to clear aims and objectives. 
 
The sub-themes from Theme 3 are discussed below.  
4.4.3.1 Lack of structured, results-driven working agreements with time 
frames  
The participants made it clear that there is an apparent lack of structured, results-
driven working agreements that contain fixed timeframes. One participant reacted as 
follows: 
There are no clear objectives. The only objectives currently are to 
get all these people [NFMCCC] together and state their problems, 
and there is where it stops. There are no action plans and tasks to 
actually address the problems and get results. In other words, it is 
not result-driven. The objectives are only to state statistics. 
Another participant similarly questioned the effectiveness of the NFMCCC: 
If they were effective, then there would be far less problems than 
what is experienced at the moment with copper cable theft. It won’t 
be gone but the problem is it is just on the increase. 
One participant acknowledged that the NFMCCC performs operations resulting in 
successes; however, he believes that more successes should be achieved given the 
structure of the NFMCCC: 
The framework is there, and it does happen. We have operations, 
we have meetings, people share the information, they run 
operations but with the operations there are successes, but if you 
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look at the whole structure you would think that there would be much 
more successes. 
4.4.3.2 Lack of open communication and trusting relationships  
Some participants were outspoken about the lack of trusting relationships, interaction, 
and co-ordinated co-operation between the NFMCCC and other role-players. The lack 
of open communication, non-sharing of information, and power struggles between role-
players emerged as inhibiting factors. One participant reacted as follows: “You will not 
share information with some guys because there is a power play, and he has an 
attitude.” In agreement, another participant confirmed the internal factors inhibiting the 
NFMCCC from achieving its aim and objectives as follows:  
The goal is not reached at all because of the stuff being put on the 
table. They guys don’t get along. Everyone is talking in the air. There 
are no goals set at an NFMCCC meeting and feedback is given at 
the next meeting. The specialised guys from the police, the LAB 
[SAPS Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL)], the forensics, they all 
have to form a quorum around a table, and everyone has to make 
an input. 
One participant posited that relationships amongst NFMCCC role-players do exist; 
however, these relationships could be strengthened in order to utilise all available 
knowledge and expertise to its fullest potential: 
A lot more can be done to establish and maintain relationships 
amongst all the role-players. I would not say they are utilised to their 
full capacity and the relationships are there, but much more can be 
done to make use of all the expertise at the Forum. 
Another participant identified poor communication and interaction between NFMCCC 
role-players and suggested additional communication methods and interaction using 
technology. According to this participant, communication and interaction are limited to 
NFMCCC meetings. In addition, communication, and interaction between NFMCCC 
role-players and the SAPS has deteriorated as a result of experienced SAPS members 
having been transferred to other units:    
There are many ways to do these interactions. Many of the things 
are done via WhatsApp, email, and text messages. There is 
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personal liaison between each other at meetings. It is done on a 
basis of that the institutions and the stakeholders know of each other 
and the police. Previously you had a Copper Cable Theft Unit at the 
police and then you liaised with the person who knew his work, but 
when the stuff changed to Visible Policing you no longer have the 
same connections. A lot of contacts or links that were in the police 
got lost because the guys were moved to other paced which had an 
impact. 
 
Moreover, another participant questioned communication and interaction as follows: 
“To be honest, I don’t think they do it as it is supposed to be done.” 
 
The fourth theme explores participant perceptions of the nature of the strategies 
planned for achieving the goal. 
4.4.4 Theme 4: The nature of planned strategies for achieving the goal  
Some participants believed that there are no clear strategies by the NFMCCC to 
address copper cable theft, although some believe that there are strategies put in place 
but are doubtful whether those strategies are being managed effectively. 
 
The sub-themes resultant from Theme 4 are discussed below.  
4.4.4.1 Lack of clearly planned strategies that are effectively managed  
One participant believed that the NFMCCC does not have a transparent strategy to 
address non-ferrous metal-related crimes. This participant suggested a governing 
body, training interventions to upskill inexperienced members as well as intelligence-
driven strategies:  
There is no clear strategy. The strategy, I would say is firstly to get 
all the relevant people together to get a solution in order to address 
non-ferrous related crimes. To get a governing body to regulate the 
Second-hands Goods dealers. Training should be given to people 
that don’t have the knowledge. I would also say that the strategy 
should have a centralised point where everything related to copper 
cable theft or essential infrastructure is centralised, whether it is 
intelligence or informants. 
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Another participant posited that the responsibility of the NFMCCC is to facilitate 
information gathering and sharing among all role-players of the NFMCCC with the 
emphasis on ensuring that available information is sufficiently acted on. This 
participant responded as follows: 
The NFMCCC is there to oversee all the different members and to 
get all the information together. Their strategy should be to 
concentrate on specifics and to act on it appropriately to eventually 
get to the common goal. 
One participant was confident that the NFMCCC has strategies in place; however, he 
suggested that strategies should be managed effectively:   
I do understand the strategies, and I think the strategies are in place, 
but you can have a lot of strategies that you still have to manage 
effectively. 
4.4.4.2 The strategies are not applied properly because of possible 
corruption or incompetence  
One participant suggested that SAPS members responsible for enforcing the Second-
Hand Goods Control Act, 6 of 2009 should be rotated since they become complacent 
and merely strive to meet site inspection targets:     
The DSO’s [Designated Second-Hand Goods Control Officers] have 
been doing the job for a long time… I think the lines are blurred and 
I don’t think guys should do that job for too long, especially in the 
same area. They should be moved around. They are under huge 
pressure to meet targets, so they don’t really do scrap dealers. They 
do all second-hand goods, but I don’t think they are actually getting 
around to it.” 
Another participant cautioned against corrupt activities among those SAPS members 
who are responsible for enforcing the Second-Hand Goods Control Act 6 of 2009 
suggesting that relationships between officers and second-hand dealers become too 
friendly creating an environment for corruption: 
I don’t think it is strategies not being applied to. I don’t believe the 
same policeman should be in charge with such a big operation and 
I don’t think that it is healthy. I can’t say all policemen are corrupt, 
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but the relationship becomes too friendly, and I have seen 
corruption. 
One participant viewed the application of strategies by the NFMCCC from a legislative 
perspective. This participant suggested that the new legislation presents challenges 
for the SAPS and NPA.  
We are aware of the basics, but we are struggling to actually get the 
DSO’s as well as the prosecutors to implement the new laws. It has 
definitely had an impact on copper cable theft. Since the day, the 
new Act has been put in place there has definitely been a change 
from the police side. I have been to police stations and to courts 
where they, for the last year or two, are still not aware of the new 
Act even though their senior public prosecutors have said they have 
informed their prosecutors. The DSO’s said they know about 
something like that. It is really not taken very seriously. 
4.4.4.3 Perceptions of strategies monitored, evaluated, and adapted based 
on up-to-date information and/or from a crime threat analysis to 
determine copper cable crime trends  
Participants illustrated that they do not clearly understand what happens to crime 
statistics and how they are analysed and implemented. Participants were further 
concerned about the timeous availability of information, which is not always available 
for information-driven operations. 
4.4.4.4 Overall negative perceptions of strategies adopted based on 
evaluation  
Participants were generally negative about strategies based on evaluations which are 
not adequately planned or communicated effectively. One participant described the 
NFMCCC meeting as a “statistical nightmare” and had reservations as to whether the 
NFMCCC sufficiently analyses crime statistics on copper cable theft to ascertain the 
impact of implemented strategies: 
It could be that it is monitored, but I am not too sure if they evaluate 
it to see the impact, because if they would have done something 
else or considered something else to see if it is not going to have a 
better, more positive effect. They do give feedback on meetings 
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regarding incidents of copper cable theft, but that has really just 
become a statistical nightmare. 
In agreement, another participant stated: 
What I have picked up from the meetings is just a number of 
incidents, number of monitory value. That is what they look at, and I 
don’t know if that has got anything to do with their yearly 
performance but is all about numbers and no action. 
Another participant suggested that the NFMCCC does not provide sufficient guidelines 
to evaluate the impact of implemented strategies which results in aimless solution-
seeking:  
If there are desired guidelines, you can certainly do the evaluation 
as desire, but if you do not have proper guidelines to do certain 
evaluations and or have the knowledge to do certain evaluations, 
then it is a matter of you grabbing around in the dark. 
Without hesitation, one participant cast doubt on some police officers’ knowledge 
and ability to conduct threat analysis and further questioned their ability to 
implement strategies without any knowledge of such strategies. This participant 
also emphasised the significance of support and expertise provided by 
specialised units:    
You must at least first know what a threat analysis is before you can 
start speaking. You must know what analysis is and what threat 
analysis is. Some police officers do not have a cooking clue what 
the word means. How can you implement something that you do not 
understand yourself and that is where the specialised units come in 
to give guidelines to be able to understand it? 
Another participant confirmed that intelligence-driven operations are conducted, 
acknowledging that these kinds of operations conducted by the SAPS impact on 
copper cable theft. This participant further stressed the importance of timeous 
crime information being available in order to make an impact:   
Yes and no. If we are able to act on information fast enough and the 
threats quickly enough, we can make an impact. A lot of it is 
intelligence driven and without that we wouldn’t have actually made 
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much of an impact. Without the police we wouldn’t have been able 
to do anything because they have certain capabilities that we don’t 
have. 
Interestingly, another participant believes that the SAPS is manipulating crime 
statistics, thus creating a skewed picture of the reality: 
They are manipulating the statistics. We are going to present the 
statistics at the Forum in our province and we will request the police 
to investigate it so that we set an example. We will stop the tendency 
because if they continue, then they don’t see the real crime picture 
because it is not registered on CAS and nobody knows about these 
incidents. 
The fifth theme explores participant perceptions of an effective strategy, which implies 
knowledge of the crime, product, and legal matters. 
4.4.5 Theme 5:  Effective strategy implies knowledge of crime and  
  product and legal matters  
The participants argued an apparent lack of forensic investigators with the necessary 
knowledge of copper cable theft investigations. One participant reacted as follows: “It 
just comes back to that they are not effective. They don’t have the skills maybe or they 
don’t have the knowledge.” 
 
Another participant suggested that a dedicated SAPS unit should be established to 
address copper cable theft. In addition, this participant recognised a lack of linking 
cases as a shortcoming:     
You should have detectives’ task specifically to deal with copper 
cable theft. Where the weakness comes in is where you have three 
different detectives dealing with different cases and they don’t even 
realise that it is linked. They need to be specialised in copper cable 
theft. 
 
One participant regarded private security’s restricted mandate as an obstacle to 
preventing copper cable theft. Moreover, this participant described co-operation 
between role-players as desirable:   
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By law, we are not allowed certain things, so we are then more just 
as eyes and ears, but our biggest issue is against the DSO’s are just 
doing the bare minimum. We catch them in the act but through police 
negligence or non-compliance the man is released on bail and that 
is it. These cases should be handled under the new Act 18 of 2015. 
It is an essential network. There is co-operation from time to time 
but not as desired. 
 
Another participant viewed efficient gathering and management of crime information 
as crucial and also identified ill-informed role-players as a shortcoming:      
On paper and on record is 100% right to be successful, but your 
problem is that your role-players starting at the SAPS and your other 
institutions, the intelligence at the stage that the information from 
anywhere comes in and if it is done right, it will be successful. If the 
information is not dealt with correctly it will not be successful and 
then we come again. Many people unfortunately everywhere at the 
institutions and at the police are ignorant of the law. 
 
One participant suggested the following strategy to address copper cable theft: 
The strategy is to address our trade like scrap sites. Then identifying 
who sells it to the guys. Who sells to the scrap metal dealer and who 
does the scrap metal dealer sells to? Will he export it or will he 
deliver it to a local refiner. The moment that the stolen copper cable 
goes to the refinery the chances to identify it is very difficult. 
 
The following participant regards the fact that the NFMCCC’s mandate is not restricted 
to copper theft, but includes liquor and firearms-related offences, as problematic: 
In my opinion the NFMCCC is not just concentrating on copper cable 
theft. There are liquor and firearms. There are other priorities as 
well, so once again we need one unit only concentrating on copper 
cable theft because it has become such a major problem. 
The sixth theme explores participant perceptions that the NFMCCC continuously 
develops and implements strategies to address identified shortcomings or improve 
existing strategies. 
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4.4.6 Theme 6:  Participant perceptions of the NFMCCC continuously  
  developing and implementing strategies to address  
  identified shortcomings or to improve on existing   
  strategies  
Participants expressed an overall lack of leadership regarding the NFMCCC’s 
adoption/adaption of strategies to address identified shortcomings or improve existing 
strategies. Answers ranged from to some extent to unwillingness. The following 
excerpts substantiate this conclusion: 
To some extent, in the Western Cape, I will say to improve it, I will 
say yes. I constantly or not constantly in some instances, hear that 
there will be training sessions, specific to the DSO’s in order for them 
to understand the legislation better. There is not done enough in 
order to make this committee more effective. 
 
I think it needs to be followed more closely, and the NFMCCC should 
continuously develop and implement strategies to address identified 
shortcomings or to improve existing strategies. I am not 100% sure 
if they are up the task at this point in time”. 
 
“Chairperson’s unwillingness or the passionate lack to take the thing 
further and it’s not that important to him because he makes more 
arrests with cash in transit. Everyone doesn’t see the big advocate, 
SA Metals and its untouchable. 
 
Criminals know as well as the scrap dealers that it is more a joke 
than anything else. We were very excited when the new Law came 
into place with the 15-year minimum sentence, but we had cases 
now that had gone through the process where we testified, and they 
had been given 50- and 10-years’ sentences. You must understand 
that they will be given early release in a few years’ time. We arrested 
a suspect in 2017, April and the following year in April he was 
arrested again on the same charge. The scrap dealers know that the 
copper cable that they buy is stolen and that they hide it. They have 
places where they will stash it or they will buy it off books at different 
premises. So definitely it needs to be ramped up quite considerably 
to actually scare them to say no I am not buying it. 
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In the past at the Provincial Forum, mostly at the beginning of a new 
year, we would sit down and will have a strategic session. We will 
look wat was our shortcomings for the past year. What did we 
achieve and what didn’t we achieve and what do we want to reach 
this coming new year? We set certain goals for ourselves and what 
we can put on the table to address the threats more effectively. 
Currently, that is not happening. There are no strategic sessions 
currently at the Provincial Forum that I am aware of. They just go 
from here to there, and they don’t set new goals and see what didn’t 
work. They don’t evaluate their strategies and the work that has 
been done maybe on a yearly basis, what were all the successes to 
what they focused on. 
 
The seventh theme explores participant perceptions of the need for co-ordination of 
integrated strategy. 
4.4.7 Theme 7:  The need for co-ordination of integrated strategies 
Participants acknowledged that sharing information at NFMCCC meetings is primarily 
restricted to non-ferrous metals-related statistics, but not the development of an 
integrated strategy that is needed most. The following responses were raised: 
 
Mostly at these meetings statistics are discussed. I don’t even think 
they [NFMCCC] analyse where they see a decrease or an increase. 
There is no pro-action in analysing the crime to see what type of 
criminals we are dealing with. What is the root cause and where will 
the crime move to? If I can speak related to syndicates, one policing 
area will have a problem and the NFMCCC will address the specific 
policing area tasking them with things like disruptive operations, etc. 
They don’t even know with what type of criminal they are dealing 
with. 
 
You attend a two-hour meeting, and when you walk out, you can tick 
off your box that you attended the NFMCCC meeting. You only have 
the minutes of the previous meeting, the agenda, and the 
attendance list in your file. Next month you will talk about exactly the 
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same thing. SA Metals is on the table again, but no one is coming 
forward with anything because no committee has been created 
within the NFMCCC to address the core, the centre point. We have 
been talking about the same thing month after month for years 
because there is no management line. 
 
Definitely not an integrated strategy. Each individual will work on his 
own objectives, his own problems, and we will come together and 
discuss our own problems, our own objectives. There is not active 
integration between the units on a daily basis. People must be in 
one building, sitting together and working daily on achieving results. 
There must be clear management, one manager managing this 
specific crime. 
 
A lot more can be done to co-ordinate the operations. Clusters 
should come back on a monthly basis and give feedback on what 
operations they did for the past month and what their successes 
were. You get 80% of the clusters don’t attend the meeting, and then 
20% will say they didn’t have chance to conduct any operations or 
they just give feedback that they just visited five or six scrap yards. 
The intelligence driven operations conducted are minimal. 
 
The co-ordination of operations does take place, but on the private 
side in the sense that the private people are dependent on the police 
for direction. The direction like Peace Officers or something like that 
will actually make it a lot easier for them to combat copper cable 
theft as well. 
 
The eighth theme explores participant perceptions of the operational relationships 
between the NFMCCC and other stakeholders. 
4.4.8 Theme 8:    Operational relationships between the NFMCCC and other 
  stakeholders  
From discussions with participants, it appears that the functional relationships between 
the NFMCCC and other stakeholders were passive, not so good or effective to a 
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certain extent, depending on the local region or the specific provincial NFMCCC 
representative. 
 
The sub-themes resultant from Theme 8 are discussed below.  
4.4.8.1   Experiences of passiveness or ineffectiveness  
Participants thought, specifically in the Community Service Centre (CSC), that 
functional SAPS members are not familiar with the Criminal Matters Amendment Act 
on copper cable theft which leads to a power play between the SAPS and the 
parastatals leading to remarks from SAPS members, for example, “Do you want to 
learn (sic) me how to do my job?” 
 
Participants further voiced their opinions relating to the effectiveness of the NFMCCC 
in the following manner: 
 
I would say it is a really passive relationship. These individuals come 
together once a month only to get problems and not solutions. A lot 
of these individuals even make an effort to in between the meeting 
get together even if it is not all the people. 
 
I will say it is not effective at this stage.  More can be done to get the 
involvement and commitment of everybody on the Forum.  From 
SAPS side, the Prosecutors, I must say the private sector are there.  
They know what the current situation is on copper cable theft in the 
country.  They want to address it but you cannot with the limited 
powers that you have in the private sector.  The private sector 
cannot do anything without the assistance of SAPS.  There are so 
many meetings held and operations where the institutions and the 
police are involved but the big problem is that the operations that 
are done monthly are being done by the same people and the 
question is if the person does not know what to look for, how will he 
know what is really going on. 
Some members are not prepared to listen to your expertise or 
consider any input from your side.  Some members do not have 
enough trust in stakeholders to share information and therefore, 
does not work to a common goal.  Some members will not speak to 
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you or will not allow you to attend a meeting if you cannot prove to 
him that you are in possession of a [Private Security industry 
Regulatory Authority] PSIRA certificate. This after he knows your 
trade for years already. 
 
There are a lot of guys out there that do try their utmost best to do a 
proper job, but then there are some of the investigators that will tell 
you “don’t come and tell me how to do my job”.  It is a matter of we 
want to assist them to share knowledge and to coach them over the 
shoulder on the scene.  If I can put it – the attitude stinks. 
4.4.8.2   Positive experiences of operational relationships  
Participants articulated their positive experiences about working relationships between 
role-players as follows:  
From our level that we dealt with at the station level, our main one 
was in the Midlands in Meyersburg, and we felt that they were very 
helpful to a certain point. You know they would instruct the various 
Station Commanders to assist or whatever that would be, so from 
that side they are really helpful. 
 
People want to get involved.  People want it to succeed.  At that 
level, if you go to Regional meetings and Provincial meetings, yes 
everyone is there, and people that actully come to that meeting are 
committed people, and they have their inputs, they share.  The 
relationship is good. 
 
They definitely do. At the meetings, I have been at they usually try 
and involve all entities. Unfortunately when you get SOE’s where 
some of the people that are appointed there are not interested. The 
invitations go out to all the various entities, but they are usually not 
there.  It is usually more your private sector that are involved and 
that are there to drive the side of Non-Ferrous (copper cable theft).  
  
According to me, the operational relationship is effective. The 
stakeholders take charge of the operations as they play a big role in 
the investigation. Most of the information comes from the community 
and are relayed to the police officials who will follow it up so that the 
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right tasks can be identified, and the operations can be executed. 
The police depend a lot on the entities like Eskom or Telkom and 
the information of the private investigators to be successful. Most of 
the time, they are successful where the stakeholders are involved, 
and the evidences are handed in the right way at the police stations. 
Evidence are properly marked, and the identifying of stolen property 
gets done before the suspect goes to Court. 
 
It is effective to a certain extent, in my opinion. At least you know 
who to phone.  The minute the Forum is there, we meet and greet 
the various role-players.  You can pick up the phone, you know who 
you can deal with and who the police officials are. There are some 
information sharing, and in that case, it is to a certain extent effective 
in that regard. 
 
The ninth resultant theme explores participant perceptions of factors hindering the 
successful implementation of policing strategies by the NFMCCC to address copper 
cable theft. 
4.4.9 Theme 9:    Factors hindering the successful implementation of  
  policing strategies by the NFMCCC to address copper  
  cable theft   
The sub-themes resultant from Theme 9 are discussed below.  
4.4.9.1 Human resource issues – availability of knowledgeable and dedicated 
SAPS members  
Participants identified an array of shortcomings in terms of human resources available 
to address copper cable theft efficiently. These shortcomings included the lack of 
trained and committed SAPS members, which negatively influences information-driven 
operations to combat copper cable theft in South Africa. Power struggles between 
certain role-players were also identified as problematic:  
 
The DSO’s are not trained correctly. I have seen people outside the 
police that have more experience related to the Legislation on the 
Second-hand Goods Act, so I would say that the correct people are 
not in the correcrt positions and this hinder the strategies.  In order 
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to address copper cable theft, it must be specialised. Resources, 
physically as well as human resources, are major problems.  There 
are definitely not enough dedicated people assigned to the problem, 
and as stated previously, it is a great concern. Forensic specialists 
are also a problem.  Communication is a problem. 
 
We used one of the members of DPCI for approximately three years, 
and he got an understanding of this whole syndicate in the Western 
Cape, and then he was transferred to the Gang Unit. Where do we 
go now?  Who do we speak to? 
 
My experience is that we are seen as a threat.  They do not want to 
work with us. It is said that we have taken their jobs and that we are 
receiving larger salaries.  
 
Manpower is our biggest shortfall in the country. If you need to do 
an operation on a day and you have one or two police members 
because they are either on leave or busy with other operations.  You 
can go with the police, but you are not allowed to go and do x, y and 
z.  We might do it, but if you come to the Courts and you have a 
clever attorney, he might know the Law better than the State 
Prosecutor and say but what were you doing there without the 
police, and he can gave the case withdrawn. 
 
Lack of commitment in the Police.  These policemen shouldn’t be 
detectives.  The prosecutors might not even need to be prosecutors. 
They are degreed people, but there is a lack of commitment and 
obviously to be fair over and above that they are all overworked.   
The number of these guys at stations, especially at smaller stations 
are not enough as they are target driven, so their visits at the scrap 
dealers become a tick in the box. 
 
What hinders this whole thing is that your DSO or your designated 
people vary at the police stations. There are very few police stations 
where you get the same person that works there.  If a person is now 
picking up trouble in places, he’s then put at the DSO to handle the 
Second-Hand goods in the areas.  
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4.4.9.2 The need for training of SAPS members  
A significant outcry by participants concerned the training of relevant role-players and 
was a common theme: 
 
Training is also a big problem because it seems as if they are not 
familiar with the provisions of the Amendment Act. 
 
It is a case of training, whether it is a case of know and so on, I think 
there is a very big shortcoming on the part of the Police to be more 
successful in the specific task.  If you are not familiar with let’s say 
a Law or a Regulation and/or whatever it may be, it’s application will 
then not be to your liking and due to the nature of the case at this 
stage, the Police are learning very strongly on the private sector, 
and it’s all the other elements such as the Eskom’s, the Telkom’s, 
the Mines and so on, relying very heavily on them to basically do 
their job well. 
 
We’ve actually been invited and attended some of their training.  
Really good in-depth training.  Ultimately there is a problem. There 
are some police who didn’t attend.  It should be a requirement. 
Training does happen. 
 
Long time ago in our Forum, we conducted training sessions to the 
Prosecutors with involvement from SAPS and also from the industry, 
experienced guys that know the materials of Eskom, Telkom, for 
example, Transnet. We developed a training manual at that stage 
that we presented also to the Prosecutors, and at that time it 
assisted us a lot, but I think with the new Act on the books they must 
look for similiar training. 
 
One participant prioritised the need for specialised detectives with the necessary 
expertise to serve on the NFMCCC: 
Most important I would say is specialists, definitely specialist within 
the areas. Whether it is from the parastatals, whether it is from DPCI 
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in the detectives. I am not of the opinion that the people with the 
relevant [expertise] are on those committees. 
4.4.9.3 Perceptions that communication/information-sharing is an 
indispensable aspect for effective operations  
Participants made it clear that there is a lack of proper communication before, during 
and after information-driven operations concerning copper theft. Although information 
sharing is a primary objective for co-operation, and the NFMCCC provides the 
opportunity, there are concerns that information sharing does not go beyond taking 
note of crime statistics. Further, members hesitate to share crucial information about 
operations or knowledge about the crime. Others are more positive about the 
opportunity for information-sharing, but it is clear that what is shared is insufficient at 
an operational level.   
4.4.9.4 Communication/information is shared though insufficient and should 
include intelligence and not only statistics  
It appeared that crime information and data is poorly communicated, and there is mistrust 
between the relevant role-players. Thus effective and efficient information-driven 
operations to combat copper cable theft in South Africa cannot be planned. The following 
responses from participants capture participant views: 
 
Information are shared on a need to know basis.  I think one of the 
most important things are to concentrate on intelligence.  A lot of 
these things are that we must have a scrap dealer visit within this 
month or we must have a disruptive operation in this month.  There 
is not enough gathering on information in order to strategise rather 
than to waste time to visit a person without any information. 
 
Definitely successful with the guys that come to the meetings 
because they give inputs where they are struggling.  We need to do 
this with monthly reports or weekly reports as your client requests, 
and then you are tied to do decent work.  Information is not longer 
coming out at the right places.  I want to go so far to say statistics 
are done on paper to show the media, but from there, nothing 
happens to the stats. 
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They [NFMCCC] provide us with stats for their areas on copper 
cable theft at the meetings we go to, but when it comes to actual 
intelligence, I don’t think they have the manpower or the capabilities 
to actually target copper cable theft and on-ferrous.  I don’t think they 
take it seriously as for example, murder and robbery. 
 
People will share information between one another, but they won't 
share 100%, because your problem with the information today is you 
have many guys in security, police officers and everywhere there is 
corruption, and there is some information that you really cant shared 
on such a Forum because you don’t know who awaits you if you 
come back. 
 
A lot of information are shared, but I will not say it is effective.  I 
would not say it is sufficient, but in certain areas, they need more 
meetings.      
4.4.9.5   Selective sharing of crime information  
Participants posited a lack of, and in some instances, selected sharing of crime 
information, between role-players of the NFMCCC. These participants expressed their 
concerns as follows:   
      
Depending of which stakeholders there are especially when it 
comes to security companies, we would divulge our intelligence that 
we have gathered on that level.  Previously we had actually gone to 
the Station Commander or the members that are involved in copper 
cable theft problems, and we would discuss the issues with 
him/them directly.  I would not bring our information out in the 
meetings like that. 
 
To my knowledge there is no crucial information sharing.  There are 
only a few Forums in the country that are effective.  I can even say 
that there is a lot that is not functional.  I am aware of only two 
Forums in the country that are really functional.  If they can get these 
Forums in each and every Province up and running effectively, there 
is a lot of information and intelligence that is coming from the private 
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sector.  Much more can be done to share information that has been 
gathered that Forum, not only for example in the Province but it must 
also be shared amongst the other Forums in other Provinces, and it 
must be shared on the National Forum where your different 
companies and component in the SAPS are supposed to be part of 
the meeting. 
 
Keeping information to themselves and not sharing is a problem. 
Lack of knowledge of syndicate groupings responsible for the thefts 
over a widespread area and even across provinces. There is only 
once formal communication that I know about, and that is a monthly 
mail with minutes and the agenda for the next meeting. 
 
There is no collaboration. They do not understand non-ferrous 
[copper-related theft]. The big shots in the police I’ve never 
experienced on a meeting that people will say listen we received 
information from source A that this scrap metal dealer is receiving 
large amounts of Eskom or Telkom. I think there may be a trust issue 
on the meeting. 
 
4.4.9.6   Non-sharing of information on cases is catastrophic 
One participant shared an example of the effect of  non-sharing of crime information 
by the NFMCCC as follows: 
It was a case that we [CPI] did of one of the dealers here in the 
Western Cape. It is a single person. It is not a big company. After 
this case, that is running in the High Court, we noticed that the 
thieves are now taking copper to another person.  The guy is a 
registered dealer. We wanted to know how many times and what 
has he given in at another shop, big shop, and big dealer.  As far as 
I understand they [NFMCCC] did not go get that information, but 
they didn’t give it to us. So we give them something, and now they 
are just keeping it. I don’t know what they saw in it. I am sure they 
did, but they never gave it back to us or asked us to assist, please. 
Other participants shared their views on the negative impact of non-sharing of crime 
information by the NFMCCC as follows: 
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So if we don’t share this information in order to catch that specific 
criminal, we will just shift crime from areas to areas. 
 
If there is no sharing of information, it is a useless Forum. 
 
The effect is actually catastrophic. If information is not shared and 
let’s say crime then increases in the first place. The element of this 
crime or let’s say the criminal sees nothing is being done and he just 
goes on with his crime. The economy at the end of the day is hurting 
because of the crime. Every piece of copper cable that is stolen 
somewhere in the system has ugly consequences. 
4.4.9.7 Link between SAPS and NFMCCC  
Participants acknowledged the link between the SAPS and the NFMCCC but cast 
doubt on the relationship's efficiency. Participants raised their voices as follows:  
 
I can say that the link is there. If it is efficient, I don’t think so. The 
reasons are that the NFMCCC was supposed to provide training to 
police stations and police officers on the new Act. That was in 2014. 
They gave training, but even last year when we got to a police 
station they didn’t even know what case to open. They didn’t even 
know the criminal code on the CAS-system. So I don’t know if the 
communication is there.  A couple of years later and on police station 
level people don’t even know about this Act. 
 
Exactly where a big gap is. A lot of information that comes to the 
knowledge of some guys, they play the card near the chest. They 
do not share the information immediately, and it will only be shared 
with the different people at a later stage when it is too late to take 
certain actions and judicial or affirmative actions such as 
perfomances and of course that is where our big problem lies with 
the scrap metal dealers. 
 
One participant concluded by referring to other external factors that influence the 
effectiveness of the NFMCCC: 
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There is a lot of other factors, but that is related to the socio-
economic environment—current unemployment. Drug-related 
definitely in the Western Cape in certain areas.  Illegal immigrants 
that are fluctuating [flocking] into South Africa, and then I think my 
main thing is there is nobody that is specialized. 
The tenth theme explores participant perceptions of NFMCCC monitoring and co-
ordinating crime-combating operations in an integrated manner. 
4.4.10 Theme 10:   The NFMCCC monitoring and co-ordinating crime-  
   combating operations in an integrated manner  
Some participants were negative about the NFMCCC integrating crime operations 
while others acknowledged that the NFMCCC serves to integrate information from 
different stakeholders, but those operations are not managed in an integrated manner.     
4.4.10.1 No or some co-ordination of integrated operations  
The majority of participants had a negative perception surrounding the co-ordination 
of operations by the NFMCCC. The following verbatim quotes summarise these 
sentiments: 
Definitely not. All the information, I don’t even know if there is a 
central database where all the information is gathered. There must 
be an active database where people are working on this and getting 
tasks. I don’t think anybody is co-ordinating the information.  Not 
even if a person is arrested. 
 
I think individuals consisting of these meetings will come back in 
their own groupings. They do their own crime analysis. At the current 
situation, the National Chair, as well as the Provincial Chair, are 
supposed to co-ordinate this within the meetings. They are looking 
at their own interest, but I don’t thing it is co-ordinated. 
 
They are monitoring and co-ordinating it [operations] because they 
give feedback on it. If it is effective, that is another question, but they 
are monitoring it. It is not effective. 
 
No, it is not done. They just hold the meetings, tick if off in the box 
and that’s it. There is also a great deal of power play. 
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I think we are stuck with the strategies as what we have had. 
Strategy to operations and providing intelligence really. I don’t see it 
changing as such. What is happening with the criminal element is 
that they change their modus operandi , their strategies. We have 
seen them changing their strategies all the time. Scrap dealers are 
not open for picked up bits and pieces of metal. They are there for 
copper. 
 
They [NFMCCC] only focus on one part of this threat, and that is 
mainly on the compliance side, e.g. scrap metal dealers. If their 
paperwork is in order and their permits are valid, then they will stop 
from there. They are not focussed on other criminal activities of 
these scrap metal dealers. They mostly will focus on the registered 
scrap metal dealers, but there are many, many illegal scrap metal 
dealers right through the country. They are the receivers of the 
stolen property, and they focus mostly on the administrative side of 
the Second-hand Goods Act and not making use of that for the 
operational side. 
 
It is done, but on different levels, different matters are examined. I 
think what should be of interest here is that projects should be 
registered and the entire investigation is run from one office, and 
then you will achieve success. 
 
Yes, I think they [NFMCCC] do combat, and their strategies are well 
performed, although there is room for improvement. Once again, 
because of all the role-players, they have around one table, it can 
actually contribute to the operations. The visists to the dealers and 
end-users can also be performed more frequently, and the forensic 
side should also be brought in. 
 
The eleventh theme explores participant perceptions of the NFMCCC’s efficiency and 
functionality in relation to copper cable theft prevention. 
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4.4.11 Theme 11:  NFMCCC efficiency and functionality in relation to the  
   prevention of copper cable theft  
From the participants' responses, it emerged that participants were mainly in 
agreement that in its current format, the NFMCCC is not effective (or only partially 
effective) and that urgent adaptation needs to be made to improve the efficiency and 
functionality of this Forum. The participant summaries regarding the functionality and 
efficiency of the NFMCCC repeat the perceptions indicated in themes 8, 9 and 10 
above and are thus not repeated here. Recommendations to improve the efficiency 
and functionality of the NFMCCC will be presented in chapter six. 
 
4.5 RESULTS ORIGINATING FROM INTERVIEW WITH SAMPLE GROUP D 
Table 4 (Sample Group D) below illustrates the themes and sub-themes resulting from 
in-depth interviews with participants from NFMCCC (sample group D). 
 








Participants perceptions of the aims and objectives of the NFMCCC 
- Sub-theme 1.1: Co-ordination and co-operation of SAPS and relevant 








Participant perceptions of the NMFCCC achieving its aims 
and objectives to combat copper theft crimes 
- Sub-theme 2.1:  Negative or doubtful that the Forum achieves its aims 
and objectives. 
















Perceptions of planned intervention strategies of the NFMCCC to 
combat copper cable theft in South Africa 
- Sub-theme 3.1: Understanding or confusion of the nature of the 
strategies. 
- Sub-theme 3.2: Understanding of the strategies.  










NFMCCC’s engagement in multi-faceted co-operative relationships, 
interaction and working agreements with stakeholders 
- Sub-theme 4.1:  Positive responses about interactive relationships of 
different stakeholders on the NFMCCC. 
- Sub-theme 4.2:  Perceptions about NFMCCC’s operationalisation in an 
integrated manner to address copper cable theft effectively. 
- Sub-theme 4.2.1:  Positivity regarding linked relationship agreements 
in the Forum but doubt about co-operation for implementation of the 
strategy based on intelligence. 








 Diverse experiences of an operational relationship between the 
NFMCCC and other stakeholders 
- Sub-theme 5.1:  Execution of strategies not happening. 
- Sub-theme 5.2:  Experiences that operations with some stakeholders 








Participant perception about the NFMCCC continuously developing 
and implementing strategies to address identified shortcomings or 
to improve on existing strategies 
- Sub-theme 6.1:  Lack of clarity of mandate and investigation division. 
- Sub-theme 6.2: Lack of senior officers’ committed representation on 
the   NFMCCC. 
- Sub-theme 6.3:  Lack of focus on illegal trading. 
- Sub-theme 6.4:  Perceptions about formal communications for effective 
functioning. 
- Sub-theme 6.4.1: Statistical information is shared at meetings, and 
electronic media help with sharing information amongst individual.  
- Sub-theme 6.4.2:  Perceptions that the flow of information from the 
Forum to ground level is affected by sensitivity for harmful leakage of 
information. 
- Sub-theme 6.5:  Lack of committed and competent SAPS human 
resources and lack of infrastructure 









Perceptions on the NFMCCC’s continuous evaluation and 
adaptation/development and implementation of strategies to 
address identified shortcomings to improve on existing strategies 
- Sub-theme 7.1:  Feedback on meetings perceived as evaluation. 
- Sub-theme 7.2:  Perceptions that evaluation of strategies and thus also 
not adaptations of strategies. 
- Sub-theme 7.3:  Perceptions about a crime threat analysis to determine 
copper cable crime trends and NFMCCC action upon identified crime 
threat analysis. 
- Sub-theme 7.3.1:  Positive perceptions about a crime threat analysis 
and action. 
- Sub-theme 7.3.2:  Positive experience of strategies based on a crime 
threat analysis. 
- Sub-theme 7.3.3:  Perceptions that evaluations and adaptation of 










NFMCCC’s monitoring and co-ordinating of crime-combating 
operations 









Perceptions about an efficient link between NFMCCC and police 
stations, government departments and other stakeholders 
- Sub-theme 9.1: A structure exists for linking but room for improvement 
regarding representation information sharing insufficient and should be 










The functionality of the NFMCCC 
- Sub-theme 10.1:  Partially functional. Except for one reported as 
functional. 
 
The researcher presents and discusses responses from sample group D by quoting 
responses verbatim as received from participants.  
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4.5.1 Theme 1:   Participants perceptions of the aims and objectives of the 
  NFMCCC 
 Like the participant feedback from sample group C, sample group D agreed that 
SAPS and relevant enterprises' co-ordination and co-operation to combat copper 
cable theft is not always sound. One participant’s viewpoint is reflected using the 
following verbatim response: 
It is the collaboration between the SAPS and all the different role-
players whether it is mines, Transnet, or Eskom to combat the theft 
of the non-ferrous metal (copper cable) and at the end, the essential 
infrastructure to identify the crime threats, gathered information 
relating to that to co-ordinate all the crime combating, the crime 
intelligence. 
In addition, two participants suggested the following to improve co-ordination and 
co-operation by SAPS and relevant private enterprises to combat copper cable 
theft:  
To plan and co-ordinate efforts between stakeholders as well as the 
SAPS in order to address non-ferrous metal theft, copper cable theft 
as well as the export of these products. 
 
A platform where SAPS and stakeholders can plan and share 
information. 
4.5.2 Theme 2:  Participant perceptions of the NFMCCC achieving its aims 
   and objectives to combat copper cable theft  
Most of the participants’ opined that the aims and objectives of the NFMCCC are not 
always clear and should be revisited in line with new developments regarding copper 
theft and the Criminal Matters Amendment Act. 
 
The sub-themes resultant from Theme 2 are discussed below.  
4.5.2.1 Negative or doubtful that the NFMCCC achieves its aims and 
objectives  
The majority of participants posited that the NFMCCC currently does not achieve its 
aims and objectives. These opinions are illustrated as follows:  
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I think the efforts they do put in are there to get the right objective 
sorted out, but the resolution is not coming through. 
 
Perhaps sometimes too much focus on the feedback from the 
stations and clusters level where there is a lot of information shared 
that is not really applicable to this situation or have an effect which 
could have been better utilised in planning and strategies. 
 
My view is two-folded, yes and no. No for the simple reason that 
there is an escalation in copper cable-related activities, and over the 
years it seems that there is very little impact. Maybe the lack of 
knowledge contributed negatively to the outcome. 
4.5.2.2 Positivity about the NFMCCC achieving co-operation  
Two participants were positive and mentioned the advantage of co-operation among 
stakeholders that assists in focusing on hotspots. These participants summarised their 
opinions as follow: 
 
I can say it does achieve [the aim and objectives]. The reason I am 
saying that is because maybe we identify a certain area where there 
is a hotspot of copper cable theft. We conduct intelligence-driven 
operations to go and curb, or maybe the incident has already 
happened. If we see that there is a tendency, we direct our 
operations towards that. 
 
The stakeholders are the ones taking us to the hotspot area, where 
there is copper cable theft. 
 
The third theme explores participant perceptions of planned intervention strategies by 
the NFMCCC to combat copper cable theft in South Africa. 
4.5.3  Theme 3:  Participant perceptions of planned intervention strategies 
  by the NFMCCC to combat copper cable theft in South  
  Africa  
It emerged from discussions that the NFMCCC planned intervention strategies are not 
consulted at all the levels, particularly at the grass-root level. 
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The sub-themes resultant from Theme 3 are discussed below.  
4.5.3.1 Understanding or confusion of the nature of the strategies planned for 
achieving the goals  
The participant responses indicate confusion between the concepts ‘objectives’ and 
‘strategy’ as indicated below. However, some participants elaborated on the objectives 
as instruments for the planning of strategies: 
 
They have to co-ordinate the efforts in combating the whole non-
ferrous in the essential infrastructure to get a decrease in the 
incidents that are taking place. Enhance the co-operation between 
the different role-players, whether it is in the private sector or the 
police within the state departments to sort it out. Ensure the 
utilisation of the necessary legislation in line with that. 
 
To get all interested and affected parties together to come up with 
solutions and share best practices and to discuss legal issues and 
possibly revise the revision. 
4.5.3.2 Understanding of the strategies  
Some participants provided examples indicating that they are knowledgeable about 
intervention strategies by the NFMCCC to combat copper cable theft in South Africa: 
 
I understand what we do and what we should do. I am with these 
investigations from 1989. I started with these investigations on non-
ferrous metals (copper cable) and scrap metal dealers. We firstly 
look in the market at the material that was stolen whether it was 
transformers, overhead conductors, copper cables or earth leaking 
in substations. You look in the community what are stolen the most.  
 
Your syndicates mostly operate in the Highveld and Witbank area. 
They are asking for certain scrap metal dealers, the receivers. What 
does the receiver need, maybe he has got an export permit? The 
copper inside the transformers has a purity of 99,5%. 
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I understand their objectives though they are very clear, but there is 
a lot of red tape in whatever they can do. We have local point where 
the cases are reported, and there is a local point in each and every 
police station where the NFMCCC crimes are reported. The problem 
is if you know where your copper went to then you want them to 
have search and seizure. They must have a Court order that makes 
the process very difficult. 
4.5.3.3  Gaps in the understanding and implementation of strategies  
Although not a general theme, the following participant’s response is included to 
identifying shortcomings relating to involvement in strategies: 
 
I won’t say I have a clear understanding and knowledge of all the 
strategies. I wasn’t involved in those processes, so I won’t be able 
to tell you in-depth what the actual strategies of the Forum will be. 
 
The fourth resultant theme that follows for discussion explores participants’ 
perceptions of the NFMCCC’s engagement in multi-faceted cooperative relationships, 
interaction and working agreements with stakeholders. 
4.5.4 Theme 4:  NFMCCC’s engagement in multi-faceted co-operative  
  relationships, interaction and working agreements with  
  stakeholders  
The participants opined that from time-to-time good working relationships exist, 
specifically in the hotspot areas. However, all participants agreed that the notion of co-
operative relationships must be revisited, e.g., a memorandum of understanding 
should be created to improve communication in a multi-faceted co-operative 
relationship and improve interaction with stakeholders. 
 
The sub-themes resultant from Theme 4 are discussed below.  
4.5.4.1 Positive responses about interactive relationships between different 
stakeholders of the NFMCCC  
Participants also offered examples of positive working relationships. On the whole, 
they referred to monthly meetings where information is shared and sometimes 
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planning is undertaken. The issue seems to be the operationalisation of strategies as 
indicated in earlier themes: 
  
We have a good relationship with certain SAPS members and NPA 
Advocate. We can work together, but I think it can improve. 
Currently, the NFMCCC is driven by visible policing in the SAPS. I 
feel that if this mandate can move to the DPCI, it will be more 
focussed. 
 
All the stakeholders are there. Everybody that can and provides 
value and inputs are all attending the meetings from Justice 
[Department of Justice] to SARS to the various stakeholders 
affected by problems and the SAPS. 
 
By the look of the role-players that are there, I can say that it is co-
ordinated in an integrated manner because we have State own 
entities and private companies. You have Telkom, your Vodacom 
and the SOE’s, the people that have lots of copper deposits with 
them. I think it is integrated. 
4.5.4.2 Positivity about linked relationships/agreements in the NFMCCC but 
doubtful about the co-operation on implementation of strategy based 
on intelligence  
A success story in sample group C related to linked relationships and/or agreements 
in the NFMCCC was mentioned by one participant as follows: 
  
We had a copper cable syndicate within the Western Cape, and we 
started to monitor this syndicate and realized the same syndicate 
are targeting the Northern Cape area. So within the Western Cape, 
we approached this body as well as other members from DPCI. We 
wanted to look into the syndicate from an organised crime 
perspective. We gathered all the information. We made proposals, 
and we just couldn’t get this from the ground, and we worked with a 
specific individual in the Northern Cape, a normal detective that 
does’nt belong to this Forum.  He is on station level, and we 
approached him and asked him for assistance in getting this from 
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the ground.  We started to analyse data.  At the end of the day, we 
combined 17 cases within the Northern Cape as well as the Western 
Cape. It was actually scary that the Western Cape didn’t want to be 
the leader in this, because we arrested two of the people that are 
buying copper from the syndicate members and then again selling it 
to a specific scrapyard within the Western Cape. This case is 
currently in the High Court.  
 
Another participant acknowledged linked relationships and/or agreements in the 
NFMCCC; however, he questioned the implementation of strategies: “The link is there, 
but the plans and the execution to get to the strategies and the goals are not there.” 
Two participants mentioned an excellent working relationship: 
 
The Copper Forum and the Mine Crime Combating Forum are two 
different forums of which copper are part of the Mine Crime 
Combating Forum. From the stakeholders’ side, we have had quite 
a good session where we got a professional guy who assisted us. I 
am happy with the Copper Forum, and I am pleased that there is a 
Mine Crime Combating Forum as well. 
 
What has been written paper has been done, but practically 
currently it is not working because everybody has got his own idea 
and he is doing his own thing. I think what is lacking is clear 
responsibilities and accountability to certain persons and the 
exception of that by the leaders. As soon as we go back and 
everybody is accepting his role and responsibility, and he does his 
work then we will maybe succeed. Whose mandate is it to 
investigate level 1 to until level 3, because it is not the HAWK’s 
mandate? The guy on the ground cannot do a 252 application. Some 
of them don’t even know how to do a 205 application of the suspect 
that you want to follow. Currently, we’ve got to go on our knees and 
beg for help when you’ve got hot spots, specific hotspot areas. … 
but the detectives, the HAWKS and Crime Intelligence disappeared, 
and that is the problem. 
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It can improve a lot if you involve your role-players like your 
operational crime intelligence capacity if the focus will be placed 
more on intelligent driven operations rather than disruptive 
operations. 
4.5.4.3 Overall positive responses  
Some participants responded positively about the NFMCCC’s integrated 
operationalisation to address copper cable theft effectively but did not elaborate on the 
implementation:  
 
If we are talking about integrated approach, we are talking about the 
involvement of all parties who are involved like police and the 
stakeholders. It is an integrated approach because the stakeholders 
cannot operate in isolation without the police, and we also don’t 
operate in isolation without the stakeholders. It is integrated. 
 
An integrated approach is utilised because the NFMCCC is not 
about the police only, it is about various stakeholders, and if you 
see, there is a problem in a certain company we go together and 
operate in terms of combating the theft of copper cables. 
The fifth theme explores participant perceptions of the diverse experiences of 
operational relationships between the NFMCCC and other stakeholders. 
4.5.5  Theme 5:    Diverse experiences of operational relationship between 
  the NFMCCC and other stakeholders  
Linking to the previous theme, participants elaborated after further probing about the 
relationship between the NFMCCC and other stakeholders. Although positive 
responses emerged about the relationship and interactions between NFMCCC 
members represented on the Forum meetings, some participants experienced the 
functional relationships and execution as not functioning effectively. 
 
The sub-themes resultant from Theme 5 are discussed below.  
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4.5.5.1  Execution of strategies not happening  
One participant was pessimistic about relationships between the NFMCCC and other 
stakeholders at the grass-roots level: “I am talking about what happens below, the 
operational execution thereof. It does not happen, and I have all the evidence.” 
 
Another participant similarly highlighted the lack of operational relationships between 
the NFMCCC and other stakeholders at the grass-roots level. This participant 
highlighted disagreements between SAPS and stakeholders as a primary inhibiting 
factor: 
Based on the meetings I have attended, and in general, there is fairly 
good co-operation, but a highlight that is also standing out is that 
there are always quarrels between the stakeholders and the SAPS 
mainly because of the lack of support from SAPS and attending 
crime scenes and then following through with the cases. The SAPS 
members attending the meetings know the aims and objectives, but 
it doesn’t boil down to the officers in the charge office. There is a 
gap in communication and a lack of co-operation between senior 
SAPS members as well as the people on the ground. 
4.5.5.2 Participant experiences of operations with some stakeholders are 
positive but lack of co-operation from others  
One participant presented a case study of an exemplary operational relationship 
between the NFMCCC and stakeholders and but also demonstrated conflict with 
others: 
I would say there is a good relationship. The NFMCCC in our 
province are working together with Eskom, Telkom, Transnet, and 
the farmers union. We had encountered a problem with the mine 
workers at Marikana. We handled it, and we sorted it out. The 
biggest problem is that the mines hijack the mining forum for their 
own purpose and then they pushed the NFMCCC to the side, and 
that causes conflict. When there is copper cable maybe recovered 
in a certain area, then the DSP of that particular station phone me 
because we have contact numbers of various stakeholders. 
Previously they phoned me as I was the provincial co-ordinator.  
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The sixth theme explores participant perceptions of the factors that hinder the 
successful implementation of policing strategies implemented by the NFMCCC. 
4.5.6 Theme 6:  Factors that hinder the successful implementation of  
  policing strategies implemented by the NFMCCC  
It emerged from discussions with participants that the lack of persistency and 
trustworthiness between the stakeholders and the SAPS, and power struggles 
influence the successful implementation of policing strategies implemented by the 
NFMCCC. However, various participants made it clear that they attempt to implement 
new ideas to enhance the effectiveness of policing strategies with a pro-active 
approach to preventing copper cable theft in South Africa. 
 
The sub-themes resultant from Theme 6 are discussed below.  
4.5.6.1 Lack of clarity of mandate and investigation work division  
Participants indicated that the mandate of the NFMCCC, which functions under the 
SAPS Visible Policing Division is not always clear to the detectives, because the 
Visible Policing Division regard their mandate as ensuring compliance in terms of Sec. 
28(1) of the Second-Hand Goods Act 6 of 2009, and detectives do not usually see 
copper cable theft as their priority. Participants voiced their concerns as follows: 
 
There is no cross station, cluster, proper provincial investigation 
going on if there is not a task team involved. 
 
We want the authority to check those scrap yards that we have 
identified and go there with a search warrant and most of the time 
we find that the scrap has been moved. 
4.5.6.2 Lack of senior officers’ committed representation on the NFMCCC  
Participants believed the absence of senior officers and senior personnel who serve 
on the NFMCCC causes a lack of commitment and distraction from the NFMCCC’s 
focus on combating copper cable theft.  
It is the manpower and willingness to let the NFMCCC succeed 
because we went into a stage or phase where we found from the 
parastatals side that sometimes you have been send to a meeting 
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by the senior that is part of their structure that should have been on 
the meeting. 
4.5.6.3 Lack of focus on illegal trading  
It emerged that role-players serving on the NFMCCC focus more on crime information 
and data, but lack focus on illegal trading, which not seen as a priority: 
Focus area should shift more from compliance inspections, 
disruptive operations, cluster operations and those things to illegal 
trading. Not the guys that are doing the things correctly by the book. 
That is where intelligence capacity comes in. The guy from Crime 
Intelligence attending the NFMCCC meeting is merely there to 
present the stats of the previous month. There need more of the 
operational people of Crime intelligence, DPCI involved in these 
meetings.  
4.5.6.4 Perceptions about formal communication procedures for effective 
functioning  
All participants acknowledged the importance of sharing crime information using formal 
procedures, but diverse responses emerged about what it implies and existing 
communication procedures. 
4.5.6.5 Statistical information is shared at meetings, and electronic media 
helps with sharing information amongst individuals  
A recurrent theme is that the Forum provides an opportunity to share statistical 
information about copper cable crime-related incidents, but that the information is not 
utilised for planning and evaluating specific strategic interventions. In this section, 
some participants identify the reasons for that, one of which is mistrust: 
  
The sharing of information is there. I just think it is one of the other 
things at Makaken a big problem, corrupt security officers and 
corrupt police officials. The people are forced to do disruptive 
operations with limited information capability to make a success of 
that and then the corrupt people inside going missing. 
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The stakeholders on the private company’s side got WhatsApp 
groups that they are using between each other. They’ve got one-on-
one liaising with the other company’s people. 
 
The focus is currently more on statistics of the previous month than 
on planning actual intelligence, driven operations. Statistics are 
given, but the convictions are left open. 
 
Information is shared during the NFMCCC meeting. It is also shared 
via the WhatsApp group that was created at Mpumalanga NFMCCC 
as well as telephonically. 
4.5.6.6 Perceptions that the flow of information from the NFMCCC to ground 
level is affected by sensitivity to harmful leakage of information  
It became evident that copper-related crime information is only shared on a need-to-
know basis by the NFMCCC and only to top Management due to mistrust and 
corruption internally and externally: 
 
There is a lack of communication from National and Provincial side, 
and there is not one NFMCCC in the bordering province. There is 
nobody to liaise with. 
 
Sometimes when we have to execute these operations, it will be an 
undercover operation where maybe the local members are not 
involved, because we have the feeling of some leakage of 
information. The police investigators will be included and maybe the 
HAWKS. 
 
Lots of time the information does not flow from where we have 
discussed it at the NFMCCC right down to station level and then 
when you get to station level the members have not received 
instructions from the NFMCCC platform. If it is not shared, it might 
be that it could be sensitive investigations being carried on and there 
might be a possibility that the information can leak so the owner or 
informant will use his discretion. 
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One participant, who commented positively about the sharing of crime information 
related to copper theft, also commented on formal communication procedures: “The 
communication is extremely poor. They only communicate during meetings and 
operations. Anything outside that, there is no communication.” 
 
Another participant summarised the perception about a lack of shared crime 
information related to copper theft: “The effect of not sharing is a matter of the left arm 
doesn’t know what the right arm is doing, and it will have a negative impact on 
eventually apprehended suspects as well as successful prosecution.” 
4.5.6.7 Lack of commitment and competent SAPS human resources as well as 
lack of infrastructure and operational resources  
Participants also referred to a lack of competent/knowledgeable SAPS human 
resources and lack of vehicles for investigation as issues that prevent successful 
operations: 
The breakdown comes in the proper investigation and utilising the 
legislation and all the tools necessary to get to a strategy to minimise 
copper cable theft. 
 
There is battling in getting cases registered. Maybe cases are 
registered under the wrong SAPS codes. There are always excuses 
of lack of vehicles, the lack of immediate support when it is needed, 
and that contributes to the frustration and success levels. 
 
Lack of knowledge on the relevant legislation requirements on the 
base-line at police stations itself as well as the will to co-operate. 
When you report at the charge office, they don’t know the Act, but 
the specific police that are dealing with the NFMCCC we know who 
to contact. 
 
My experience is that the successful implementation of policing 
strategies implemented by the NFMCCC to address copper cable 
theft is where the stakeholders give the information or the dealers 
who are receiving the copper. 
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4.5.6.8 Lack of or too little training  
Participants identified copper-related crime training and alternative awareness 
campaigns to empower SAPS members with appropriate knowledge since there is a 
need for more efficient communication and additional trained SAPS officers: 
 
I think a pamphlet type of thing explaining the different commodities 
of each of the stakeholders is definitely useful. At least then you 
empower the SAPS, for example, on identifying these commodities. 
Usually, we will be part of that operation so we will take responsibility 
of identifying the commodities by assisting them. 
 
I don’t believe that they are doing enough with regards to SAPS 
members. Stakeholders themselves know their product and their 
equipment, and they know their materials, but with the SAPS it is a 
big struggle for them to identify and to know even with the new 
Criminal Amendment Matters Act it has been taken a long time for 
them to learn the Act and to implement it correctly. 
 
The seventh theme explores participant perceptions of the NFMCCC’s continuous 
evaluation and adaptation/development and strategies to address identified 
shortcomings to improve exiting strategies. 
4.5.7 Theme 7:  Participant perceptions of the NFMCCC’s continuous  
   evaluation and adaptation/development and   
   implementation of strategies to address identified  
   shortcomings to improve on existing strategies  
Participants had diverse perceptions on whether the NFMCCC continuously evaluates, 
adapts, develops, and implements strategies to address identified shortcomings to 
improve on existing strategies. 
 
The sub-themes resultant from Theme 7 are discussed below.  
4.5.7.1 Feedback on meetings perceived as evaluation  
It emerged from the interviews that feedback occurs at the NFMCCC meetings, but the 
focus is on statistics, but not conviction rates for copper cable theft in South Africa: 
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“Feedback is done on the monthly meetings. Another problem that is experienced is 
that there are always different representatives from the different entities attending the 
meetings. There is not a continuous flow of processes every month.” 
4.5.7.2 Perceptions that evaluation of strategies is not happening and thus no 
strategic adaption occurs  
Participants indicated that evaluation of policing strategies occurs, and as a result, they 
have identified new strategies specifically for Mpumalanga, which will be based on 
incidents that serve as best practices: 
 
The evaluation is not lying with the Chairperson. The NFMCCC 
continuously monitor because they ask the questions. They give the 
taskings, ask the questions and evaluate strategies to determine its 
impact.  
 
The strategies should be confirmed more frequently and then 
outcomes tested according to the strategy and strategies to be 
adjusted more frequently if there are no effective success rates. 
4.5.7.3 Participant perceptions about crime threat analysis to determine 
copper cable crime trends and NFMCCC action upon identified crime 
threat analysis 
Some participants believed that crime threat analysis to determine copper cable theft 
trends and subsequent NFMCCC’s action is undertaken by Crime Intelligence (CI). 
Comparisons are then shared effectively at the NFMCCC meetings: 
 
Crime intelligence is coming down with some stats saying we have 
had so many incidents. From Crime intelligence, very little 
information is received on copper cable theft. The threat analysis 
and the trend come into the Copper Forum are given back to the 
station, and now they must act on the information from Crime 
intelligence. In Mpumalanga, it is the Crime intelligence doing that.  
         
Crime threat analysis are being conducted. When we are in the 
Forum, there is a person from Crime Intelligence from National 
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Registrar who will show us the comparison in order to show us to 
which are there is a threat of copper cable theft. 
 
They do crime threat crime analysis to determine the copper cable 
crime trends because it is costing South Africa a lot of money in the 
essential infrastructure. 
4.5.7.4 Participant perceptions that evaluations and adaptations of strategies 
are not happening  
One participant believed that proper evaluation and adaptation of strategies are not 
happening since crime information and data are often outdated due to meetings 
occurring only once a month:  
We’ve got the stats from CIG [Crime Intelligence Gathering] that is 
coming to us on each meeting – how many thefts and what the 
losses per private company was. We don’t see the analysis coming 
through into an operation. Currently, there is not enough 
intelligence. We can have information, but it cannot be verified to be 
put over into intelligence so that we can do a proper intelligence 
operation. 
The eighth theme explores participant perceptions of the NFMCCC’s monitoring and 
co-ordination of crime combating operations. 
4.5.8 Theme 8:  NFMCCC’s monitoring and co-ordination of crime   
  combating operations  
From the interviews, it appears that the NFMCCC does not always monitor and co-
ordinate crime combating operations and often leaves it to the parastatals who do not 
have the power to arrest resulting in conflict between the stakeholders and the SAPS. 
4.5.8.1 Participants’ perceptions of the overall uncertainty/doubt on the co-
ordination of operations  
There was general uncertainty among participants about the NFMCCC’s efficiency in 
monitoring and co-ordinating operations and a feeling that the SAPS lacks mandate 
and/or commitment:  
From their side, I think they are doing everything that they can to 
assist. The question is now the execution of crime intelligence-
driven operation … how can you for 10 years not arrest that guy? 
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It has been done, currently now for the past 5 months, there is a lot 
of doubt, because there are no operations currently. Previously we 
concentrated on that, and I want to say that the companies took the 
lead. 
 
I am not convinced of that, and there is a lot of room for 
improvement, and that is purely because the focus is more on 
compliance and disruptive operations and understanding the real 
thing and the Act accordingly and then intelligence-driven 
operations rather than just disruptive operations. 
 
We, as the police are co-ordinating and monitoring the crime 
combating operations and focus on the dealers and the suppliers 
whether they did receive the stolen copper. 
 
The ninth theme explores participant perceptions about the efficiency of the link 
between NFMCCC and police stations, government departments and other 
stakeholders. 
4.5.9 Theme 9:  Participant perceptions about an efficient link between  
   NFMCCC, police stations, government departments and  
   other stakeholders  
From the interviews, it appeared that the various entities operate in silos and only 
nurture a link during copper cable theft incidents and after that revert to operating in 
silos. This situation becomes more apparent (especially in the case of the SAPS) once 
the matter goes to court.  
4.5.9.1 A structure exists for linking, but there is room for improvement 
regarding representation; information sharing insufficient and 
should include intelligence and not just statistics 
It transpired from the interviews that a link exists between the NFMCCC, police 
stations, government departments and other stakeholders; however, it is not optimally 
implemented: 
They are bringing all the people together with a plan, but the 
execution is not going through. 
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All role-players are represented. The only problem is if the role-
players do not have consistent representation with regards to 
coming to the meetings. 
 
There is a link because as I have already mentioned when we are 
talking about government institutions, we’ve also got the National 
Forum where the Provincial Forum is also reporting to in terms of 
what is being done by our Provincial Forum and when we are talking 
about our Provincial Forum, we are talking about the stations all over 
the Province. 
 
It is supposed to be, but there is room for improvement. 
 
There is a really good link, but it needs to be empowered. The police 
need to get their powers back. 
 
The tenth theme explores participant perceptions about the functionality of the 
NFMCCC. 
4.5.10 Theme 10: Functionality of the NFMCCC  
The overall perception of participants was that the NFMCCC is partially functional. The 
Forum serves as a platform for sharing information about non-ferrous metals and 
networking with external stakeholders, but the operational part is ineffective, referring 
to the previously reported shortcomings/challenges. 
4.5.10.1 Partially functional  
Participants made it clear that the NFMCCC is functional, but not as effective as it 
should be: 
It is a good platform for networking. You get to know the right people. 
Build relationships with the right people. Between our stakeholders, 
we are then able to at least know there is some good coming from 
it, and it is functional for as long as the stakeholders communicate 
with each other. 
 
I believe it is currently not running as optimal as it can. It does have 
a good impact. All of the stakeholders and the SAPS have an 
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opportunity to share their experiences, and whatever they achieved 
or did not achieve or whether they were struggling with anything then 
that can be relayed to each other. 
 
It does make a positive contribution, but we are far from being 
effective. Just getting feedback on the escalation of copper cable-
related theft means that we are not successful. The bottom-line test 
is the increase in the amount of copper cable-related thefts and the 
huge monetary values that are reported and then also the few 
success rates. 
 
One participant was positive about the functionality of the Forum in his Province: “In 
Mpumalanga, I can say it is 99% functional and efficient because we have our 
meetings, and we will also conduct our operations together with stakeholders”. 
 
4.6 SUMMARY 
This chapter presented the combined qualitative data obtained from in-depth 
interviews with awaiting trial detainees at Pollsmoor Correctional Centre Western 
Cape, representatives from Mpumalanga and Gauteng Provincial NFMCCC’s, 
BACSA, and CPI private investigators. The participants' experiences and views were 
presented via identified themes and sub-themes. The participant views were cited 
verbatim to highlight their opinions, observations, and experiences. The in-depth 
interviews provided the researcher with an improved insight into the participant 
experiences of copper cable theft in South Africa. 
 




INTERPRETATION OF THE RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 5.1   INTRODUCTION  
In this chapter, the researcher presents the interpreted data arising from in-depth 
interviews with awaiting trial detainees (on charges of copper theft) at Pollsmoor 
Correctional Centre Western Cape, Mpumalanga Provincial NFMCCC and Gauteng 
Provincial NFMCCC, BACSA, and CPI private investigators (as described in chapter 
one). The interpretation is presented by way of themes and sub-themes that were 
categorised and presented in chapter four. These identified themes and sub-themes 
are associated with the participants’ day-to-day experiences of copper cable theft. 
 
The above approach speaks to the research problem, the purpose of the study, the 
research aims, and the research questions presented in chapter one. This chapter 
aims to understand the participants' experiences by measuring participant experiences 
against the literature presented in chapter one to three.  
 
The research findings' interpretation commences with a synopsis per theme, 
supplemented with the relevant literature, as per chapter one to three. The 
interpretation aimed to create an improved understanding of the impact of the 
NFMCCC on the combating of copper cable theft and therein: 
o To describe the extent and impact of copper cable theft in South Africa. 
o To describe the impact of the NFMCCC on the combating of copper cable 
theft. 
o To explore the co-operation between government and industry stakeholders 
who form part of the NFMCCC to combat copper cable theft. 
o To investigate factors that hinder the implementation of effective policing 
strategies to address copper cable theft. 
o To examine current policing strategies to address copper cable theft. 
 
The section below presents a discussion of sample group A’s perceptions of the 
various Themes which arose from the in-depth interviews.  
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5.2   SAMPLE GROUP A – AWAITING TRIAL DETAINEES (DETAINED ON 
CHARGES OF COPPER THEFT) AT POLLSMOOR CORRECTIONAL 
CENTRE, WESTERN CAPE 
5.2.1 Theme 1:  Participant perceptions/awareness of damage caused by 
  copper cable theft  
The literature presented in chapter two highlights the damage caused by copper cable 
theft. Parks (2015:2) estimated that the crime costs South Africa up to R 7 billion per 
annum. In addition, it takes a toll on human life as is evident in the case where two 
people died, 19 were critically injured and a further 281 were injured when two trains 
collided near Pretoria in January 2011 (as discussed earlier). This collision resulted 
from the theft of two 25-metre copper cables, which disrupted the signalling system. 
The financial cost of this accident to trains and rails was more than R 22 million. 
 
Mawisa for Carte Blanche (2019) reported that criminals target copper cables from 
essential infrastructures like power lines and communication networks and their action 
border on sabotage as syndicates make millions. In addition, and as emphasised in 
para. 2.3.1, the damage caused by copper cable theft affects the victims directly and 
indirectly.  
 
Damage caused by copper cable theft is furthermore accentuated in para. 2.3.3. Parks 
(2015:2), as per para. 2.3.3 states that Telkom has simply stopped replacing stolen 
cables due to the high theft rate. Workers’ jobs at Eskom, Telkom and Transnet are 
threatened, as those state-owned companies have drained their funds trying to repair 
the damage caused by copper cable and metal theft. Workers and companies suffer 
further financial losses due to the constant train delays caused by copper cable theft. 
 
From the in-depth interviews, as presented in para. 4.2.1, it became evident that most 
participants realise the impact of damages caused to infrastructure because of copper 
cable theft. However, some of these offenders only realise the extent of the damage 
they caused when they appear in court.  
 
The majority of thieves are well aware of the damage caused by copper cable theft. 
These criminals are insensitive towards the consequences of their actions. Damage to 
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critical infrastructure and even the loss of life in some instances does not deter copper 
cable thieves.  
5.2.2 Theme 2:  Planning the copper cable theft 
The literature discussed in para. 2.6.1, highlights the involvement of individuals and 
organised crime, which relies on inside information and expert reconnaissance to plan 
their copper cable theft. Torkelson (2010:1 & 2) confirms that many networks are 
domestic, but evidence suggests the involvement of militarily trained cells from 
Southern Africa. Elvia (2018:1) explains, as emphasised in para. 3.1 that the strategy 
of most copper thieves is to operate under cover of darkness.  
 
From the in-depth interviews conducted, as presented in para. 4.2.2, it became evident 
that most copper cable thieves have evolved into skilled and trained criminals and 
conduct thorough planning and surveillance before executing the crime.  
5.2.3 Theme 3:  At the wrong place at the wrong time 
The literature presented in chapter two (para. 2.4.3.2), stipulates that national 
legislation contained within the CPA highlights that any person who unlawfully and 
intentionally – 
 (a) Tampers with, damages, or destroys essential infrastructure in; or 
 (b) Concludes with or assists another person in the commission, performance 
or carrying out of an activity referred to in paragraph (a), and who knows or 
ought reasonably to have known or suspected that it is essential 
infrastructure, is guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to a period of 
imprisonment not exceeding 30 years. 
 
Venter (2008:1), highlights (as discussed in para. 2.6.1), that the typical small-time 
copper thief (“bread and butter thieves”) is a subsistence criminal who is financially 
underprivileged. These subsistence criminals' hopeless position is capitalised on by 
organised crime elements that employed them to steal. However, they are in the 




From the in-depth interviews conducted, most participants echoed their innocence of 
the crime.  
5.2.4  Theme 4:  The motivation and incentive to commit copper cable theft 
As noted in para. 2.6.1, and according to Torkelson (2010:1 & 2) the consistently high 
price of copper makes it a valuable commodity for illicit business. Thieves are 
sophisticated market analysts, who decide when the price of copper has risen to a 
point where the theft of the commodity (weighed against the risk) is more financially 
rewarding than any other. Copper is widely available, poorly secured, and easy to steal 
due to the extensive transportation, power and communication networks belonging to 
Transnet, Eskom, and Telkom. It is also effortless to sell, due to eager scrap dealers, 
looking to profit. Consequently, many actors – from petty thieves and organised 
criminals to scrap dealers and private security companies – benefit from this illicit 
economy. In para. 2.7.1, the researcher refers to Kolevar (2007:1), who reiterates that 
copper cable theft is on the rise all over the world. Large concentrations of copper in 
one place make a lucrative target for theft. Bergal (2018:1), as noted in para. 2.7.1 
confirms the profitability of stealing copper. Copper cable thieves take their loot to 
scrap recycling yards to sell something, they effectively received for nothing. Similarly, 
according to Koba (2013:1), copper is attractive to thieves because it is easy to steal; 
it is difficult to get caught stealing, and the penalties when caught are merely a 
reprimand. Van Dalen (2017:2), as noted in para. 3.1, further confirms that the illegal 
trade in non-ferrous metals has become a multi-million Rand trade in South Africa, with 
people involved from all social classes. 
 
Many participants, as referred to in para. 4.2.4.1, confirmed that copper cable theft and 
the later selling of this precious metal are financially rewarding crimes supported by 
scrap metal buyers facilitating an easy market for selling. The fact that participants 
repeatedly commit copper cable theft was also emphasised during the interviews, and 
the participants acknowledged the profitability of selling stolen copper, confirming that 
many perpetrators commit this crime for a living. In effect, many legal scrap metal 
dealers serve as enablers for copper cable theft reimbursing the perpetrators a 




In addition, it became evident from the in-depth interviews with awaiting trial detainees 
charged with copper cable theft, and as demonstrated in para. 4.2.4.2 that many 
perpetrators are drug abusers and commit the crime to finance their drug habit. 
Consequently, a sustained market for the seller is created. It also became evident that 
the risk of being electrocuted does not deter these perpetrators.  
5.2.5  Theme 5:  Facilitating/reinforcing factors for copper cable theft 
As stated by Nationwide (2019:1), and as noted in para. 3.2.1, increased demand for 
copper from Asian markets such as China and India have created a thriving 
international scrap trade. 
 
It became evident from the in-depth interviews with awaiting trial detainees charged 
with copper cable theft that the theft is facilitated by the burning of trains and load 
shedding since there is no live electric current, and thus no risk of electrocution for 
perpetrators. As a result, the burnt wires are then laid bare, and it is not necessary to 
strip the plastic casing. The same applies during load shedding because it is an 
exceptionally insignificant risk as there is no live current running through the cables. 
 
In addition, the in-depth interviews with awaiting trial prisoners (as noted in para. 
4.2.5.1), revealed that many security personnel responsible for securing parastatal 
assets are corrupt and involved in stealing copper cables from their employers.  
5.2.6 Theme 6:  Executing the alleged offence 
As noted in para. 2.6.1, and according to Torkelson (2010:1 & 2) organised crime 
networks have been implicated in the theft of miles of copper cable from peri-urban or 
rural areas in Gauteng, the North West and KwaZulu-Natal. Many networks are 
domestic, but recent evidence suggests the involvement of militarily trained cells from 
Southern Africa. Their modus operandi entails stealing underground cable in the early 
hours of the morning, or from electrical substations, construction sites or vehicles in 
transit. Criminals use hired vehicles to transport the copper. The perpetrators even use 
trucks and ambulances.  
 
International literature reviewed in para. 2.7.1 illustrates copper theft in the USA. 
Kolevar (2007:1), as noted in para. 2.7.1, explains the theft of copper wire from US 
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utilities primarily at substation transformers, from utility poles, streetlights, or the back 
of service trucks. According to CMC Queensland (2012:10), as noted in para. 2.7.4, 
copper is stolen from locations such as power stations, railway lines, 
telecommunication facilities, churches, construction sites and unoccupied buildings. 
 
As observed in para. 2.7.1, the FBI (2008:1) states that copper thieves are threatening 
US critical infrastructure by targeting electrical substations, cellular towers, telephone 
lines, railroads, water wells, construction sites, and vacant homes for lucrative profits. 
As stated by Van Dalen (2017:2), mentioned in para. 3.1, equipment and copper cables 
containing non-ferrous metals have proven to be the dominant targets. Other strategic 
objects are also targeted like drain covers, solar panels, water-meters and (the latest 
addition) transformer oil. 
 
The participant responses, as noted in para. 4.2.6.1, illustrate the Anaconda is usually 
the last resort for perpetrators, because the risk is higher, and it is physically 
demanding work because it requires digging to get to the cables. There is also a more 
significant risk of electrocution, and the copper bears less value. The shiny bright 
running overhead is easier to steal and has more monetary value. 
 
5.2.7 Theme 7: Perceptions of the protection of copper cables –    
  effectiveness of security and protection measures   
Bindeman (2011:3), as illustrated in para. 2.1, argues for implementing stricter control 
measures and prosecution based on economic sabotage for copper cable theft and 
stricter controls on export measures. Bindeman further argues that the SAPS should 
prioritise copper cable theft as a priority crime. In addition, Robertson (2018), 
contends, as per para. 2.1 that the SAPS will never effectively control copper cable 
theft if they do not protect assets (including copper cable) that provide essential 
services. Similarly, Michael (2012:1) posits that Parliament has indicated that the 
government is losing the war against copper cable theft. Liebenberg (2018:1), as per 
para. 2.2 further highlights the magnitude of copper cable theft, explaining that South 
Africa is experiencing an unprecedented challenge in the high number of copper cable 
theft incidents. Planting (2011:2), as per para. 2.3.1, warns that the phenomenon of 
copper cable theft cannot remain unresolved as it can implode and destroy the 
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country’s fragile economy. Pieterse (2017:3) quotes La Marque, as per para. 2.3.4 
proposes stricter measures to prevent copper cable theft.  
 
Philip (2014:1), as per para. 3.1, suggests that a strategy to curb copper cable theft is 
to paint or spray barely visible micro-dots onto both copper cable and steel 
infrastructure that will allow the police and parastatals to identify cable as stolen 
effectively and efficiently and instantly identify its owner. Chetty (2010:2), as per para. 
3.1, mentions an alternative approach to curb copper cable theft, explaining that in a 
strategic move, the parastatal Telkom has decided not to replace the copper cables, 
but rather provide affected customers with wireless services. 
 
5.3  SAMPLE GROUP B – BUSINESS AGAINST CRIME SOUTH AFRICA 
 
5.3.1 Theme 1:  BACSA participant perceptions of the aims and objectives 
   of the NFMCCC 
Coetzee (2013:3), as discussed in para. 1.2 confirms that the NFMCCC aims to 
address theft and other related crimes on national and provincial levels pertaining to 
non-ferrous metals by implementing a joint venture between the relevant stakeholders. 
The NFMCCC is also mandated with co-ordinating integrated crime combating 
operations focusing on the suppliers, dealers, and end-users. The literature, as 
discussed in para. 1.2, further illustrates that the National NFMCCC and the nine 
provincial chapters meet once a quarter, to share information between role- players 
and operationalise initiatives to address non-ferrous metal-related crime. 
 
The responses from BACSA participants, as per para. 4.3.1.1, echoed that the current 
aim and objective of the NFMCCC to prevent copper cable theft is not based on pro-
active prevention. It was suggested that legislation addressing non-ferrous metals' 
theft should be communicated to all role-players to implement effectively. It further 
emerged, as noted in para. 4.3.1.2 that participants regard the implementation of 
industry standards for scrap metal dealers and the control of the export market as a 
significant aim of the NFMCCC in the regulation of non-ferrous metals crimes.  
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5.3.2 Theme 2:   Participant perceptions of the NFMCCC achieving its aims 
  and objectives to combat copper cable theft  
As stated in para. 1.3, copper theft and its impact on the South African criminal justice 
system are confirmed by BACSA, in their National Strategy and Funding Proposal of 
2012-2015 (BACSA, 2012) which highlights that non-ferrous metal theft, which 
includes copper theft, poses a severe threat to the South African criminal justice 
system and has done so for many years. Van den Berg (2007), as mentioned in para. 
1.3, states that the theft of non-ferrous metals, copper, and aluminium in particular, is 
a severe problem in South Africa and non-ferrous metal theft had escalated to such an 
extent that losses run into millions of Rand annually. 
 
Most participants replied with diverse opinions about the NFMCCC achieving its aims 
and objectives, and most agreed that limitations exist. Participants ascribe these 
circumstances to the insufficiency of communication and the fact that the aims and 
objectives of the NFMCCC are not aligned to the new Criminal Matters Amendment 
Act.  
 
One participant agreed that the aims and objectives of the NFMCCC are achieved to 
some extent since statistics for copper cable theft remain low. However, this participant 
cautioned that official SAPS statistics on non-ferrous metal-related crime are not 
reliable because they are often incorrectly captured. 
5.3.3 Theme 3:  Challenges/Constraints to successful implementation  
Bindeman (2011:3), as noted in para. 2.1 suggests stricter control measures and 
prosecution based on economic sabotage for copper cable theft and stricter controls 
on export measures. Bindeman argues further that the SAPS should prioritise copper 
cable theft as a priority crime. According to Robertson (2018), as mentioned in para. 
2.1, the SAPS will never effectively control copper cable theft if they do not protect the 
assets (containing copper cable) that provide essential services. Michael (2012:1), as 
per para. 2.1, further reiterates that Parliament has indicated that the government is 
losing the war against copper cable theft. 
 
As discussed in para. 3.3, the need to protect South African infrastructure against 
copper theft was never foreseen. Infrastructure crime (ferrous, non-ferrous, and 
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essential infrastructure-related crimes) remains a national priority that should be 
addressed operationally, primarily to combat the scourge and strategically control and 
prevent future occurrences.  
 
According to participants, the NFMCCC is inhibited by various factors which makes 
achieving its aim difficult. It appeared from the in-depth interviews with BACSA 
participants that the SAPS experiences a challenge to prioritise copper cable theft due 
to other priorities, limited resources, and insufficient expertise. Echoing his colleague's 
sentiments, another participant believes the SAPS have too many other crime priorities 
to address and resultantly copper cable theft is in effect left behind in the bigger 
scheme of crime prevention. The lack of information sharing and inefficient 
communication between the NFMCCC and members on the grass-roots level also 
became evident during the interviews. These shortcomings result in copper cable theft 
not being pro-actively prevented. Another participant highlighted regular non-
attendance of NFMCCC meetings by role-players, which hampers decision-making 
and the consequent execution of decisions. Replies from participants point to negative 
experiences regarding the proper and effective implementation of the NFMCCC aims 
and objectives.  
5.3.4 Theme 4:   The nature of the expected multi-faceted co-operative  
  relationships, interaction and working agreements with  
  stakeholders 
Coetzee (2013:3), as mentioned in para. 1.2 confirms that the NFMCCC focuses on 
addressing theft and other related crimes on national and provincial levels pertaining 
to non-ferrous metals by implementing a joint venture between the relevant 
stakeholders. The NFMCCC is also mandated with co-ordinating integrated crime 
combating operations focusing on suppliers, dealers, and end-users. According to the 
SAPS Annual Report 2014/2015 (SAPS, 2015: 157-158), as per para. 1.2, the National 
NFMCCC meets once a quarter, as do the nine provincial NFMCCCs to share 
information between role-players and operationalise initiatives to address non-ferrous 
metal-related crime. As stipulated in the SAPS Annual Report of 2016/2017, discussed 
in para. 1.2, a National Operational Committee and Provincial Operational Committees 
have also been established under the auspices of the SAPS Directorate for Priority 
Crime Investigation (DPCI) to operationalise the functioning of the NFMCCC through 
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disruptive operations, and to address all criminal activities associated with non-ferrous 
metal-related crimes, in an intelligence-led and integrated manner. 
Multi-faceted, co-operative relationships, interaction and working agreements with 
stakeholders are emphasised in the SAPS Annual Performance Plan 2018/2019 
(SAPS, 2019:3), as per para. 2.5.1, which stipulates that the Mining Crime Combating 
Forum and Non-Ferrous Metal Crime Committees should be operationalised at the 
appropriate organisational levels to effectively combat copper cable theft and focus on 
an operational approach to address the theft of copper cable. This co-operative 
working agreement is further accentuated in SAPS Circular 2/28/23 of 2011 (par.3) 
(SAPS, 2011), as set out in para. 2.5.2, mandating the NFMCCC to address the theft of 
non-ferrous metals actively by: 
 
o Establishing and maintaining an NFMCCC to address theft and related crimes 
pertaining to non-ferrous metals. 
o Implementing a joint venture between the relevant stakeholders to effectively address 
crime pertaining to non-ferrous metals on a national and provincial level; and 
o Co-ordinating integrated crime combating operations that focus on the 
suppliers/dealers and end-users. 
 
Arendse (2010:39), as discussed in para. 3.1 confirms that the NFMCCC must identify 
trends, give strategic guidance and co-ordinate operations. The following NFMCCC 
strategic objectives, as mentioned in para. 3.3.1, further clarify the Committee’s 
expected multi-faceted co-operative relationships, interaction and working agreements 
with stakeholders: 
 Strategic Objective 1: Led by NFMCCC assisted by NICOC co-ordinate and 
consolidate government’s effort in combating theft and illicit trade in ferrous and 
non-ferrous metals in partnership with affected industries.  
 Strategic Objective 2: All role-players co-ordinated/monitored by NFMCCC (no 
executive authority). Mitigate theft and illicit trade in ferrous and non-ferrous metals 
across the illicit value chain (detect, prevent, combat, investigate and prosecute)  
 Strategic Objective 3: South African Revenue Protection Association (SARPA) and 
the involvement of DIRCO to be strengthened Regional and international co-
operation to combat infrastructure-related crimes.  
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It became evident from the in-depth interviews with BACSA participants that the 
relationship between the NFMCCC and other role-players is not always sound and 
trustworthy, especially during information-driven operations. Participants were further 
of the opinion that the SAPS are not always present. Participants suggested this 
relationship has deteriorated because of factors, such as budgetary limitations and 
changes to legislation. Another participant pointed out that the new legislation placed 
limitations on the interaction and working relationships between SAPS and other role-
players.  
 
Moreover, participants agreed that although statistics are available, no real co-
operative and co-ordinated intervention strategies were planned based on threat 
analysis information. One participant acknowledged the registering of statistics but 
questioned the sharing of information and how information is acted upon to inform new 
co-ordinated operational strategies to address non-ferrous metal-related crimes.  
 
The responses further suggested that stakeholders co-operate with the local SAPS 
and parastatals since they are more supportive than the NFMCCC regarding strategies 
based on threat analysis. In agreement, another participant confirmed that parastatals 
are more supportive in implementing co-operative interventions based on crime threat 
analysis, though these interventions do not always result in success.  
5.3.5  Theme 5:   Additional external operational challenges to the   
  NFMCCC and its copper theft prevention aim  
From the literature presented in para. 2.1, copper cable theft is indeed a national crisis, 
while Michael, the DA Spokesperson on Public Enterprises (2012:1), similarly argued 
that the time has come to take serious action to stop copper cable theft. Bindeman 
(2011:3), as discussed in para. 2.1 proposes stricter control measures and prosecution 
based on economic sabotage for copper cable theft and stricter control on exports.  
 
Participants identified additional external challenges that face the NFMCCC. These 
challenges include the following: the difficulty of identifying the owner of copper cabling 
once perpetrators have burnt the outer plastic casing to expose the copper; and the 
involvement of foreign nationals (these foreign nationals are abused by drug dealers 
who accept copper cable as payment for drug purchases); informal, illegal trading of 
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copper; the excessive number of copper theft cases withdrawn; and copper theft 
increases during electricity outages (which are becoming more common in South 
Africa).   
5.3.6  Theme 6:   The operationalisation of the NFMCCC in an integrated  
  manner 
It emerged from the in-depth interviews that participants are positive about the 
existence of the NFMCCC; however, the functional operation and co-ordination of this 
Forum has several challenges that relate to challenges identified in Theme 3. Due to 
the lack of arresting powers, parastatal find themselves in a difficult position during 
operations co-ordinated by the NFMCCC. The SAPS are not always present at crime 
scenes, and an obvious lack of training at station level exists surrounding the mandates 
and legislation. Participants further expressed that the functional relationships between 
the NFMCCC and other stakeholders are not optimal and should be re-evaluated. In 
addition, it appears that the SAPS do not have dedicated members to address non-
ferrous metals-related crimes. The lack of sufficient training by the NFMCCC once 
again emerged as a theme. One participant stressed that certain SAPS members are 
not familiar with the procedures to follow in non-ferrous metals-related crimes.  
 
5.4  SAMPLE GROUP C – CPI PRIVATE INVESTIGATORS  
5.4.1 Theme 1:   CPI participant perceptions of the aims and objectives of 
   the NFMCCC 
The SAPS Annual Report of 2014/2015 (SAPS, 2015:156), as noted in para. 1.3, 
identifies the following NFMCCC aims and objectives (SAPS is responsible for the 
Second-Hand Goods Control Section):  
o Maintaining governance in co-operation with SAPS Legal Services.  
o Maintaining National and Provincial NFMCCCs.  
o Maintaining mechanisms, such as training for the effective identification of non-
ferrous metals. 
o Sustaining an integrated approach between relevant stakeholders. 
o Co-ordinating compliance, as well as crime combating operations.  
o Monitoring the import and export of non-ferrous metal.  
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o Monitoring investigations pertaining to non-ferrous metals-related crimes. 
o Maintaining fixed structures on national and provincial levels and conducting a 
non-ferrous metals analysis to determine crime threat tendencies.  
In addition, the purpose of the Second-Hand Goods Control Act 6 of 2009, as 
confirmed in para. 2.4.2 is to regulate second-hand goods dealers and pawnbrokers 
to combat trade in stolen goods (copper cable); to promote ethical standards in the 
second-hand goods trade and provide for matters connected therewith. This Act thus 
sets the foundation for the aims and objectives of the NFMCCC. Arendse (2010:39), 
as mentioned in para. 3.1, describes the NFMCCC as a Forum identifying trends, 
giving strategic guidance and co-ordinating operations concerning non-ferrous metals 
crimes. 
 
Participants made strong statements that the aims and objectives of the NFMCCC are 
not upheld due to a lack of proper communication and training which should be 
integrated with the new laws on copper cable theft in South Africa. The participants' 
responses further indicate that the co-ordination of prevention initiatives by the 
NFMCCC is not always effective, particularly during major operations. It also emerged 
that parastatals are left without support from the SAPS due to internal power struggles.  
5.4.2 Theme 2:   Participant perceptions of the NFMCCC achieving its  
  aims and objectives to combat copper cable theft  
The magnitude of copper cable theft in South Africa and the impact on the economy, 
electricity supply, transport, telecommunications, health services, agriculture, and 
productivity, as discussed in para. 2.2, suggests the NFMCCC experiences challenges 
in achieving its aims and objectives regarding the combating copper cable theft.  
 
Participants perceived the NFMCCC as partially successful in achieving its aims. 
Participants ascribed this partial success to the NFMCCC, focusing on easier targets 
instead of copper cable theft and effective management. Another participant was 
sceptical about the NFMCCC, explaining that it only partially achieves success 
because it focusses on petty criminals instead of organized syndicates.  
 
Participants indicated mixed feelings about the NFMCCC attaining their goal and 
objectives, ranging from a clear no to being uncertain and/or acknowledging it as 
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partially successful. It emerged from the in-depth interviews with CPI participants that 
the NFMCCC does not achieve its aims and objectives to combat copper cable theft. 
It appears that NFMCCC meetings only focus on non-ferrous metals crime statistics; 
however, no action is taken to address this crime collectively.  
5.4.3 Theme 3:  Engagement in multi-faceted co-operative relationships,  
  interaction and working agreement with stakeholders to  
  facilitate and sustain policing strategies to combat copper 
  cable theft  
According to SAPS Circular 2/28/23 of 2011 (par.3) (SAPS, 2011b) and para. 2.2.5, one 
of the responsibilities of the NFMCCC is to actively address the theft of non-ferrous 
metals by implementing joint ventures between the relevant stakeholders to address the 
crime on a national and provincial level effectively. Moreover, Bindeman (2013:1), as 
discussed in para. 2.2.5, confirms the NFMCCC involves role-players such as the SAPS, 
BACSA, state-owned entities such as Eskom, Transnet and the JSE-listed 
telecommunication group Telkom, Metrorail, mines, municipalities, and representatives 
from many government departments. 
 
The strategic objectives of the NFMCCC, as discussed in para. 3.3.1, stipulate 
partnerships with role-players and co-ordination and co-operation in combating theft and 
illicit trade in ferrous and non-ferrous metals.  
 
From the CPI participant views, as discussed in chapter four, it appears that the existing 
NFMCCC structure is primarily used for discussion and interaction, but doubt was 
expressed as to whether planning and implementation occur according to clear aims 
and objectives within the Forum. Participants opined a lack of structured results-driven 
working agreements incorporating timeframes. One participant acknowledged that the 
NFMCCC performs operations resulting in successes; however, was further of the 
opinion that more should be achieved given the structure of the NFMCCC.  
5.4.4 Theme 4:  The nature of the strategies planned for achieving the goal 
As stated in para. 1.2, the SAPS, which is the custodian of law and order, must follow 
a holistic approach whereby governmental and private stakeholders co-operate and 
identify policing strategies to address copper theft. According to SAPS Circular 2/28/23 
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of 2011 (par.3) (SAPS, 2011b), as discussed in para. 1.3, one of the NFMCCC’s 
responsibilities is to actively address non-ferrous metal theft by launching and 
implementing a non-ferrous metal anti-crime communication plan and strategy, including 
educational awareness campaigns. The SAPS Annual Report of 2014/2015 (SAPS, 
2015:158), as mentioned in para. 1.3 confirms that intelligence-driven operations have 
been initiated in all provinces in order to combat non-ferrous metal-related crimes.  
 
Philip (2014:1), as noted in para. 3.1, posits that one strategy to curb copper cable 
theft is to paint or spray barely visible micro-dots onto both copper cable and steel 
infrastructure that will allow the police (and parastatals) to identify cable as stolen and 
instantly identify its owner. In addition, Van Dalen (2017:2), as per para. 3.1 argues 
that a proper strategy must include all role-players in the investigation and prosecution 
of suspects, who must work together to ensure effective and efficient processes. 
Goosen, (2017:1), as mentioned in para. 3.1, further suggests that an alternative 
strategy to prevent copper cable theft is the use of geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) 
analysis software systems implemented to support operational strategies in countering 
copper cable theft in the central Gauteng region of South Africa. Van Dalen (2017:2) 
believes that any concrete strategic plan would be challenged by the number of voices 
and opinions currently involved in the issue but that the time has passed where the 
SAPS owns crime prevention, and he calls for the public (partnership policing) to assist 
in the prevention of copper cable theft. 
 
Some participants believed that there are no clear strategies by the NFMCCC to 
address copper cable theft, although some believe that there are strategies put in place 
but are doubtful whether those strategies are being managed effectively. One 
participant believed the NFMCCC has no transparent strategy to address non-ferrous 
metal-related crimes. This participant suggested a governing body, training 
interventions to upskill inexperienced members, and intelligence-driven strategies as 
a partial solution. Another participant opined that the responsibility of the NFMCCC is 
to facilitate information gathering and sharing among all role-players with an emphasis 
on ensuring that available information is sufficiently acted upon. One participant was 
confident that the NFMCCC has strategies in place; however, he suggested that 
strategies be managed effectively. One participant suggested that SAPS members 
responsible for enforcing the Second-Hand Goods Control Act 6 of 2009 should be 
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rotated since they become complacent and merely strive to meet site inspection 
targets.  
 
Another participant cautioned of corrupt activities among SAPS members responsible 
for enforcing the Second-Hand Goods Control Act 6 of 2009 suggesting that the 
relationships between officers and second-hand dealers tend to become too friendly 
creating an environment for corruption. One participant viewed the application of 
strategies implemented by the NFMCCC from a legislative perspective. This 
participant emphasised challenges from implementing new legislation among 
members of the police and members of the NPA. Participants illustrated that they do 
not clearly understand what happens to crime statistics or how they are analysed and 
implemented operationally. Participants were further concerned about the statistical 
timeframes which are not always practical when used for information-driven 
operations. Participants were negative about adopted strategies based on evaluating 
statistics that are not appropriately planned or communicated effectively. One 
participant described the NFMCCC meeting as a “…statistical nightmare…” and 
expressed reservations whether the NFMCCC sufficiently analyses the crime statistics 
on copper cable theft to ascertain the impact of implemented strategies.  
 
Another participant suggested that the NFMCCC does not provide sufficient guidelines 
to evaluate the impact of implemented strategies resulting in solutions being aimless 
or implemented with uncertainty.  
 
One participant cast doubt on police officers’ knowledge and ability to conduct threat 
analysis and further questioned their ability to implement strategies. This participant 
also emphasised the significance of support and expertise provided by specialised 
units.  
 
Another participant confirmed that intelligence-driven operations are conducted by 
SAPS, acknowledging that these kinds of operations impact on copper cable theft. This 
participant further stressed the importance of timeous crime information which assists 
with successful operations.  
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Interestingly, another participant believed SAPS is manipulating the crime statistics, 
thus, creating a skewed picture of the reality. 
5.4.5 Theme 5:   Effective strategy implies knowledge of the crime,  
  product, and legal matters 
As confirmed in para. 2.4.2, the Second-Hand Goods Control Act 6 of 2009 was 
enacted to regulate second-hand goods dealers and pawnbrokers, to combat trade in 
stolen goods (including copper); to promote ethical standards in the second-hand 
goods trade, and to provide for matters connected therewith. Furthermore, SAPS 
Circular 2/28/23 of 2011 (par.3) (SAPS, 2011b), as discussed in para. 2.5.2, emphasises 
some of the responsibilities of the NFMCCC including actively addressing the theft of 
non-ferrous metals and monitoring investigations pertaining to non-ferrous metal-related 
crimes and establishing mechanisms (training interventions) for the practical identification 
of non-ferrous by law enforcement officers. 
 
The participants argued an apparent lack of forensic investigators with the necessary 
knowledge of copper cable theft investigations. Another participant suggested that a 
dedicated SAPS unit should be established to address copper cable theft. In addition, 
this participant recognised the lack of linkage between related cases as a shortcoming. 
One participant regarded the private security industries restricted mandate as an 
impediment to copper cable theft prevention. Another participant viewed the efficient 
gathering and management of crime information as crucial and identified ill-informed 
role-players (especially relating to implementing applicable legislation) as a 
shortcoming.  
5.4.6 Theme 6:  Participant perceptions of the NFMCCC continuously  
   developing and implementing strategies to address  
   identified shortcomings or to improve on existing   
   strategies 
The SAPS Annual Report of 2014/2015 (SAPS, 2015:158), as discussed in para. 1.3 
states that intelligence-driven operations have been introduced in all provinces to 
reduce copper cable theft in South Africa. Further, SAPS has created and maintained 
structures on a national and provincial level to conduct non-ferrous metals analysis to 
determine crime threat tendencies. 
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Michael (2012:1), the DA Spokesperson on Public Enterprises, as mentioned in para. 
2.1, advocates that the time has come to take serious action to stop copper cable theft 
and secure national assets (including critical infrastructure reliant on copper), which 
ensure daily life necessities. He cites as examples of assets essential services like 
telecommunication, electricity, and transport. Furthermore, the SAPS Strategic Plan 
2014-2019:17 (SAPS, 2019), as noted in para. 2.5.1, regulates the investigation of the 
theft of environmental assets and natural resources, namely, theft of non-ferrous 
metals, and mandates a pro-active approach to policing.  
 
Participants expressed an overall lack of commitment from leadership for the 
NFMCCC’s strategies to address identified shortcomings or improve existing 
approaches.  
5.4.7 Theme 7:  The need for co-ordination of integrated strategies 
The SAPS Annual Report of 2014/2015 (SAPS, 2015:156), as discussed in para. 1.3, 
highlights that the SAPS Second-Hand Goods Control Section, which is the custodian 
of the NFMCCC, is responsible for sustaining an integrated approach between relevant 
stakeholders. However, as mentioned in para. 1.3, and from the researcher’s extensive 
experience in copper theft investigations, a significant shortcoming in the policing of 
copper theft is that the SAPS and all other stakeholders that form part of the NFMCCC 
address copper theft in isolation and do not holistically engage with other stakeholders 
in the copper industry to identify policing strategies to curb copper theft. As a result, 
the SAPS, and stakeholders in the copper industry work in silos resulting in non-
sharing of crime information, crucial evidence being lost, and being unaware of similar 
cases that could be linked. Van Dalen (2017), as noted in para. 1.3, further points to 
the outcome of a Commission of Enquiry and Task Team on Copper Theft stating that 
copper theft should be addressed immediately using a focused approach. 
 
In addition, SAPS Circular 2/28/23 of 2011 (par.3) (SAPS, 2011b), as referenced in para. 
2.5.2, mandates the NFMCCC to actively address the theft of non-ferrous metals, 
highlighting the implementation of a joint venture between the relevant stakeholders to 
effectively address crime pertaining to non-ferrous metals on a national and provincial 
level, and the importance of co-ordinated integrated crime combating operations that 
focus on the suppliers/dealers and end-users. 
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Participants acknowledged the sharing of information at NFMCCC meetings; however, 
opine that information is primarily restricted to non-ferrous metals-related crime 
statistics, and not on developing an integrated strategy that is critically needed.  
5.4.8 Theme 8:  Operational relationship between the NFMCCC and other 
  stakeholders 
The SAPS Circular 2/28/23 of 2011 (par.3), as mentioned in para. 2.5.2, prescribes 
that the NFMCCC must implement a joint venture between the relevant stakeholders 
to effectively address crime relating to non-ferrous metals on a national and provincial 
level. 
It appeared from discussions with participants that the operational relationship 
between the NFMCCC and other stakeholders was either passive, not so good or 
effective to a certain extent, depending on the region or the specific provincial 
NFMCCC representative. Participants' opine that SAPS members are not familiar with 
the Criminal Matters Amendment Act and its effect on copper cable theft, which has 
led to a power-play between the SAPS and the parastatals.  
5.4.9 Theme 9:   Factors hindering the successful implementation of  
   policing strategies implemented by the NFMCCC to  
   address copper cable theft   
Participants identified an array of shortcomings in terms of staff available to address 
copper cable theft efficiently. These shortcomings include a lack of trained and 
committed SAPS members, which negatively influences information-driven operations 
to combat copper cable theft in South Africa. Power struggles between certain role-
players were also identified as problematic. All participants further identified a lack of 
training as having a negative effect on the combatting of copper cable in South Africa. 
In addition, participants made it clear that there is a lack of proper communication 
before, during and after information-driven operations in relation to copper theft.  
 
Although information sharing is a primary objective for co-operation, and the NFMCCC 
provides the opportunity to share information, there were concerns from some 
participants that information sharing does not go beyond taking note of crime statistics 
and that members are hesitant to share crucial information about operations. Others 
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are positive about the opportunity to share information but still express concern over 
its practical implementation.  
 
It further appeared that because of poor communication of crime information and data, 
(specifically in covert operations) and mistrust between the relevant role-players, 
effective information-driven operations are challenging to plan and execute.  
5.4.10 Theme 10:   The NFMCCC monitoring and co-ordinating crime  
   combating operations in an integrated manner 
According to Bindeman (2013:1), as per para. 2.5.2, the NFMCCC holds national and 
provincial meetings aimed at preventing non-ferrous metal thefts across South Africa. 
These meetings are currently also conducted quarterly at the station level, proving the 
SAPS’s commitment to stopping non-ferrous metal theft. According to the SAPS Circular 
2/28/23 of 2011 (par.3) (SAPS, 2011b), as per para. 2.5.2, the NFMCCC is responsible 
for co-ordinating integrated crime combating operations that focus on the 
suppliers/dealers and end-users. 
 
Some participants were pessimistic about the integration of crime operations, while 
others acknowledged that the NFMCCC serves to integrate information from different 
stakeholders, but those operations are not managed in an integrated manner. The 
majority of participants had a negative perception surrounding the co-ordination of 
operations by the NFMCCC.  
 
5.5 SAMPLE GROUP D – MPUMALANGA AND GAUTENG PROVINCIAL 
NFMCCC 
5.5.1 Theme 1:  Participant perceptions of the aims and objectives of the 
   NFMCCC 
The SAPS Annual Report of 2016/2017 (SAPS, 2017:122), as referred to in para. 1.2, 
stipulates that Second-Hand Goods Dealers Forums have been established in majority 
policing areas to reduce property-related crimes through information sharing and serve 
as a platform to establish good co-operation and communication between the SAPS 
and the second-hand goods industry. Moreover, the SAPS Annual Report of 
2014/2015 (SAPS, 2015:156), discussed in para. 1.3, further illustrates some of the 
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SAPS Second-Hand Goods Control Section’s responsibilities, namely, monitoring 
investigations concerning non-ferrous metals-related crimes, and maintaining fixed 
structures on national and provincial levels and conducting a non-ferrous metals 
analysis to determine crime threat tendencies. 
 
Moreover, the strategic objectives of the NFMCCC, as illustrated in para. 3.3.1, 
stipulate that the Forum should co-ordinate and consolidate the government’s effort in 
combating theft and illicit trade in ferrous and non-ferrous metals in partnership with 
affected industries. In addition, the NFMCCC is to co-ordinate and monitor all role-
players to mitigate theft and illicit trade in ferrous and non-ferrous metals across the 
illicit value chain. 
 
Sample group D confirmed ineffective co-operation between SAPS and relevant 
enterprises in the fight against copper cable theft.  
5.5.2 Theme 2:   Negative or doubtful that the Forum achieve its aims and 
  objectives  
As stated in the SAPS Annual Report of 2014/2015 (SAPS, 2015:158), which is 
referred to in para. 1.3, an increase of non-ferrous metals-related crimes has raised 
concerns about its impact on South Africa’s economy, society, and critical 
infrastructure which, in particular, impact various industries, including local 
government, energy, transport and mining. The theft of non-ferrous metals, copper, 
and aluminium is further emphasised by Van den Berg (2007) as discussed in para. 
1.3, who states that non-ferrous metal theft had escalated to such an extent that losses 
run into millions of Rand annually. These concerns raise the question of whether the 
NFMCCC is achieving its aims and objectives. 
 
The majority of participants believed that the NFMCCC currently does not achieve its 
aims and objectives.  
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5.5.3 Theme 3:   Perceptions of planned intervention strategies of the  
  NFMCCC to combat copper cable theft in South Africa 
As stated by Arendse (2010:39), in para. 3.1, the NFMCCC identifies trends, gives 
strategic guidance and co-ordinates operations. The strategic objectives of the 
NFMCCC further require consultation and communication with stakeholders.  
 
It arose from discussions with participants that the NFMCCC planned intervention 
strategies to combat copper cable theft in South Africa are not consulted at all levels, 
particularly not at the grass-roots level.  
5.5.4 Theme 4:  NFMCCC’s engagement in multi-faceted cooperative  
  relationships, interaction and working agreements with  
  stakeholders 
The SAPS Annual Report of 2014/2015 (SAPS, 2015:156), as presented in para. 1.3, 
emphasises that the SAPS Second-Hand Goods Control Section, which is the 
custodian of the NFMCCC, is responsible for sustaining an integrated approach 
between stakeholders to address non-ferrous metal crimes. Moreover, the strategic 
objectives, as per para. 3.1, further emphasise that the NFMCCC should co-ordinate 
and monitor all role-players to mitigate theft and illicit trade in ferrous and non-ferrous 
metals. 
 
The participants believed that there is a good working relationship from time to time, 
specifically in the hotspot areas. However, they advised that the strategy be revisited 
and include a memorandum of understanding to improve communication in the multi-
faceted interaction with stakeholders. Participants also indicated positive, co-operative 
relationships, but were overall referring to monthly meetings where information is 
shared, and sometimes planning occurs.  
Another participant acknowledged relationships and/or agreements in the NFMCCC; 
however, he questioned the implementation of strategies: “The link is there, but the 
plans and the execution to get to the strategies and the goals are not there.” 
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5.5.5 Theme 5:   Diverse experiences of operational relationships between 
  the NFMCCC and other stakeholders 
The importance of implementing and maintaining operational relationships between 
the NFMCCC and other stakeholders has been emphasised in paras. 1.2; 2.5.1; 2.5.2; 
and 3.1.  
 
Linking to the previous theme, participants elaborated on the relationship between the 
NFMCCC and other stakeholders. Although positive responses emerged about the 
relationship and interactions between NFMCCC members represented at the Forum 
meetings, the operational relationships and execution thereof were experienced as 
ineffective by some participants.  
 
Participant also highlighted the lack of operational relationships between the NFMCCC 
and other stakeholders at the grass-roots level. These participants highlighted 
disagreements between SAPS and stakeholders as a primary factor inhibiting the 
success of the NFMCCC. 
5.5.6 Theme 6:   Factors that hinder the successful implementation of  
  policing strategies implemented by the NFMCCC 
The strategic objectives of the NFMCCC (specifically to implement efficient policing 
strategies to combat copper cable theft) have been illustrated in paras. 2.5.2 and 3.3.1. 
Moreover, challenges that exist to address copper cable theft effectively are 
demonstrated in paras. 2.2.1, and 3.3. 
 
From discussions with participants, a lack of persistence and trustworthiness between 
stakeholders and the SAPS and power struggles influence the successful 
implementation of policing strategies implemented by the NFMCCC. However, various 
participants made it clear that they attempt to implement new ideas to enhance the 
effectiveness of policing strategies with a pro-active approach to preventing copper 
cable theft in South Africa. Participants indicated that the mandate of the NFMCCC, 
who functions under the SAPS Division Visible Policing is not always clear to the 
detectives, because the SAPS Visible Policing Division regards their mandate as 
ensuring compliance in terms of sec. 28(1) of the Second-Hand Goods Act 6 of 2009, 
but detectives do not usually see copper cable theft as their priority.  
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Participants were further of the opinion that the absence of senior officers and senior 
personnel to serve on the NFMCCC and too many other tasks cause a lack of 
commitment and distraction from the focus of combating copper cable theft.  
 
Additionally, all participants acknowledge the importance of sharing crime information 
using formal procedures, but diverse responses emerged regarding what this entails 
and the exact procedures to follow. A recurrent theme that emerged during the in-
depth interviews is that the Forum provides an opportunity to share statistical 
information about copper cable crime-related incidents; however, the information is not 
used to plan or evaluate specific strategic interventions. Some participants argued a 
lack of trust between the Forum members and a fear that corrupt officials will leak 
information.  
 
Another participant summarised his perception concerning the lack of shared crime 
information related to copper theft: “The effect of not sharing is a matter of the left arm 
doesn’t know what the right arm is doing, and it will have a negative impact on 
eventually apprehended suspects as well as successful prosecution.” Participants 
further concur that copper-related crime information is only shared on a need-to-know 
basis by the NFMCCC and only to top management due to mistrust and corruption 
internally and externally. Participants also referred to a lack of 
competent/knowledgeable SAPS members and a lack of investigation vehicles as 
issues that prevent successful operations. 
5.5.7 Theme 7:  Perceptions on the NFMCCC’s continuous evaluation and 
  adaption, development, and implementation of strategies 
  to address identified shortcomings to improve on existing 
  strategies 
The monitoring of investigations pertaining to non-ferrous metals-related crimes and 
conducting a non-ferrous metals analysis to determine crime threat tendencies by the 
SAPS Second-Hand Goods Control Section is confirmed in the SAPS Annual Report 
of 2014/2015 (SAPS, 2015:156), and mentioned in para. 1.3.   
Participants had diverse perceptions of whether the NFMCCC continuously evaluates, 
adapts, develops, and implements strategies to address identified shortcomings or 
improve existing strategies. It emerged from the interviews that feedback is done at 
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the NFMCCC meetings, but that the focus is on statistics, but not on the conviction 
rate of copper cable theft in South Africa: “Feedback is done on the monthly meetings. 
Another problem that is experienced is that there are always different representatives 
from the different entities attending the meetings. There is not a continuous flow of 
processes every month.” However, some participants indicated an evaluation of 
policing strategies and demonstrated that they are looking at new strategies 
specifically in Mpumalanga, which will be based on incident rates.  
 
Other participants believed that crime threat analysis to determine copper cable theft 
trends and subsequent action by the NFMCCC’s was the responsibility of Crime 
Intelligence (CI). Comparisons are then shared at the NFMCCC meetings. 
 
One participant thought that proper evaluation and adaptation of strategies is not 
happening since crime information and data are often outdated because meetings 
occur only once per month.  
5.5.8 Theme 8:  NFMCCC’s monitoring and co-ordinating of crime   
  combating operations 
The NFMCCC’s responsibility to monitor and co-ordinate crime combating operations 
has been illustrated in para. 2.5.2 and 3.3.1. 
 
From the interviews conducted it appears as if the NFMCCC does not always monitor 
and co-ordinate crime combating operations and often leaves it to the parastatals who 
do not have the power to arrest resulting in conflicts between the stakeholders and the 
SAPS. 
 
There was a general uncertainty among participants about the NFMCCC’s monitoring 
and co-ordination of operations and queries as to the SAPS mandate in this regard.  
5.5.9 Theme 9:  Perceptions about an efficient link between NFMCCC,  
  police stations, government departments and other  
  stakeholders 
The responsibility of implementing and sustaining multi-faceted co-operative 
relationships, interaction and working agreements with stakeholders by the NFMCCC 
is emphasised in para. 1.2, 2.5.1, 2.5.2 and 3.3.1. 
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It transpired from the interviews with participants that a link exists between the 
NFMCCC, police stations, government departments and other stakeholders; however, 
it is not optimally utilised.  
5.5.10 Theme 10: Functionality of the NFMCCC 
The following functions of the SAPS Second-Hand Goods Control Section (custodian 
of the NFMCCC) are stipulated in the SAPS Annual Report of 2014/2015 (SAPS, 
2015:156) discussed in para. 1.2: 
o Maintaining governance in co-operation with SAPS Legal Services. 
o Maintaining National and Provincial NFMCCCs.  
o Maintaining mechanisms, such as training for the effective identification of non-
ferrous metals. 
o Sustaining an integrated approach between relevant stakeholders. 
o Co-ordinating compliance and crime combating operations.  
o Monitoring the import and export of non-ferrous metal. 
o Monitoring investigations pertaining to non-ferrous metals-related crimes. 
o Maintaining fixed structures on national and provincial levels and conducting a 
non-ferrous metals analysis to determine crime threat tendencies. 
The overall perception of participants was that the NFMCCC was partially functional. 
The Forum serves as a platform for information sharing and networking with external 
stakeholders, but the operational part is ineffective, which results in shortcomings as 
previously discussed in earlier chapters. 
5.6  SUMMARY 
This chapter interpreted the research findings from the in-depth interviews conducted 
with awaiting trial detainees charged with copper theft incidents at Pollsmoor 
Correctional Centre, Western Cape; Mpumalanga Provincial NFMCCC and Gauteng 
Provincial NFMCCC, BACSA, and CPI, respectively. A summary of the literature 
perused in chapter one to three, was presented. The research findings were classified 
into the themes as categorised in chapter four. The interview results were condensed, 
and the research findings and literature revealed the impact of the NFMCCC on the 
combating of copper cable theft in South Africa (or the lack thereof in some cases).  
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Chapter six recaps chapters one to five, and the pertinent issues are applied to reach 
conclusions. Recommendations will be made concerning the critical research findings 
highlighting the value and importance of a systematic pro-active plan that presents 
practical solutions for copper cable theft in South Africa.  
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter commences with a summation of chapters one to five, after which the 
interpretations from chapter five are considered, and inferences presented. 
Consequently, recommendations will be formulated based on the key findings from the 
themes and sub-themes explored in chapter four to contribute to the body of 
knowledge about the combating of copper cable theft. 
 
Recommendations made in this chapter could contribute to the mitigation of copper 
cable theft in South Africa. This study is significant because it explores the NFMCCC’s 
impact on copper cable theft and provides recommendations to enhance its functional 
capacity. Consequently, a systematic pro-active plan for the reduction of copper cable 
theft in South Africa is proposed. This plan realistically presents real-world answers to 
reduce copper cable theft and thus advances the current knowledge on copper cable 
theft in South Africa. 
6.2  A SYNOPSIS OF THE FOREGOING CHAPTERS 
Chapter one presented the study's general orientation, set out the methodological 
parameters, and began introducing the study. The identified problem statement paved 
the way for the subsequent research aim, namely, to evaluate the impact of the 
NFMCCC on the combating of copper cable theft in South Africa. The objectives of the 
study which originated from the research problem and research aim then followed.  
 
The aim of this study was achieved; namely, to evaluate the impact of the NFMCCC 
on the combating of copper cable theft, with the purpose of: 
o Describing the extent and impact of copper cable theft in South Africa. 
o Describing the impact of the NFMCCC on the combating of copper cable theft. 
o Exploring the co-operation between government and industry stakeholders - who 
form part of the NFMCCC - to combat copper cable theft. 
o Investigating factors that hinder the implementation of effective policing strategies 
to address copper cable theft. 
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o Examining the current policing strategies to address copper cable theft. 
o Examining international best practices to address copper cable theft. 
 
 The following research question was resolved in this study:  
What is the impact of the NFMCCC on the combating of copper cable theft? 
 
The following additional research questions were formulated and answered in this 
study: 
o What is the extent and impact of copper cable theft in South Africa? 
o Is the NFMCCC effective in addressing copper cable theft? 
o Do government and industry stakeholders - who form part of the NFMCCC - 
efficiently engage in co-operative relationships to combat copper cable theft? 
o What factors hinder the implementation of effective policing strategies to address 
copper cable theft? 
o What policing strategies are currently implemented to address copper cable theft? 
o Could current policing strategies that address copper cable theft be enhanced?  
o What international best practices address copper cable theft? 
 
The researcher explored the views of awaiting trial detainees charged with incidents 
of theft (of copper) at Pollsmoor Correctional Centre in the Western Cape; 
representatives from Mpumalanga Provincial and Gauteng Provincial NFMCCC, 
representatives from BACSA, and CPI. In-depth interviews were conducted with these 
participants. The chapter also clarified the crucial theoretical terminology used in this 
study. The methodological parameters were delineated and included an outline of the 
study's explorative nature, the research approach and design, data collection and 
analysis methods, ethical considerations, and the procedures followed to guarantee 
trustworthiness. 
 
Chapter two offered a comprehensive overview of the magnitude of copper cable theft 
in South Africa. The chapter then highlighted the impact of copper cable theft in South 
Africa, paying specific attention to the economy, transportation, telecommunication, 
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agriculture, electricity supply, and critical infrastructure. A discussion of copper cable 
theft globally then followed, highlighting copper cable theft trends in specific countries.  
 
Chapter three commenced with a presentation of legislation focusing on the most 
prominent legislation governing copper cable theft in South Africa. Prominent role-
players in the combating of copper cable theft in South Africa were furthermore 
identified. The chapter concluded by presenting various strategies implemented by 
selected international jurisdictions to prevent copper cable theft that could act as best 
practices in addressing the research problem.  
 
Chapter four theorised the participants' experiences and opinions and permitted the 
reader to gain rich insight into the collected data originating from the in-depth 
interviews. Tendencies and patterns were categorised through themes and sub-
themes that developed from the detailed interviews. Direct verbatim quotations were 
used to demonstrate the participants’ responses to the themes and sub-themes.  
 
Chapter five dealt with the interpretation of the results presented in chapter four. The 
basis of this chapter was the themes and sub-themes that originated during the in-
depth interviews. As discussed in chapter four, each theme was presented and 
reinforced with the literature from chapters one to three to evaluate the impact of the 
NFMCCC on combating copper cable theft in South Africa. 
6.3  RECOMMENDATIONS  
Copper cable theft has created profound safety, economic and service delivery 
challenges for all sectors in South Africa. The analysis and interpretation of research 
findings revealed that the NFMCCC has numerous shortcomings and faces various 
challenges which influence its ability to address copper cable theft. The researcher 
proposes a systematic pro-active plan to reduce copper cable theft in South Africa. 
The recommendations are founded on in-depth interviews with research participants 
and national and international literature reviewed earlier in the study. In addition, the 
successes and shortcomings of theft reduction programmes implemented in the USA, 
UK, France, Italy, Germany, and Bulgaria as a response to copper cable theft were 
explored and may serve as best practices for South Africa. 
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These recommendations could be considered for implementation in other countries; 
however, they should be adapted according to each countries’ particular situation. 
Each of the suggested theft mitigation measures should be evaluated and validated 
before implementation. Best practices implemented in the USA, UK, France, Italy, 
Germany, and Bulgaria to mitigate copper cable theft have proven that this 
phenomenon typically requires a combination of measures to be efficient. Sharing best 
practices and crime information, and collaboration among law enforcement and the 
various affected role-players is essential to mitigate copper cable theft. 
6.3.1 Recommendations for the South African Police Service 
i. A specialised police unit with the sole mandate to mitigate and investigate copper 
cable theft could produce better outcomes for combating this crime, rather than a 
generalised approach. Such a unit could enhance responsiveness and 
effectiveness in dealing with copper cable theft. It is recommended that the 
NFMCCC should be replaced with a specialised SAPS Non-Ferrous Metals Theft 
Unit that could reduce copper cable theft. Consequently, this unit could dedicate its 
time and resources to the mitigation of copper cable theft. The mitigation of copper 
cable theft should be based on pro-active measures.  
ii. These pro-active measures should be based on intelligence-led policing by 
establishing active informer networks, efficient copper theft crime analysis and the 
timeous communication and sharing of crime information. Subsequently, the SAPS 
Non-Ferrous Metal Theft Unit could act pro-actively to identify copper cable thieves 
and prevent these crimes. Currently, the SAPS do not utilise crime intelligence to 
its fullest potential to inform a precise and efficient intelligence-led approach to 
address copper cable theft, but mainly follow a reactive approach to police copper 
cable theft. Copper cable thieves and syndicates have become ever more 
organised in their criminal behaviour, necessitating that the police act strategically 
and in an effective and well-organised manner. Thus, it is further suggested that 
copper cable theft be addressed using pro-active gathering and analysis of crime 
information.  
iii. Intelligence analysis and co-ordination of copper cable theft incidents should be 
enhanced. Analysis of intelligence should focus on outcomes, such as criminal and 
behavioural analysis, risk factors and risk assessments, and escalation patterns to 
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mitigate copper cable theft, emphasising prevention. The enhancement of 
intelligence analysis would enable the identification of modus operandi. 
iv. Strategic partnerships between the police and all role-players should be revitalised. 
Joint ventures between the proposed SAPS Non-Ferrous Metal Theft Unit, various 
industry sectors affected by copper cable theft and private security should be 
increased and strengthened. The Italian government developed an innovative and 
co-operative programme involving a selection of the principal role-players in their 
attempt to mitigate copper theft. The National Monitoring Centre on Copper Theft 
was founded in Italy and was intended to improve collaboration among law 
enforcement bodies and the organisations usually subjected to copper theft. The 
UK created a National Metal Theft Task Force and designated the BTP as the lead 
agency. These initiatives are relatively similar to South Africa’s NFMCCC. 
However, it is recommended that a theft monitoring system - under the 
guardianship of the proposed SAPS Non-Ferrous Metal Theft Unit - be introduced 
to improve collaboration and information-sharing among the relevant role-players. 
Industry sectors affected by copper cable theft and private security companies are 
valuable sources of information. Consequently, effective, and efficient co-operation 
between the proposed SAPS Non-Ferrous Metal Theft Unit and the affected 
industry sectors could enhance their impact on copper cable theft through 
intelligence-led interventions. 
v. Implementing a specialised SAPS Non-Ferrous Metal Theft Unit, and substituting 
the NFMCCC, could more effectively build and enhance collaborative relationships, 
enhance information sharing between role-players, and operationalise initiatives to 
address non-ferrous metal-related crime. Ultimately, improved information sharing 
could improve the detection of copper cable theft incidents, catalysing the overall 
reduction of copper theft.  
vi. A SAPS Non-Ferrous Metal Theft Unit exclusively mandated to prevent and 
investigate copper cable theft would be better positioned to intensify copper cable 
crime combating operations in collaboration with relevant entities affected by 
copper cable theft and private security organisations.  
vii. Relevant role-players should be educated on the legislation governing copper cable 
theft. SAPS members and the proposed SAPS Non-Ferrous Metal Theft Unit 
should undergo regular refresher training that addresses all relevant legislation 
governing copper cable theft. Continuous training would empower the members to 
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keep up to date with specific laws and ensure that they understand legislative 
aspects relating to copper cable theft.  
viii. The proposed SAPS Non-Ferrous Metal Theft Unit should conduct intensified 
intelligence-led operations at scrap metal dealers. These operations would identify 
corrupt scrap dealers and afford legitimate dealers an opportunity to educate 
themselves about their industry's relevant legislation.  
ix. The SAPS Non-Ferrous Metal Theft Unit should be resourced and capacitated to 
optimise copper cable theft prevention and investigation. Expanding the capacity 
and professionalism of the Unit should be a SAPS priority. 
6.3.2 Recommendations for utility companies on hardening copper cable 
 theft targets  
Utility companies significantly impacted by copper cable theft, such as PRASA, 
Telkom, and Eskom should apply unique markings to their copper cables using 
innovative identification methods. The use of nanotechnology, for example, micro-
dotting4 would, simplify the identification of company-owned copper cables, assist in 
the recovery of copper cables, support the police with convictions, lessen the incentive 
to buy stolen copper cables and make it increasingly difficult for copper thieves to sell 
the stolen copper.  
 
These utility companies could, in addition to the above measures, implement target 
hardening measures to mitigate copper cable theft further: 
o Install detection, alarm and surveillance systems that persistently monitor high risk 
and remote sites in real-time. Surveillance systems are currently used with 
remarkable success by the private security company, CPI. These systems create 
instant alerts to police and private security companies when a trespasser is 
detected and enable rapid response to apprehend copper thieves. Other target 
hardening measures that could be considered and intensified are infrared detectors 
and security cameras, roaming security patrols, and copper substitutes where 
                                            
4  A process whereby numerous microscopic dots is sprayed on different places of a particular surface 
leaving permanent marks on the surface. Microdots can only be detected by means of specialised 
equipment such an ultraviolet light and magnifier lamp.  
190 
possible (for example, copperweld5). Replacement products, such as copperweld, 
would prevent copper cable thieves from profiting from copper's high-value. 
However, utility companies should advise prospective copper cable thieves through 
media campaigns of the low value of copperweld. These target hardening 
measures would increase the effort required to steal copper cables.  
o Similarly to the USA, South Africa should implement a theft alerts website or mobile 
application through the proposed SAPS Non-Ferrous Metal Theft Unit. It would 
permit scrap metal dealers to collaborate with the police, private security 
companies and utility companies, by reporting suspected copper cable thefts and 
circulating crime information through the SAPS Non-Ferrous Metal Theft Unit. 
These copper cable theft incidents should first be evaluated and confirmed by this 
Unit before being disseminated to all registered subscribers within a specific range 
of the crime site. 
o Private security providers should perform regular risk assessments and based 
thereon enhance their security measures and tactics. 
6.3.3 Recommendations enforcing firmer legislation regulating licensed 
 scrap metal dealers 
i. South Africa should, like measures implemented in the USA, UK and France enact 
firmer legislation regulating licensed scrap metal dealers operational in South 
Africa. Thus, it is recommended that the Second-Hand Goods Control Act 6 of 2009 
be amended to include increased record keeping and penalties for non-compliant 
scrap dealers. These increased transaction trails and harsher punishments should 
compel scrap metal dealers to obtain identification from copper sellers, record the 
registration number of the vehicle the seller is driving, retain purchase records for 
at least two years, ban recyclers from making cash transactions exceeding a certain 
amount, and impose substantial fines for violators. Payments should only be made 
by electronic funds transfer or direct debit or credit transactions.  
                                            
5  Using an exclusive high-heat, high-pressure process, Copperweld permanently link high-strength steel 
or aluminium and copper. The copper shields the core metal from corrosion, and the core reinforces 
the copper offering the same electrical performance as solid copper and the strength of steel or 
aluminium. Copperweld’s permanently bonded copper covering can never be returned to virgin copper, 
making its conductors uninviting to metal recyclers and fruitless for copper thieves. Copperweld® brand 
products are manufactured solely by Copperweld Bimetallics in the USA. 
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ii. Moreover, the Second-Hand Goods Control Act 6 of 2009 should compel second-
hand scrap metal dealers to obtain a written statement from copper suppliers 
confirming lawful ownership to sell copper. In addition to these measures, this Act 
should also force second-hand metal dealers to install CCTV cameras on their 
premises to obtain footage of copper vendors and the traded copper products as 
record-keeping for police inspections.  
 
These measures would deter copper cable thieves from selling stolen cable to scrap 
metal dealers for fear of being identified and linked to stolen copper cable. In addition, 
prospective copper cable thieves and scrap metal dealers would be aware that copper 
cables are identifiable by the SAPS. 
6.4  CONCLUSION 
The research findings indicate various shortcomings limiting the NFMCCC’s 
effectiveness and its impact on copper cable theft. The SAPS plan to establish a forum 
addressing copper cable theft in South Africa is encouraging; however, this forum's 
impact on copper cable theft does not achieve the desired results. It is suggested that 
the SAPS evaluate the constraints, shortcomings and challenges experienced by the 
NFMCCC to enhance the impact on copper cable theft. Consequently, the functioning 
of the NFMCCC in its current format cannot be justified, hence the recommendation 
that the NFMCCC be replaced with a specialised SAPS Non-Ferrous Metals Theft Unit 
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